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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS 
Indian philosophers from the earliest times have 
strived to realize the true nature of man, in the perspective 
of his physical existence. A person is a persistent self-
conscious being as is evident in his reflections 'I am', 
'I exist' and so on, and is opposed to the objective world 
which is experienced by him. A person is a subject of reference. 
The classic definition of a 'person' is given by BoethiUB: 
'person is an individual substance of rational nature. As 
individual, it is material, since matter supplies the principle 
of individuation. The soul is not person, only the composite 
is. Man alone is among the material beings 'person', he alone 
having a rational nature. He is the highest of the material 
beings endowed with particular dignity and rights'. (The 
Dictionary of Philosophy ed. by Dagobert D. Runes. Ph.D. London, 
Peter Owen - Vision Press. p. 229). 
The present endeavour is a critical study of the conception 
of human personality as has been formulated mainly in the 
~lassical Sa~khya and Advaita-Vedanta systems of Indian 
Philosophy. Both these systems owe their origin to the Vedic 
and Upani~adic literature. In the classical stage Advaita-
Vedanta and SaTkhya developed into two parallel systems confronting 
each other. It is my aim to discuss how far these two systems 
agree or disagree regarding the conception of human personality 
and how far the respective system has succeeded in giving a 
plausible explanation of the empirical existence. 
In the Introductory Chapter (Chapter I), I have proposed 
the comparative and critical study of the general conception of 
human personality in Indian philosophy. 
. ( V-) 
Second Chapter deals with the conception of human 
personality in the Advaita-Vedanta system. As a pre-history 
to the emergence of the Advaita concept, the vedic and post-
vedic conception of human personality has been discussed. 
This chapter subsequently deals with the developement of 
Advaita conception of human personality through the sucessive 
stages of Gau..c;Iapada's Ma!fc;lukya-Ka.rika and Badavayaq.a's Vedanta-
/ 
~ Sutras - finally into the Advaita-Vedanta of Samka~acharya. 
Third chapter deals with the dualistic preachings that 
can be traced in the Vedic literature. It also deals with the 
Sa~khya views in the Caraka-Samhita and in the Epics. Finally, 
I have discussed the Classical Sa~khya conception of human 
personality (as in I~vara~~f.la's Sal!lkhya-Karika.; Yuktidlpika 
and in the Sa~khya-sutras). 
Last chapter is devoted to a comparative study of the 
classical Sa~khya and the Advaita-Vedanta views -where I have 
tried mainly to bring out the points of agreement and 
disagreement regarding their ideas of the different aspects of 
human personality. 
I have arrived at the conclusion that the conception 
of human personality in these two systems has evolved from the 
same source though they followed two different lines of 
systematization. Thus, there is a great deal of affinity 
between them, yet they differ regarding the conception of the 
essential reality in man. It is regarded as the highest reality 
in both the systems. Both Sa~khya and Advaita Vedanta posit 
a transcendental self, the essence of which is pure consciousness 
unadulterated by qualities and empirical relations - over and 
(vi) 
above the empirical self. While Advaita-Vedanta believes in 
the reality of the transcendental self only, Sa~khya believes 
in the reality of the transcendental self and the objective 
world. There are certain weak points in both the systems. 
The analysis shows that both Sa~khya and Advaita Vedanta, in 
their attempt to rescue the empirical self from the bondage 
of personality - have succeed~only in blighting the prospects 
of liberation and almost depersonalising the person. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The concept of 'Human Personality' invariably involves 
the human 'person' to whom it belongs. A person himself 
appears to be a speck in the cosmic dust. Yet he seems 
to have infinite creative power, somehow working through 
a finite physical body. A person is an experiencing subject. 
"St. Thomas gave the definition of 'person' as 'a distinct 
subsistent in an intellectual nature.' The person is first 
of all an intellectual indivdual, but what characterizes 
him is his distinct subsistence, concious of himself and 
opposed to others. There have been different views regarding 
the nature of his personality. Some conceived it as a kind 
of special mode, qualifying either the essence or the existence, 
others confused it with individuality, while yet others 
identified it with existence, either as opposed to or as 
inclusive of the proper essence. However, all agreed that 
person is the highest ontological value, 'perfectissimum quid 
in natura', the most perfect aspect of the self manifestation 
of being."(l) 
A person is a persistent self-conscious being as is 
evident in his reflections 'I am' 'I exist' etc. Moreover, 
a person is opposed to the objective world, experienced by 
him. Standing in the ·midst of beings, yet transcending them 
all, the (human) 'person' presents a peculiar aspect of reality. 
It is not a thing among other things. It is a subject of 
reference. He is not a thing, but he by whom and for whom a 
thing is and he is for himself. In this sense a 'person' is 
opposed to mere being. If man is merely the mechanical or the 
organic body, he appears to be, how can he be the creator of 
-2.;. 
this vast civilization? A creative being must be a free 
being. If he is only the physical body, -- from where does 
he derive the freedom? It suggests that his being is rooted 
in something great and infinite. The philosophers, from the 
earliest days have strived to determine the true nature of 
a human individual (or person) who seems to be determined by 
the physical body yet who asserts his freedom and individuality 
at the same time. 
The individual person stands self-proved and is always 
immediately felt and known. One is absolutely certain about 
the existence of one's own being and there can be neither doubt 
nor denial about it. Vacaspatimisra remarks in the Bhamatitika-
no. kasci t sandigdhe ahamasm.i n.a va_. (no one ever doubts I am 
or not). This person I am conscious of as 'me' is the emperical 
person manifested in the physical body as a persistent 
experiencing subject, as well as thinking, feeling, willing, 
endeavouring to attain the desirable and has aversion from the 
undesirable. Moreover, the person who asserts himself as a 
subject, is opposed tothe objective externaltworld and always 
tries to determine his true reality. We are concerned here 
with this empirical personality only. 
The conception of human personality in Indian philosophy 
is inextricably entwined with the conception of an important 
distinction betweenthe empirical person and the transcendental 
self. This distenction is most rigidly maintained in the A.V. 
and the Sa~khya systems. These two systems though differing 
in many vital and fundamental aspects, have however met at 
this one important point that the empirical person is not the 
transcendental self,and that a transcendental self must be 
-}-
posited in order to justify the very possibility of the 
empirical self. According to these two systems the 'person~ 
properly speakingJis the empirical self. 
The Nyaya-vaisesika system is the most consistent advocate 
r 
of a personal self and the personal God. In its view, which 
is vigorously persued by its supporters) God is as much a 
person as an individual self, and that both are real persons. 
Here atman is one of the nine fundamental realities falling 
under the category of 'substance'. Hence, in the enumeration 
of fundamental substances1 God or Paramatman has found no 
special mention but is included in the class of atman. 
- , - . In Nyayadarsana, atman 1s defined thus -- icchadvesa-
prajatna-sukha-dupkha-jna-nani atmano liQgam. (ND. I.l.lO) __ 
- -------~------~=---
"will, aversion, endeavour, pleasure, pain and knowledge are 
the essential characteristics of a person". Thus NV., unlike 
AV., and Sa~khya, believes in a personal self who is a real 
empirical subject experiencing both the subjective and the 
objective worlds. He has the will to do, to attain the 
desirable and to avoid the undesirable. He exerts himself 
for this purpose. He feels both pleasure and pain. The 
agreeable is sought to be attained and the disagreeable is 
sought to be shunned. And above all he is the knower. These 
are the specific qualities of atman, which characterizes him 
as a person and hence constitute his personality. There 
are three other specific qualities -- namely merit, demerit 
and memory -- impressions (dharma, adharma and bhavana). But 
these are imperceptible properties which can only be inferred. 
God or Paramatman has however only three special properties, 
namely will, exertion and knowledge. 
-4-
The personal character of atman in the NV. System is 
further emphasized by its well-known epistemic tenet, that 
atman is not directly self-conscious in itself but can be 
known only through mental per .. ·•ception in relation to one 
of its appropriate specific qualities. In other words the 
self can be known only as the possessor of one of these 
qualities. The pure substratum bereft of qualities is beyond 
the ken of perception. So the self-cognitive perceptual 
judgement necessarily takes such forms as 'Iknow', 'I do', 
'I am happy' and so on. Thus Visvanatha observes in 
Siddhantamuktavali - the atman can be perceived only in 
relation to the appropriate special qualities like knowledge, 
pleasure, etc, and not otherwise, as it appears, 'I know', 
'Ido', and so on. ( 2 ) Among the three special qualities, presence 
of merit and demerit are necessary for the moral evaluation 
of a person. The continuity of past impressions (bhavana) 
suggest the continuity of being. Thus we get a realistic 
definition of an empirial person, who is essentially an 
experienceing intellectual subject. He experiences both the 
external and internal objects. Without the reality of the 
objective world, the reality of the experiencer becomes logically 
illegitimate. Thus, the external world of experience must be 
real. Nyaya is the only system where we get a full consistent 
definition of the empirical person, as Nyaya believes in the 
reality of subjective person responding to the reality of the 
objective world. 
In the pragmatic world, we have seen that the existence 
of a thinking feeling and willing person is undeniable. Thus, 
every system has to explain the fact of experience of an 
empirical being, and to do that they had to resort to various 
-5-
hypot~is in accordance with the respective fundamental 
postures of their respective philosphical systems. Unlike 
the NV. system, both the Sa~khya and the AV. posit a 
transcendental self, the essence of which is pure conscious-
ness, unadalterated by qualities and empirical relations, --
over and above the empirical self. 
According to AV/ 'jlva' or the individual personality 
comprises of a subject-~bject complex. Its subject element 
is pure conciousness and is called(Saksin: Its object 
element is the internal organ called the 'antahkarana' 
' •J 
(i.e. mind or intelligence), which as a mode of material 
existence, undergoes consta.tilt configurations (_v:rtti) through 
its contact with the external objects. According to AV. the 
entire universe except 'pure consciousness' (Brahma~ is 
illusory. Hence, antahkar~a together with its 
contact with the external world is also a projection of avidya, 
the positive principle of cosmic illusion and as such it is 
unreal. Hence, it follows thtitjlva or the personal empirical 
self is not a basic reality. According to AV it is only the 
-
empirical self or 'jLvatman', which enters into a supject-
object relation involved in every fact of experience. Buddhi 
or antahkarana (i.e. intelligence) is a material object which 
is too inert and obtuse to be a conscious cogniser in itself. 
But any form of experience indubitably involves some sort of 
consciousnur.To know, feel or will is to be cons~us of an 
object of knowing, feeling and willing. To be an object of 
experience is to be manifested in and through consciousness. 
Thus, it is consciousness which is the final illuminator of 
-6-
an otherwise unilluminated object. The Buddhi undergoes 
constant transformation in the shape of objects with which 
it comes into contact. These transformations are also 
material and so cannot manifest an unmanifested material 
object. But the fact of conscious experience cannot be 
denied. Then how to explain this phenomenon? It is then 
assumed that material intelligence must be somehow charged 
with some sort of borrowed consciousness through which the 
intelligence itself become illuminated, so that it can 
illuminate in its turn the material objects appearing in 
cognition. Herein lies the necessity of assuming the 
transcendental self of pure consciousness from which the 
material intelligence receives its illumination that illumines 
the object of experience. As the fundamental illuminator-of 
inert matter the transcendental self is called 'Sak~in' or 
'witness-consciousness', which lendscognising character to 
intelligence. This conception of Saksin- consciousness is a 
novel but basic principle in Advaita epistemology. The very 
possibility of subject-object relation depends on this Sak~in 
without which the world would have been steeped in blinding 
darkness. 
The empirical personality is thus dependent on the 
absolute transcendental self for its relative reality which 
is captured in the subject-object relational complex. As 
an illustration of its dependence. We may talce the case of 
perception, wherein the sense organ comes in contact with an 
object and the internal organ (Buddhi) assumes the form of 
that object. It is the vrtti or nature of the internal 
-7-
organ (buddhi or antahkarana). This vrtti enlightened by 
• • 
the s~ksin, takes the form of empirical knowledge. 
The Sa~khya accepts the fundamental reality of both 
spirit an~ matter. In this respect, it is definitely 
opposed to the Advaita view which dismisses the material 
universe as only a tentative reality, being a false 
projection of the Brah:mo.Jwhich is the transcendental self 
o~ Atman per excellence. But despite this basic difference 
the Sa~khya also assumes a transcendental self to be beyong 
the range of any empirical relation. It is unqualified , 
uncharacterized, unrelated pure-consciousness~ As such it 
cannot be called a 'person' in its proper sense. Yet 'person' 
cannot be denied, s~nce the fact of experience and hence 
the subject-object relation is too eloquent to be suppressed. 
It is a fundamental tenet of Sa~khya philosophy that Buddhi 
or intelligence is the first evolute of Pra~ti, the 
primordial matter. As a form of matter, it is subject to 
continuous change. In the context of empirical knowledge, it 
assumes constant configurations in the shape of objects which 
are experienced. As a form of matter in the process of 
evolution, intelligence (buddhi) can neither be self-expressive 
nor can express its objects, the shape of which it is bound 
to take in conformity with the material aspect of the epistemic 
law. Hence Buddhi alone cannot explain the phenomenon of 
consciousness without which experience is impossible. It 
is here that Sa~khya propounds its famous theory of 
(pratibimbav~da,(theory of reflection) according to which the 
material buddhi catches the reflection of t·he transcendental 
-8-
~elf and thus shines in the borrowed glory of a derivative 
consciousness. Buddhi or intellect acts as an intermediary 
between the Puru~a (s cij-) and the ahamkara (empirical ego). 
The material intelligence (buddhi) enlightened by the 
reflection of the transcendental consciousness is the empirical 
self or person, reinforced by the sense of ego or ahamkara. 
It is important to mention here that Sa~khya does not 
feel the need of assuming the Advaita hypothesis of Sak~in-
conciousness in order to explain the empirical relation of 
the personal self. In conferring its reflection on Buddhi, 
the Puru?a need not act as the.agent of any action. Its very 
existence is enough by virtue of which the reflection of 
consciousness is spontaneously passed on to intelligence. 
It is further important to note that the empirical 
person of the Sa!'lkhya is not as much unreal as that of the 
Advaita. According to the Sa~khya view, the fundamental 
reality is basically classified into two categories -- eit 
and acit (spirit and matter). The spirit or pure-consciousness 
(Purusa or Atman) is eternal without any change. It is a 
sort of static eternity. Matter is equally eternal and 
indestructible but its eternity is attended with constant 
change without any loss of essential identity and continuity. 
It may be called dynamic eternity. The material objects 
including Buddhi and ego are all real substantial things of 
the world. The person of Sa~khya is thus endowed with double 
character. It is material insofar as its basic const~uents 
Buddhi and~hamkara are the real shapes of real matter. It 
~ 
is also spiritual in the sense that it dawns the mantle of 
-9-
of spirituality through the reflection of transcendental 
consciousness. Hence the personal self of the Sa~khya 
( , 
can be called unreal only in this limited sense of a 
reflectional consciousness, being mistakenly assumed to be 
real consciousness as a result of which the difference 
between spirit and matter is obliterated in the practical 
world. Consequently, false assumption and suppression of 
distinction between matter and spirit leads to a false 
entanglement of the Puru~a in such basically false judgements 
as 'I know the pitcher', 'I am happy', etc. In other words, 
the falsity here lies in the erroneous identification of 
pure spirit with the buddhi qualified by ego, -- that 
which is not a person is conceived as a person. In the 
Sa~khya view, it is an eternal and universal error by which 
a person is projected into the supreme impersonal (Puru~a)/ 
Apparently this coexistence and interdependence of the 
transcendental self and the empirical personality verges on 
mysticism of some sort, as it stands totally on t.'t\.f erenc e 
and hypothetical imagination. Whether we call it mysticism 
or not, there is a logic behfu.nd it, which we have partially 
explained above and shall deal in some details later on. 
Fleeting sense-impressions emphasise the reality of a 
continuent self, which runs as an inserverable thread, 
through the entire range of experience and thus save them 
from drifting away as so many 'wandering adje.ctives •. The 
rational experience projects empirical personality as a 
continuous entity. We have seen, so far, that persistence, 
continuity and identity are indispensible factors determining 
the concept of a person. The Bud~st philosophers, especially 
-10-
of the Mahajana school and more particularly of the 
Madhyamika school and the Dinnaga-Dharmakirti school of 
Vijlana~t~are uncompromising opponents of these 
notions of identity, continuity and persistence. Just as 
a stream of water particles or a flame of lamp is conceived 
as a persistent identity, so also a stream of impressions or 
conscious moments (vijnanasantana) is assumed to be a 
continuent personal identity. According to them, what 
appears as self is but the bundle of ideas.,,\ emotions and active 
tendencies manifesting at any particular moment. The next 
moment these dissolve and new bundles determined''by the 
preceeding ones appear. The present thought is thus the 
only thinker. Apart from the emotions, ideas and active 
tendencies, we cannot discover any separate self. As these 
ideas emotions etc., change every moment,there is no such 
thing as a permanent self. 
The question here is, how do we explain the past and 
future experiences, if we do not accept a continuous permanent 
self? Buddhist says -- that we have the feeling of continuity 
and permanence -- is due to(anadivasari~ or the eternal false 
disposition by which a constructed (Kalpita) sense of 
identity and permanence is superimposed on the fleeting 
moments of experience which are really discrete and discontinuous. 
The philosphers of the Nyaya, the Sa~khya-yoga, and the 
Mima~sa schools including the Vedanta school have relent-
lessly attacked this Buddhist view of universal flux and 
impermanence. We are, howev.er, not concerned here with this 
protracted debate between the Buddhist and the Brahmanical 
-11-
Philosophers within the limted compass of this desertation. 
Moreover, there is one reality in the empirical life, 
which is universally accepted in human experience as some-
thing which apparently seems inescapable, but from which 
we continually strive to escape. This is the reality of 
suffering. This can be regarded as one of the important 
characteristics of human existence, that he has to undergo 
suffering from the moment of his empirical existence. The 
Samkhya philosophers have considered that the empirical life 
is full of three kinds of sufferings. The first kind, called 
'~dhyatmika', is due to intra-organic psychophysical causes 
and includes all mental and bodily sufferings. The second, 
!Adhibhautika' is due to extra organic natural causes, 
inflicted by men, beasts etc. The third 'l!dhidai vi·ka' is due 
to supernatural causes like the planets, elements, etc. Even 
the so-called worldly pleasures lead to pain. The end. of man· 
is to get rid of these three kinds of pain and sufferings. 
Liberation means complete cessation of all sufferings -- which 
is the summun bonum, the highest end of life (apavarga/parama-
purusartha) . 
' 
The N.V. school also conceives emancipation as the 
complete and final cessation of sufferings. This conception of 
liberation has evoked sharp criticism from their opponents 
especially the Advaita Vedantists. If the highest ideal of man 
is limited to mere cessation of sorrows, we cannot reasonably 
explain man's persuit of happiness as a positive aspect of 
life. This positive aspect is too insistent to be denied or 
dismissed as only negation of pain. The state of emancipation 
should be imagined not as a complete break with what man 
-12-
positively desires, rather it should be accepted as the final 
sublimation of the aspirations of man. The concept of 
emancipation as entertained by the si~khya-Yoga and the 
NV. schools, is entirely negative in approach. In this 
context, the N.V. school may be called the most uncompromising 
negativists, because in their view even consciousness is 
finally and completely obliterated in the stage of emanicipation. 
So the critics have compared the state of liberation 
advocated by this school to a conditon of permanent stupor. 
It is revolting to accept the position that the summum bonum 
of human existence is a ceaseless comatic condition. Hence, 
the emancipated stage of man must be an expression of the 
highest and unalloyed fulfillment of his positive aspiration 
for happiness. That is why the Advaitins look upon the essence 
of the Transcendental Being as eternal bliss and consciousness. 
The final liberation is nothing but this ultimate realization 
in which the jlvatman sheds off its empirical character for 
good and becomes completely identifed with the transcendental 
Brahman, shining in its eternal glory of blissful consciousness. 
It is interesting to note that even Vasubandhu, the great 
teacher of Buddhist Vijnanavada, has accepted emanicipation as 
a state of eternal bliss. Thus, in the 30th verse of Tri~~ik­
avijnaptimatratasiddhi, it is explained that the cosmic 
consciousness (dharmakaya) of Buddha is also absolute happiness. (3) 
According to Sa~khya-Yoga, liberation is a state of complete 
isolation of Puru~a from the empirical state and the world of 
matter. This is a state of ultimate and complete cessation of 
sufferings which are erroneously sumperimposed on Purusa, which 
• 
is essentally pure conciousness, i.e. never really charged 
with pleasure or pain. In the state of liberation Purusa is 
. 
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established in its essence of pure consciousness which is 
bereft of all qualities and relations. Hence. neither pain 
nor happiness can exist as a property of the pure spirit. 
Pleasure presupposes pain and is relative to it. Pleasure or 
happiness is the result of Sa~tvaguna and liberation transcends 
0 
all gur;as. 
Here the Adviatins criticism against Sa~khya proceeds 
along the following line. Samkhya forgets that the bliss 
. 
in liberation is not empirical pleasure produced by Sattvaguna 
~ 
The bliss is also transcendental in nature. It is beyond both 
pain and pleasure. The Advaintins criticism of the Sa~khya 
theory of emancipation is primarily directed against its sole 
emphasis on negation. This theory fails to do any justice to 
mans aspiration for happiness. Man does not simply want to 
negate something, he also wants to achieve something. This 
sense of achievement-is clearly expressed in his positive 
aspiration. It is agreed, however, that the terms 'mukti', 
'freedom', 'liberation' or 'emancipation' undoubtedly suggests 
some undesirable or unpalatable condition from which we want 
to be 'mukta', 'to-be freed', 'liberated' or 'emancipated'. 
This has ~iven rise to the negative conception of emancipation 
as an e:scape from something which we do not like. But, Che 
meaning of a term is not always entirely exhausted by its 
grammatical suggestion or derivative sense {vyutpattinimitta_). 
The sense of a term established in convention, very often 
transcends the meaning which is directly obtained by grammatical 
analysis. The meaning-concept is 'pravrttinimitta' (through 
• 
connotation) which is other than 'vyutpattinimitta. So the saying 
goes --
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'sometimes the connotation of a term is something else 
than the meaning given through grammatical analysis•( 4) 
If we accept this theory of meaning concept, it is easy to 
'mu.kh 'o-r 
see why the meaning of f'emancipation' can not be limited 
to a mere escape from the unwanted aspect of existence and 
also why the meaning should be stressed to something positive 
that one wants to attain. Thus, emancipation is more an 
attainment than a negation. This emphasis on the positive 
aspect does justice to human aspiration for happiness. The 
transcendental nature of. man must have some continuity with 
his empirical nature. It is not unfortunate that man hankers 
after happiness. What is however unfortunate is that man, 
limited by the empirical world, falls in a fundamental error 
of judgement by misconstruing something as happiness which is 
o-r 
really sorrowA suffering in disguise. According to the 
Advaiti'\'\.s,the j{vatman or the personal self in its f.undamental 
aspect is also the transcendental self or pure universal 
consciousness, that in jlva-stage, however, is circumscribed 
by the ego and antahkarana, which is a projection of ~vidya~ 
Thus, the aspiration of jiva for happiness is grounded in its 
basic transcendental nature, which is identical with Brahman. 
This presupposes that bliss or happiness should be the very 
essence of this universal ground: of the universe. From this 
the Advaitins argue that the state of emancipation is the 
state of Brahmahood in which bliss and consciousness are 
identified in 'One Being' 
The Sa~khya, however,has one re~ieving feature. Though 
its conception of emancipation is charged with a sense of 
negation and escapism, it makes a thorough departure from the 
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Nyaya-Vaise~ika theory in its emphasis on the full glory of 
consciousness in the final emancipated stage of the self. 
It is not a state of stupor, completely bereft of consciousness 
on the contrary, it is the full affirmation of consciousness 
untarnished by the touch of the empirical ego. At this 
point the AV. and the Samkhya find a partial meeting 
.. 
ground. 
Despite all these differences among the SEi.frkAtc..-loer) AV-~ 
the NV. schools, relating to the concept of liberation --
they seem to agree on one basic aspect, namely-- 'emancipation 
means a total loss of personality! This loss is accounted for 
from different angles in the three different schools. 
According to the NV., the self or person in the emancipated 
stage, is not only released from the bondage of suffering 
but is also released from all the specific qualities including 
consciousness even, which constitute his personality. Thus 
the person of theem~rical world is fully depersonalised in 
the realm of liberation. The emancipated selves are not 
persons but only so many individuals, among which it is 
difficult to notice any mark of differentiation. 
The Sawkhya theory also fares no better in this respect, 
despite its retention of consciousness in emancipation. All 
relations with the empirical ego and the empirical world are 
abolished. Consciousness is not a property of Puru~a, but 
is Purusa or Spirit itself. It is completely detached (asanga) 
and unqualified (nirguna) in its uncompromising purity. So 
the emancipated soul is nothing but an isolated and scattered 
unit of consciousness to which the term(persod or(personality> 
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cannot be applied in any way. Here,too, then emancipation 
is a supreme act of depersonalization. 
The AV. clearly pronounces its faith in depersonalization, 
since it announces the person to be an illusion, -- which must 
be deleted in the state of final liberation. The self of 
the Samkhya and the NV. looses its personality but not its 
0 
individuality in liberation. But the self of the AV. looses 
both by being integrated without any distinction into the 
One Supreme Being. But, all these three schools have this 
common point that, the'person-liberated' is the 'person-lost'. 
So far I have tried to give a brief outline of the concept 
of personality crystalized in the Samkhya, Advaita-Vedanta , 
and Nyaya-Vaise~ika systems. In this dissertation, I shall 
limit myself to the concept of personality in the Samkhya 
and the AV. systems only. The relevance of the NV. system 
has,in this context, come in only as a way of interesting 
contrast and comparison, which is expected to highlight the 
Vedanta and Sa~khya concepts. 
The Sal!lkhya and the Vedanta have a long history of 
evolution through the Vedic and the post Vedic periods, before 
they were organised into regular systems. Both the systems 
are.very old and their germs can be unmistakably located in 
the Vedas and the Upanisads. This is more so in the case of 
.. 
AV., though it is not difficult to trace the Samkhya thoughts 
also in this ancient period of Indian literature and 
philosophy. From this consideration, I think a historical 
resume of the evolution of the concept~of human personality 
in these two systems is called for before we go for the detailed 
examination of the subject. 
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In persuance of this plan, the second chapter deals 
with the conception of human personality in the Advai t a.-
Vendanta System and is divided into four main sections. 
Section A deals with the Pre-Upanisadic and Upanisadic 
, . 
literature. 
Section B deals with the Gaudapadas Mandukyakarika. 
I . 
Section c deals with the Vedanta Sutras of Badar ayaf!a. 
Section D deals with the Advaita Vedanta conception of 
~ / 
personality in Sa~karacharya's Sarirakab~~~ 
Chapter III is divided into four main sections. 
Section A deals with the Pre-Upani~adic and_ Upani~adic 
literature 
Section B deals with the the Caraka Samhi ta-. 
./ Section C deals with the Pancasikha and the Mahabharata 
Section D deals with the Classical Sa~khya, mainly in 
human 
- , 
Isvarakrsnas Samkhyakarika, Sa~khyasutras and Yuktidipika. 
Chapter IV comprises of two sections. 
Section A deals with a review of the conception of human 
personality in the Advaita Vedanta and Classical Sa~khyaQ~ i~ 
Section B; a critical appreciation of the conception of 
human personality in these two respective systems is attempted. 
CHAPTER II 
THE CONCEPTION OF HUMAN PERSONALITY IN THE ADVAITA VEDANTA 
SYSTEM 
Etymologically the term 'Vedanta' means 'the end of the 
Veda' or the doctrine set forth in the Upanisads, i.e., the 
. 
closiog section of the Vedas. In the Mahabharata XII.55. 
the term 'Vedanta' is taken to denote the Upani~ads, (l) and 
this may be regarded as its primary reference, which through 
the AraQyakas and the Brahmal).aS reaches back the the VedFts. 
According to Urquehart, the Upanisads are later summarized 
in the Vedanta-Sutras, a collection of aphorisms in which 
the salient points of the Upani~ads are emphasized ..•. the 
culmination of the Vedanta is to be found in the commentaries 
such as those of Sa~kara and Ramanuja. (2 ) The name'Vedanta' 
is given to the whole developement as a rule. Yet the 
_, 
philosophy of Sa~kara has been assigned to the central place 
in the field of Vedantic consciousness. We meet with the 
concepts conforming to the Vedantic tradition at every step 
in the Vedic and Upani~adic literature. Thus, the conception 
of human personality in the earlier and later Vedic-, literature, 
wherein the concept conforming to the Vedanta system is 
obviously present, -- is necessary to be discussed. 
Section A - PRE-UPANISADIC AND UPANISADIC LITERATURE 
I . - THE VEDAS : 
The Vedas have contributed uniquely and abundantly to 
the understanding of man. These earliest literary signposts 
of the Indo-European people represent the groping of man for 
a satisfactory answer to the mysteries of nature and the 
enigma of his own existence. The primary concern of the 
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Vedic Aryans was nature and not man. Thus prayers and 
oblations were offered to the sun, the moon and other 
natural forces, and they were worshipped as individual 
gods. Awed by the vastness and magnificence of Nature, he 
sought the numinous in the personification of natural 
phenomena. Thus snrya the luminous sun, agni the all-
consuming fire, dyaus, the infinity of the sky, maruts 
the defiant storm and many others are continuously praised. 
Subsequently, the Vedic seers, by way of serious reflections 
turned from the conception of a plurality of deified natural 
phenomena to a more comprehensive monotheism, not to find 
one god above all other gods but the common power that works 
behind all of them. In fact, the awareness of the regularity 
and orderliness in the universe (in the samhitas this principle 
is Rta), which would be impossible without an underlying 
. 
unitary principle controlling the forces of Cosmos, led to 
the worship of a single god ultimately.()) 
These religious as well as metaphysical considerations 
gave rise to the doubt as when the seer wonders 'Who is the 
God to whom we are to offer sacrifices?' and then reflects 
~He is not' (RV.II.l2.5). Besides, when the Vedic seers were 
reflecting on the ultimate reality behind the visible diversity, 
their attention was simultaneously attracted to another 
direction -- to the inward Man. This is borne out by such 
pressing questions, 'What thing I truly am,I know not' (RV.I.164.J7) 
In a verse of the 16th hymn of the 10th mandala of the 
RV, which is devoted to the description of a funeral ceremony, 
the eye of the deceased has been asked by the seer to go tb 
the sun which is it's cosmic-counterpart, the atman is 
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directed to go to heaven or to the earth according to its 
qualities (dharma), or else to move even to waters or the 
plants if it so suited it. This ~g-vedic verse seems to 
be an older evidence of the conception of the correlation 
between microcosm and macrocosm. 'This correlativity is 
best illustrated in the semi-mythological narrative of the 
Ai tareya Upani~ad : the ~tman once existed al.one and desired 
to create the worlds. It then created the upper and lower 
worlds. Then it wished to create the lords of the worlds. 
It created a form (the world person) and meditated on it. 
The mouth of the form opened; from mouth speeah, and from 
speech the god. of fire came ·forth. It's nostrils opened; 
out of the nostrils came life (prana) and out of life air 
. 
came forth. It's eyes opened; out of eyes sight, and out 
of sight the sun came forth. Similarly other gods came out 
of other senses and the mind. The gods w~ted a habitat and 
sustenance. The atman gave them first a cow and a horse. 
When they said that the animals were not enough, they were 
given man and thereafter they were satisfied. Thus, the 
senses and the mind of man and their corresponding objects 
became the realms (~yatanas) of the gods of the world and all 
the gods were subordinate to atman. This narrative is highly 
significant as it states how the external gods became internal 
in man. 'Man was thus made the meeting point of the gods of 
the universe and its controlling forces•.< 4) Atman was the 
highest reality within all men and the universe, whereupon 
Prajapati, Varuna and others were relegated to a lower place. 
The insight of the Vedic seers about the fundamental universal 
reality was not directly projected on to the inner essence of 
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man. One can only say that the Vedas showed the way: .to the 
gradual discovery of a universal inner principle as the 
basic fundamental reality, which culminates in the Upanisadic 
• 
doctrine of the 'Absolute Atman'. 
The Rg-Veda and other vedic literatures have developed 
. 
three different approaches to unveil the mystery of the 
universe and its reality, namely, theological, metaphysical 
and psychological. (5) The theological approach which is 
markedly present in the earlier Vedic literature has led to 
the conception of a particular god, worshipped and adored as 
the 'transcendental impersonal principle' that underlines the 
whole universe and yet appears to be related to it as the 
creator and preserver. He is comprehended as Supreme Being 
(paramapurusah) and has the whole universe as his body. The 
Purusa-sukta explains - 'The Purusa is of a thousand heads, 
. ~ 
a thousand eyes, a thousand feet. He exists per.vading the 
whole terrestrial regions and is above it by ten fingers' 
(RV.X.l.J). Thus whatever was 6r whatever will be- all that 
is Purusa. This immanent Purusa contains the physical universe 
in his body but is essentially transcendental. Hiranyagarbha 
• 
(in RV.~.121) and Vi~vadeva (in RV.I.89) are also conceived 
as the uncaused progenl!tors of the whole universe. 
This theistic speculation is essentially different from 
the metaphysical postulations in the 'creation hymn' 
(Nasadlya-sUkta : RV.X.l29). This hymn speaks of the trans-
cendental reality beyond the range of physical limitations. 
It gives a pantheistic view of creation. The hymn declares 
the state before the emergence of the universe thus : 'Then 
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there was neither existence nor non-existence'. Here 
non-existence (asat) does not mean absolute non-existence; 
the existence (sat) denotes that'. which is differentiated 
by name and form. The term'non-existence' thus would mean 
the same previous to its differentiation. This neutral 
state was immensely potential in bringing forth the 
universe. The absolute reality, which is at the background 
of the whole world, cannot be characterioterized either as 
being or non-being, existent or non-existent. 
The psychological approach is also quite evident in 
the Rg-Veda. In RV.I.l64 we notice the first doubt about the 
• 
reality of the physical body together with the quest for the 
nature of man. Thus, the Rsi ·exclaims - "Who saw the first 
• • 
being born, when the boneless covered the bony (the unmanifest-
ed Maya covered all manifestations)? From Earth arose the 
breath and blood, but whence is the Atman (soul)? Who 
enquired about this of the sages?" Again he exclaims - "Am 
I really this (the physical body) that I know not? For I 
am not of clear mind and wander about being in doubt and 
bondage". Another verse says - "The immortal residing with 
the mortal in the same place and having obtained the physical 
body, sometimes goes to upper regions and sometimes to lower. 
Both of them always remain together and move about together. 
People can recognize one of them, the other is not recognized" 
(RV.I.l64). These passages clearly indicate that the 
indfuvidual soul is immortal and migrates to different planes 
of existence. 
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The identity of the individual soul with the cosmic 
spirit has been revealed in the following well-known verse 
of the ~g-Veda in which Rsi V~madeva having realized the 
.. 
ultimate spirit, exclaims - "I am Manu, I am the son, I am 
/ the intelligent sage Kttksivat .....• I am the poet Usanas, 
• 
behold me! I have offered the terrestrial region to the 
Aryas, I have given rain to men; I am the giver of waters 
with thunderous sounds. All gods obey my orders~·" Vac also 
speaks in the same mantra in the same strain - "I am the 
queen of the.whole universe, the bestower of all wealth. 
I am the knower of truth, the first among the worshipful. 
The gods have placed me in various regions, as diverse are my 
abodes and I exist in various living beings" (RV.IV.261,2~. 
Here we see that a correlation is established between man 
and the physical world outside. The seer realizes in himself 
a miniature universe. 
In the Vedic age itself, the seers of the enlightened 
souls also realized that marls nature is not accounted for by 
dissecting his physical body -- and accordingly, that there 
must be something more in the universe than the sum-total of 
its physical elements. As to the question of the essence in 
man, there are various revelations. 'Frana', the 'life-breath' 
which sustains the body and is the essential process of 
living, is considered as the principle of man's life (which 
leaves the body at death). Its cosmic correspondent is 
·~· or 'wind!. Frana refers to the active process of the 
rhythmic outgoing and ingoing breath, analogous to the great 
breath of the "One that breathed breathlessly by,Itself" 
(RV.X.129.2). Frana is that which underlies breath and 
-2'±.= 
therefore life and thus pervades all living beings. 
Without it there is no life. The vital principle underlying 
the physical life may be regarded as one, but only up to 
a certain level. Beyond that level there is the supreme 
universal reality, apprehended by the Vedic seers. This 
is the conception of ?urusa or Atman. 
The word Atman occurs several times in the ~g-Veda, 
where it generally denotes an immaterial principle ascribed 
to "Various phenomena of Nature and living beings. Although 
it cannot be seriously doubted that in most philosophical 
contexts it denotes some aspects of what is papularly 
understood by the word 'soul'. Whatever the original 
meaning of the term might have been, it is clear that in the 
~v. Atman also is primarily used in the sense of 'breath' 
(~V.X.16.J), held to be the life-principle in man and beast, 
along with the appreciation 6f the fact that 'wind' (vata or 
vayu) is its macrocosmic parallel. Thus it is interesting 
to 1 note that even in the earliest parts of the ~g-Veda, the 
word Atman acquired a special meaning signifying 'breath' or 
the vital spirit as the 'life principle' in living creatures 
or denoting in a metaph~sical sense, the intrinsic nature 
(swarUpa) or the essence (sara) of persons and things. 
Deussen has given different etymologies of the term 
Atman. Thus, the word is said to have been d·erived from the 
root 'a' of 'aham' and 'ta' = 'this' so that it denotes 
- ---- -- , 
'This I', 'the self', "which in due course is felt to be the 
final expression possible for the ultimate fact of existence, 
arrived at by stripping away the various coverings, which 
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envelope the ultimate reality in man, - the covering of the 
body, the covering of the mind, the covering of the intellect~( 6 ) 
As Deus sen has suggested, the meaning of the w:ord developed 
into four directions - (i) the ·~wn person, own body as 
opposed to the outside wor~d; (ii) the trunk of the body as 
opposed to the limbs;(iii) the soul as opposed to the body, 
and (iv) the essence as opposed to what is not the essential 
self. 
Furthermore, the tendency to correlate microcosm and 
marcocosm influenced the development of the notion of Atman 
(~V.I.ll5.1) : "Sun is the 'soul' of all that moves and 
stands." But, it is probably in the Atharva-:Veda that the 
macrocosmic sense proper of Atman is clearly recognized. In 
AV,X.84J-44, the word Atman is clearly used to denote the 
macrocosmic Yaksa (Hiranyagarbha) which is no other than 
. 
the primeval soul or empirical BrahMa in its incipient stage. 
The latter idea is fore-shadowed, however dimly, in ~V.X.168.4 
where reference is, 'made to '~tma devanam bhuvanasya gopta : 
the soul of the gods and the embryo of the universe. In view 
of the embryonic analogy, which is implied here, it is not 
unreasonable to interpret the concept of "the primeval man, 
as occurring in the Purusa-sukta, as the macrocosmic 
anthropomophic representation of the same Atman". (7) In the 
Vedic speculation, the ultimate reality was thus kept 
uncharacterized both in regard to its essence and its relation 
to man. 
Thus we may sum up the Vedic conception of Atman. First, 
it is the Sun which is the root essence of what moves and 
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moves not (RV.I.115.1); the all-seeing, all-illuminating 
life-giver ( RV. IV. 53.3, 4); the best ower of insight ( RV. VII. 66.10); 
illumination and immortality (RV.IV.54.2.); that solar 
splJ~ur which for the races of men, extends with his rays 
'immortal light' (AV.XII.l.l5); then it is the light 
immortal not outside, but inside all beings (YV .XXXLV-.1. 6), 
and finally it is the immanent Atman synonymous with the 
transcendent self of the Upani~ads. In the AV.X.8.44, Atman 
is mentioned as serene, ageless and youthful, - qualities 
pointto the transcendence of the essential nature of man. 
Thus, Atman, Purusa, Surya and Brahman, though apparently 
conceived independently, imply a similar meaning - the 
immortal unchanging principle hidden in the form of man. 
In the RV.I.l64.4 the word Atman is interpreted by Sayana 
as Pa~ca bhutatmaka-sarira-sambaddha-cetanah: the thinking 
and intelligent principle abiding in the perishable body which 
is essentially different, yet attached to the gross body. 
There are several other terms signifying the soul or essence 
in man, such as manas, ajobhaga, ~· and tman. The reflexive 
pronoun or adverb 'tman' is once interpreted by Sayana as 
'life' or'existence' (RV.I.6J.8), where Indra is asked to 
bestow on his worshippers the 'tman~. 
The word 'Jiva' occurs several times in the Rg-Veda in the 
connotation of (i) ind1·vidual soul._ (RV.I.l316); (ii) life 
(RV.VIII.44.5, 78.9, 11J.8,X.57.5); (iii) living being in 
general (RV.I.l92.9, IV.51.5 etc.); and (iv) children (RV.X.18.4,8). 
In RV.I.llJ.l6 the seer speaks of the return of life (~) 
at the approach of dawn, meaning thereby the revival of 
consciousness after sleep, and shows that he is aware that 
there is a spirit which is distinct from the body and 
without which the body is insentient. Here Jiva is taken 
as the 'active and animating principle' in the individual. 
Asu is taken by Sayana to mean (i) life or life-preath (pr~a); 
(ii) controller of the body (sarirasya prerayita~, and (iii) 
suksma sarira (subtle body). In a prayer (RV.X.59.7) the 
. 
earth is requested to restore t;h.e departed::.- soul (~), while 
Soma is asked to return the body, which thus makes a clear 
distinction between the body and soul. 
We may surmise the conception of a subtle body (s'lil-:-ksma 
sarira) in RV.X.10.6. It was developed and categorized in 
the later philosophical systems. The subtle body, according 
to the later philosophical systems, comprises 17 or 18 finer 
qualities; but in the earliest Vedic conception ajobhaga implies 
the vague idea of a subtle entity outliving the physical 
death. In another hymn, the soul ~ called.::manas) of one who 
is lying apparently dead is. beseeched to return to the body 
whereever it may be wandering. Thus, there is the essence, 
which is different from the body with which it moves and grows 
and without it the body is inert. 
Death was regarded as the beginning of a new life in 
another world. The path was prepared by the ancestors who 
went long before. It was sufficient for them to know that ' 
higher elevated persons went to heaven which over-flow with 
honey (RV.I.l54.5). In RV.X.16.J the dead person is asked 
by the seer to move back to the sun, which is analogous to 
infinity, the Atman or breath-spirit to the vata (wind) or 
-28.,._ 
to the heaven or the earth, according to the qualities or 
else to move even to the waters or the plants. This mantra 
suggests the return of the elements to their causes. It 
presupposes that the human personality is built up by 
different elements of nature to which it is asked to return 
at death. 
It is an eternal urge in man to preserve his ego, his 
identity, the personality or the body with which he tends 
to identify, from the clutches of death and decay. The 
Indian philosophers from the earliest Vedic tfumes realized 
the perishability of this 'persona' or mask, covering the 
essence or self in man, which is ~mmortal. Thus, they defied 
the fear of death. 
II THE BRAHMANA£: 
In the BrahmaQas the ~gvedic ideas are presented in a 
more organized way. The creative principle is here concentrated 
in Prajapati (the Lord of Creatures), sometimes mentioned 
anonymously as 'Ka' which is assimilated in the later 
Brahmanas and mainly in the Upanisads as Brahman. 
' 
Prajapati creates the beings from his vital organs. Out 
of his mind emerged man, out of his eye the horse, out of 
his breath the cow, and so on. Because man is created out of 
Prajapati's mind and mind is the first of the vital organs, 
therefore, man is the first and strongest of all creatures 
(Satapatha Brahmaoa VII.5.2.6.). It is important to note 
that man is regarded as the highest form of life on earth. 
Yet the real order of the development of the conception of 
human personality is difficult to trace. The following 
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/ 
confusing passage in the Satapatha Brahmana VI/1.1 is 
characteristic of the fact - "In the beginning there was 
only asat (non-existence)". It is added, thereafter, that 
"this non-existent was really the Rsis, and these by 
.. 
means of self-mortification, brought forth everything. These 
Rsis, however, were the Pranas or life-spirit. and these 
~
created first seven Purusas (or persons) and then united 
them to a single Purusa. to Pra,japati". Furthermore, this 
Purusa (person) Prajapati desired to multiply himself to 
propagate his species (St.Br 6.1.&). The text goes on to 
relate how Pra,japati 'standing firm upon th.e foundation' 
mortified himself and then first created the waters. With 
the aid of the Veda he brought forth an egg; out of the egg 
arose Agni, and the egg-shell became the earth. The whole 
account taken together. is rather confusing. But it is 
quite significant that the personal and rather confusing. 
But it is quite significant that the personal and impersonal 
evolutions are proclaimed to be based on the ultimate reality 
called 'Brahman'. But. in comparison with that, the Atman 
doctri:ne, as the essential reality in man. is not yet fully 
defined. 
III -THE ARANYAKAS: 
... 
Sorrie of the Ara.r:yaks preserve the references of pre-
Upanisadic thought more clearly and systematically than the 
' 
BrahmaQas. According to the expositions of the Aitareya 
Aranyaka (II.).ll) from the five-fold hymn, the living soul 
springs. There is no difference in kind, either between the 
physical universe and the organic world, or between the world 
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andman. The fundamental difference if any, is only the 
difference in intensity or degree of growth. Historically, 
it is for the first time that, in Aitereya-Aranyaka, we 
• 
find a determined effort to reflect syst·ematically on the 
different stages of the development of citta (consciousness) 
in the living world (pranabhrtsu). It is put forward in 
4 • 
this way: "Know the gradual development of the indd.vidual 
thigs" atmanam avistar.am veda' i.e. ' avistaram = atiS'ayena 
pr.akatatvam: - Sayana. First of all, a beginning is made 
here in the successive gradation of reality on the basis of 
degrees of consciousness in plants, animals and human beings. 
Thus, the text expounds: "There are herbs and trees and all 
that is animal, and he knows the atman gradually developing 
in them. For in herbs and trees, sap only is seen, but 
ci tta is seen in animated beings.. Among animated beings again, 
the atman develops gradually.; and in man again, the atman 
develops gradually, for he is most endowed with prajna. "He 
says what he has known, he sees what he has known, he knows 
what is to happen tomorrow, he knows the visible and the 
invisible world; by means of the mortal he desires the immortal. 
Thus, is he endowed. With regard to other animals, hunger 
and thirst are a kind of understanding, but they do not say 
what is to happen tomorrow ... They go so far and no further" 
(A.A.II.J.2). (Note: The word atman is used here in the 
sense of vital force, and not in the Upani~adic sense proper.) 
Here not only the psychical development, but also the 
physical development is pointed out. 'Yet it is not said that 
sense itself develops into reason or a plant becomes a man 
by gradual evolution'~B) It postulates that sense perceptions 
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and reasoning, as mental functions, are not different in 
kind but only in intensity. According to this view, all the 
mental. functions, bear the name of reason. (9 ) Secondly, we 
can assume that there is no difference in kind either 
between the physical universe and the organic world, or 
between organic world and man. As we have already mentioned, 
the difference is only of intensity or degree of growth. 
Thus, we can conclude that man is more manifested than other 
worldly things and the organic things are less manifested 
than man. 
According to the exposition of the Aitareya-Aranyaka man 
• 
is to be conceived as the miniature universe (A.A.II.l.S.l). 
It says - 'whatever there is belonging to the father, belongs 
to the son; whatever there is belonging to the son, belongs to 
the father'. This concept is translated in terms of macrocosm 
and microcosm (A.A.III.l.2.6-7), and is also considered 
true in the case of every living substance, down to root, 
seed and germ. As already mentioned, the difference between 
man and the apparently inorganic things, is only one of 
intensity or the degree of growth or manifestation. The 
distinction is characterized thus - "All these shining gods -
the sun, lightning, the moon, the planets and the stars, and 
all these five great elements (mahabhutani) - the earth, air, 
sky, water and fire - belong to the physical world; the 
reptiles, birds, horses, cows, etc., to the animal kingdom; 
and man naturally belongs to the animal kingdom (A.A.II.6.15). 
The difference is explained as to the gradual development of 
self, i.e. of life in the world as a whole, particularly of 
a thinking soul in man. More precisely, according to the 
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Aitareya-Aranyaka all the material things are built up of 
8 
five elements - water, fire, earth, air and space. These 
five elements along with prana constitute man (A.A.II.J.l.2.). 
" 
IV- THE UPANISADAS: 
The ideas of the Upani~ads are more important than 
those of the earlier parts of the Vedas, because the ideas 
of the Upanisads obtained the form in which the Vedanta 
' 
philosophers took them up for developing their systems of 
thought. The sum-total of the Upani~adic teaching rests on 
the two pillars, namely the concepts of Brahman and Atman, 
which ultimately developed into the equation "Atman equals 
Brahman." The fundamental idea that runs through the early 
Upani~ads is that, underlying the external world of continual 
change, there is an unchangeable reality which is identical 
with that which constitutes the essence in man. (Brh .. IV.4.5.22). 
This unchangeable ultimate reality of the universe is named 
Brahman. But the quest goes on to determine the nature of 
this ultimate reality and the question is put forth - "What 
is the beginning, what is Brahma?" ( Brh. 2 .1. 1; Chan V .11. l). 
We have noticed that in the later Samhita period, the 
conception of a single creator and controller of the universe, 
variously called Hiravyagarbha, Prajapati, Purusa, Brahmanaspati 
ahd Brahman - gradually gains ground. But this divine 
'creator' was still a deity. The search for the nature of 
this deity began in the Upanisads properly. Many visible 
objects, like the sun, the moon and so on, and various psychic 
phenomena, like the mind, the vital breaths, etc. were put 
forward, but could not satisfy the great ideal that had been 
awakened. The ideal started with the idea of a supreme 
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controller (essence) of the universe and man. Here the 
primal entity is posited as Brahman. The Upani~ads recor.d 
the history of the proceedings of the quest up to the final 
mystic realization. When we merely look to this quest, we -
find that we have not yet gone out of the Brahm~ic and 
ArarlYaka conceptions, where Pr~a (vi tal breath) was regarded 
as the most essential function for the life of man for its 
superiority over all the senses and indispensibility for the 
life. This leads to the mediation of Frana as Brahman 
(Brh.2.2.1). So also, we ;find akasa (ether). (Brh.5.1), 
Aditya (sun), moon, lightning, ether!, fire, water, etc. 
(Brh.2.1), life and void (Chan 4.10.5), food, breath and mind 
(Taitt.J) and so on meditated upon as Brahman. But none 
could satisfy the ideal. It is also true that the effects of 
the sacrifical duties and magical element in it, lingered in 
the minds of the sages, while Brahman was regarded as a personal 
deity. The inadquacy of the explanation to bring out the 
nature of Brahman, can be found in Brh. 2.; l. Gargya Balaki 
A .- a/ t volunteering to expound Brahman before King ~~atru stars: 
"The person who is yonder in the sun - him indeed I worship 
as Brahman"; A.jatasatru said, 'Talk not to me about him; I 
worship him as the pre-eminent, the head and king of all 
beings'. Thus, protested, Gargya tried again and again for 
eleven times more, describing the Person in the moon, in the 
lightning and so on, ending with the Person in the body (Atman) 
as Brahman. He was refuted by the king each time. Being 
asked, A.iitasatru ultimately consented to bring out the 
conception of Brahman thus - "He verily 0 Biliki, who is the 
..,;4-
maker of all these persons (whom you have mentioned in 
succession), of whom verily this is the work- he verily 
should be known." The direct definition of the supreme 
entity could not be brought out, because Brahman is beyond 
the field of our cognition - (asabdam-asparsa:.-:-: ..:.rupam-
avyayam). With the illustration at hand, of a man awaking 
from sleep, Ajatasatru shows that finally Brahman is to be 
conceived of as that into which one goes to sleep and from 
which one wakes again. The conclusion is - "As a spider 
might come out with his thread, as small sparks come forth 
from the fire, even so, from this soul come forth all vital 
energies, all worlds, all gods, all beings. The mystic meaning 
thereof is 'the real of the real'"(Brh.2.1.20). This 
discourse is very important, as it is here, that the world-
ground is established to be Brahman. 
Ultimately it was realized that it was impossible to 
bring out a positive and definite content of the ultimate 
reality, i.e. Brahman. The approach changed into a negative 
method. Yajnavalk: ya, is the pioneer of expounding - 'He, 
the Atman, is not this nor this (neti neti). He is in-
conceivable, for -~he cannot be conceived, unchangeable for 
he is not changed, untouched, for nothing touches him; he 
cannot suffer by a stroke of the sword, he cannot suffer 
any injury' (Brh.4.5.15). Katha 3.15 declares - "That which 
is inaudible, intang~ble, invisible, indestructible, which 
cannot be tasted nor smelt, eternal, without beginning or 
end,greater than the great (mahat) and fixed - He who knows 
it is released from death". 
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The conception of Brahman developed into the conception 
of the transcendent reality as the essence. He is infinite 
and vast, yet the smallest of the small (mahato mahiyan 
anoranlyan), at once here and there, 'no characterization 
of him is possible, otherwise than with the denial to him 
of all empirical attributes, relations and definitions'. (lO) 
The doctrine of Atman is perhaps the most significant 
topic in the Upanisadic philosophy. We have already discussed 
the implication of the word Atman, in the ~gveda, where it 
denotes on the one hand the ultimate essence of the universe, 
and on the other hand, the 'vital breath' in man. (11 ) 
Later on, in the Upanisadic period we see an evident difference, , 
where the word Brahman is used in the former sense ( i. e. 
the ultimate essence of the universe), and the word Atman 
is used to denote the inmost essence in man. Furthermore, 
it is emphasized that the two are one and the same. (12 ) The 
doctrine of unity is the greatest contribution of the 
Upanisads. To quote Deussen - "It was here that for the first 
.. 
time the original thinkers of the Upanisads, to their immortal 
honour, found it when they recognized 'Our atrnan, our inmost 
individual being, as the Brahman, the inmost being of the 
universal nature and of all her phenomena". (13) 
On many occasions, the two terms Brahman and Atman are 
used as synonyms. The Ch. Upanif?ad. :frames the central question 
thus- 'Ko nu atma kim Brahma?' (Chand.5.11.1), i.e., 'What 
is Atman, what Brahman?' In certain contexts, the word 
-Atman is used to denote the source of the universe and the 
word Brahman is on the other hand used to denote the essential 
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reality in man. Through an inquiry into the true nature 
of one's own self, the realization of a non-dual reality 
had been felt of the diversified universe and the plurality 
of selves. 
As we have already discussed the Brahman theory, the 
approach to the highest reality in both the occasions has 
started with a gr~ss expression and has gradually deVeloped 
into subtle conceptions. We can mention here about the great 
philosophical contest, held at the court of K.~ng Janaka, 
where Gargi started questioning Yajnavalkya - 'since all 
this world is woven warp and woof on water, on what, pray, 
is the water woven warp and woof?' (Brh.III.6). Yajnavalkya 
answers- 'On wind o Gargi•. And thus through a ser~es of 
questions and answers, Yajnavalkya leads the inquiries to 
higher and higher worlds and lastly reaches to the point of 
Brahman as the highest reality. The questions beyond this 
becomes futile. 
Questioned by another questioner, Uddalaka, Yajnavalkya 
explained that the principle that lies behind all things, 
cosmic as well as individual, the principle which these 
things do not know but which controls them from within, is 
the inner ruler; and this ruler,said '·- -'I. . Yajnavalkya,was our 
own immortal self. "He who dwell:ing in all things_yet is 
other than all things do not know, whose body all things are, 
who controls all things from wi t"hin - He is your Self, the 
inner ruler, immortal". (Brh.III.715) 
Now the question as to 'ko nu atma?' i.e. what is Atrnan 
{Chan.5.11.1) remains to be discussed. A positive answer to 
the question is quite impossible. The Self of man involves 
an ambiguity. 
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The Indra-Virocana episode in the Chandogya Upanisad 
explores the reality in man, starting with the 'body'. Here 
Virocana - a representative of the asuras, is said to believe 
in the doctrine that the self or atman was identical with 
the botly. But Indra was not satisfied with this idea and 
-
through repeated attempts realized the Atman beyond the 
dreamself and the Self in deep sleep. Ultimately Prajapati 
explains the highest truth - "This body is the support of 
the deathless and bodiless self. The self as embodied is 
affected by pleasure and pain; the self when associated with 
the body cannot get rid of pleasure and pain, but pleasure 
and pain do not touch the bodiless Self" (Chan VIII.7-12). 
This anecdote shows that the Upanisadic seers sought an 
CJ 
eternal, changeless essence in man. Katha Upanisad describes: 
• 
'As the one fire has entered the world 
And becomes corresponding in form to every form/ 
being (bhuta) 
So the One Inner Self (antaratman) of all things 
Is corresponding in form to every form and yet 
is outside' (Katha V.9) 
The rsis sometimes tried to understand the t~ue meaning of 
-.-.. -
the atman by analysing the changes in the conditions of man 
in wakeful, dreaming and sleeping states. The conclusions 
they arrived at was that there can be four states of existence 
for human beings, namely, (i) the active wakeful state, (ii) 
the dreaming state, (iii) the deep sleep state, and (iv) the 
transcendental blissful state (tiiriva) (Mandll2.7). 'The three 
~ 
stages of waking, dream and deep sleep are respectively 
called VaiS'vanara, Tai.jasa, and Prajna. The fourth state 
is the real self, beyond the changing modes of existence. It 
is beyond empirical usage and it shines by its own light'. (l 4 ) 
-38-
In the state of turiva, all the functions of body and mind 
are stopped - only the essence of life-force exists. This 
is called the natural state of atman. 
In the Chandogya Upanisad, Uddalaka tells his son 
• 
Svetaketu - 'That which is the subtle essence, this whole 
world has for its self that is the true, that is the self. 
/ 
Tha.t art thou· . , Svetaketu' . Whoever, therefore, knew his 
own Atman, knew the atman of the universe, Brahman too. Thus, 
the atman was supposed to be the essence of all internal 
reality, while Brahman was described as the transcendent 
unity of the world. In this sense one is not different from 
the other. 
The ultimate reality, according to the Upani~ads, is 
neither subject nor object, but it underlies both subject 
and object. This truth can be realized only when the apparent 
distinction between the ~osmic and the individual f:orms may 
be broken. In the Chandogya Upanisad, the RPerson'seen in the 
I 
eye is identified with the one observed in the sun, (I.?.5.) 
and the mind and space are ~aentified as Brahman (III.l8.1). 
In the dialogue between Balaki and A.iatas'atr:u in Brh. II. 1, 
which is repeated i~ Kausitakf IV, there is first an 
objective approach to the problem of reality. Balaki refers 
to the Person in the sun and the moon as Brahman. .- I A.Jatasatru 
shows in each case that there is a deeper principle behind 
the cosmic phenomena. These are the adhidaiva forms of the 
reality. Then the discussion turns in the direction of 
Adhyatma forms like one's shadow, echo, body and eye. Finally, 
.- I AJatasatru gives a description of the cosmic soul from which 
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comes forth all worlds, all gods and all beings: He is 
·the seer of all seeing, the hearer of all hearing and the 
knower of all knowledge. He is the light of all lights. 
He is like a lump of salt, with no inner or outer, which 
consists through and through~entirely of savour, as in 
truth this atman has no inner or outer, but consists through 
and through entirely of knowiliedge (Vijnanamaya). Bliss is 
not an attribute to it, but it is itself Bliss. The state 
of Brahman is thus like the turiya stage, i.e. beyond dream-
less sleep. It is dearer to one than anything. It is for 
it and by it that things appear dear to us. This is our 
inmost Atman. (Kau IV) 
L .> The Absolute of the Upanisads manifests itself as the 
' 
'Subject' as well as the 'Object', and transcends them both. 
The self and the not-self are equally manifestations of the 
Absolute and are at the bottom one. The individual self is 
in fact no longer inclividual but universal. The microcosm 
and the macrocosm are essentially identical . 
• A Brahman scholar asked Yajnavalkya in the Brhadaranyaka, 
• 3 
"Explain to me the Brahman that is immediately present and 
directly perceived, who is the self in all things?"(l5) 
Yajnavalkya replied, "This is your self. That is within all 
things". In the Cnandogya Upanisad, Uddalaka teaches his son 
/ 
Svetaketu - "That which is the subtle essence, this whole 
world has for its self. That is the true, that is the self. 
That art thou Svetaketu". (Chan. VI.lO) Whoever knew his 
own self, knew Brahman. Atman as the inner reality and 
Brahman as the transcendent unity of the world were regarded 
as the same. The Taittiriya Upani~ad asserts - He who considers 
Brahman as non-existent questions his own existence". 
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c-
Some passages of the Upanisads assert that Brahman is 
0 
man himself and that nothing is superior to man. In the 
Brhadaranyaka, for example, we find the following regar~ing 
il u 
Brahman's relation to the self: "Whoever knows this, 'I 
am Brahman' becomes this all. Even the gods cannot prevent 
his becoming thus, for the becomes their self. So whoever 
worships another divinity (than himself) thinking that he is 
one and Brahman another, he knows not. 
The non-dual Brahman-Atman is conceived of in two forms 
in the Upani~ads - (i) as the all-inclusive ground of the 
universe- perishable, unmov~ng and actual (sa-prapanca); 
(ii) as the reality of which the universe is but an appearance -
imperishable, moving and true (ni~prapanca), (B~h.II.J.l-3). 
On these two different currents is based the divergence later 
on between the theistic and the absolutistic school of 
Vedanta. 
The Upani~adic view of the unitary principle behind the 
diversity of nature, seem to have two different aspects; one 
materialistic view that the universe is the outcome of a single 
material stuff underlying the whole universe; secondly, the 
idealistic view is that the unity behind the diversity of the 
. . . (16) 
un1verse 1s pure consc1ousness. 
The Upanisadic seers have pondered on the questions of 
II 
the reality and components of human personality, most critically. 
The simple questions like "Whence are we born? By what do 
• • -"' - I • 
we l1ve? .... " 1n the Svetasvatara Upan1sad, have become more 
' 
critical when we see the following quests: "Why does not mind 
keep still? Why is the human mind restless? .... " Or, 'When 
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a person fell asleep where was his intelligence and whence 
did it come back'? (Brh.II.l.l6) Different seers have 
I 
answered the questions in different ways. Yet all the Upani~ads 
have preached the existence of Atman (the inner self) which 
is the basis of human existence and which is one with 
Brahman - the ultimate reality of the universe. 
The term 'Jlva' (derived from the root jiv; which means 
'to live') applies to the human personality (individual soul). 
There are a few passages in the Upani~ads wh~ch apparently 
speak of two selves. The analogy of two birds best declares 
the apparent difference between Paramatman and Jivatman. 
"Two birds, ever united companions, cling to the self-same 
tree. Of these two, one eats sweet berries. The other looks 
on without eating. On the self-same tree a person immersed 
(in the sorrows of the world) is deluded and grieves on 
account of his want of strength. But he becomes free from 
sorrow when he sees the other who is worshipped (by man) and 
/ 
who is the lord, and also his greatness'. (Sve.IV.6.7.;Mund 
III.l.l-2) The Ka~ha compares the supreme self and the 
individual self to light (atapa) and shade (chaya). (Ka~ha III.l.) 
The Pr.asna Upanisad says, "From the Atman this life (prana) 
I a 
is born. Just as there is this shadow in the case of person, 
so is this (life i.e. the individual soul) connected therewith 
(i.e. the Atman)". (B~h III.J) 'Thus it will be seen that 
._ 
what makes for the state of jiva is the apparent conditioning 
of the self by a complex of body and mind. (l7) 
The older texts of the Upani~ads do not recognize any 
duality in the soul. The Brhadaranyaka says,: 
"' I 
"It is thy 
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soul, which is within all (Bfh.III.4.l;III.5.1). The 
immortal immanent soul dwells in the earth, the water, 
the fire, in space, wind, etc., yet is distinct from them 
and he rules them all from within (Brh.III.7.JT2J). This 
• 
Atman who alone exists is the knowing subject in us, and 
as such sustains the whole universe, in which is everything 
and b,eyond which is nothing, and with the knowledge of 
this Atman therefore all is known (Brh. 2.4.5). This is 
the pure idealistic view, which denies the existence of 
everything else besides the knowing subject. The other 
theory equates the conception of Atman with the old 
cosmogony and teaches that the Atman created the universe 
and then entered into it as the soul (Chan.6.J.2.). In 
fact it is for the first time here that we meet with the 
word jlvatman. Yet there is no proper criterion of the 
individual soul. The atman himself who creates the universe, 
-
enters into it as j~vatman. Eventally the universal atman 
omnipresent, omniscient and omnipotent is regarded as Brahman 
and the jlvatman (the self in living beings) not in any way 
distinct but individualized is called atman. 
All the Upani~ads, even the oldest ones, have made a 
distinction between the soul imprisoned in sams.ara and the 
divine emancipated soul (Chan.III.l4.4). Yet all the poetic 
differenciations are dominated by the consciousness of the 
unity of Atman. The Katha J.4 gives also a description of 
the individual soul as the Bhoktr (enjoyer). This enjoyer, 
the individual soul results from the union of the Atman 
(the supreme self) with the organs, manas (mind) and indriyas 
(sense organs) (Katha III.4.) 
. 
/ - / The Svetasvatara also 
/ 
mentions the individual soul as the Bhoktr, (Sve 1.8.9.12) 
where the contrast with the supreme self is brought out. 
The entire fifth chapter serves as a further exposition of 
this contrast. Furthermore, the individual self is here 
contrasted with the supreme self as being endowed with 
sapkalpa (volition), ahamkara (ego) and buddhi (intellect). 
Yet the individual self is identical with the supreme self. 
The question as to how and why this supreme self assumes 
the apparitional form and as an individual self become.s. fettered 
to the Samsara, first arises in the latest Upani~ads and 
the answers to them are unsatisfactory and indefinite. In 
Prasna III.l the question is proposed -"Whence does the 
prana (life-force) originate? And how does it enter into 
a 
this body?" The answer says - "From the atman this prana 
.. 
originates; as the shadow of a man so he projects himself on 
it; and he enters into the Body out of his own will 
(manokrtena)". This answer is not wholesome. 
Maitrl Upanisad III.2 explains after pbint~ng out the 
C) 
difference between the supreme and the individual Self: 
'assuredly his immortal atman continues to exist like the 
drop of water on the lotus flower; yet this atman becomes 
overcome by the qualities of Prakrti. Being thus overcome 
then it falls into an illusion and it fails to recognize. the 
holy creator subsisting in itself; but torn asunder and 
drifted by the stream of gunas it becomes without support, 
• 
weak, broken down, sensual, disordered and a prey to delusion, 
fancies 'This is I', 'This is mine' and fetters itself by 
its own action, as a bird by its nest'. 
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In the beginning the Atman alone in the form of a man 
was the universe, He gazed around; he saw nothing there 
but himself. Thereupon, he cried out at the beginning~ 
'It is I'. Thence originated the name 'I'. Therefore, 
today, when anyone is summoned, he answers first, 'It is I'. 
Here the I-consciousness, termed ahamkara, is the starting 
point. When this original idealism had been obscured by 
the advancing realism and a distinction had been set up 
between the supreme and the individual soul - then only 
ahamkara appeared4rnong the functions or organs of the 
individual soul. 
According to the Upani~ads, Atman is at the root of all 
our senses and experiences. Chahdogya VIII.l2.4.says, 
"When the eye directs itself into space, it is the spirit in 
the eye, the eye (itself) serves (only) for seeing, and if 
a man desires to smell, that is the atman, the nose serves 
only for odour II . . . . This essential identity of the organs 
with the atman lies in the basis of the expression in the 
Mundaka II.l.J- "From it originates breath, the mind, and 
all senses." 
In Chandogya 6.5, manas, prana and speech are said to 
!I 
be the most subtle products of the elements, food, water, and 
heat, created by the atman. To the organs of the individual 
atman, there correspond in the universe, the forces of nature 
(nature gods) as organs of the cosmical atman. Similar to the 
idea, which we learn from the hymn of the Purusa (RV.X90.13-14), 
Aitareya I.l-2 presents the gods, Agni, Vayu, Aditya, Dis, etc. 
as originating:from the mouth, nose, eyes, ears, etc. of the 
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primeval man, and these then enter into the individual 
man as speech, smell, sight, hearing and so on. 
The name indriya for the organs of senses is first found 
in the Kausitaki U~nisad 2.15. Still in the end, they are 
again described by the old name Pranas. The oldest passage 
which cites the ten later indriyas complete, with the 
addition of manas and hrdayam in Brhadaranyaka 2.4.4 and 
4.5.12. With manas and without hrdayam in the later total 
• 
of eleven·f'o they appear first in Prasna 4. 2, in evident 
contrast with the five Pranas; while in the continuation of 
the passage (Prasna 4.8) there are enumerated five elements, 
five tanmatras, ten indriyas, with their objects, together 
with manas, buddhi, ahamkara, cittam, te.jas and prana. 
.. 
This passage is the precursor of the Vedanta's sixteen-fold 
enumeration of the·.~psychical organs, and at the same time, 
of the Sa~khya's twenty-five tattvas (principles). 
Manas (mind) is regarded as the central organ of the 
eleven organs, and the other ten are subordinated to the 
mind. 
In the Taittiriya doctrine of Kosas (Taitt.II) five 
sheaths of the soul are mentioned - (i) annarasamaya, which 
is the outermost sheath made of food, viz, the physical body; 
pranamaya, the sheath of vital airs; monomaya, the sheath of 
• 
rniild;,vijnanamaya, the sheath of knowledge, and anandamaya, 
the sheath of bliss. The Katha compares the self to the 
.. 
Lord of the chariot, the body to the chariot, the intellect 
to the charioteer, the mind to the reins, the senses to the 
horses and the sense objects to the roads (Ka~ha III.J.4). 
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The body (annamaya) and breath (pranamaya) are the physical 
G 
basis of soul's enjoyment. The vijnanamaya and the 
anandamaya, which are higher than the manomaya represent 
the moral and supra-moral levels of experience. The 
Brhadaranyaka 2.2.1 describes the body of 'a new-born-infant' 
• r 
(man) as Er~a's abode, of which the head forms the roof, 
in which it is bound to the breath as posts, by food as ropes. 
The most interesting problem of the Upani~adic psychology 
still remains to be the sheath of the soul which is enumerated 
in Tai ttiriya. It s,ay.s, "Within this physical body whibh 
is made up of food, is another body which is made up of 
breath; the former is filled with the latter which is also 
like the shape of man. More internal than the body which 
is made up of breath is another body which consists of mind; 
the former is filled with the latter, which is again like 
unto the shape of man. More internal still than the mental 
body is anbther body which is full of intelligence; the 
former is filled up with the latter, which is again like unto 
the shape of man. Finally still more internal than this 
body of intelligence. is an6ther body, consisting of bliss; 
the former is filled with the latter, which still is like the 
shape of man"(Taitt.II.l). 
Ranade is not very happy with the problem of the sheaths. He 
comments - "It was possibly such a passage as this which has 
been responsible for spreading such a notion as that of the 
Pancakosas or the five. bodies of man." He further comments-
"What are by difference called the 'bodies' of man in the 
Upani~ads, are nothing more than mere allegorical representations 
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of certain psychological conceptions. Man is made up of a 
physical body, of vital air, of mind and intellect, and of 
the faculty which enables him to enjoy an exstatic ®ew:ptce. 
(enjoyment). (l8 ) 
The soul~ in the view of the Upanisads, is not born with 
• 
the body, nor does it perish with it. "The wise one (i.e. 
the soul) is not born; nor does it die. This one has not 
come from anywhere; nor has it become anyone,.Unborn, constant, 
eternal, primeval, this one is not slain when the body is 
slain" (Kau II.l8). What happens in death is only the decease 
of the physical body. The soul migrates from life to life, 
being conditioned by the cause of such migration - ignorance, 
and by the instrument which enables it to migrate i.e., the 
'subtle body'. The first vivid refference of the transmigration 
doctrine is found in the Brhadaranyaka Upanisad, there 
. - . 
Yajnavalkya enumerates the basis of rebirth as karman (Kau XXX.5) 
In Chandogya this is said of a dying man - "In the case 
of this man, my dear Sir, when he dies, his speech enters 
into the manas, manas into the prana; prana into the heat, heat 
:; 6 
into the supreme god-head" (Chan 6.8.6; 6.15.2). Here, 
/ 
acc·ording to Sarpkara (Com. on sutra 4. 28) as by speech the 
indriyas as a whole are to be understood, so by heat (tegas) 
the elements as a whole are to be understood, as they constitute 
the subtle body on the departure of the soul. According to 
the words of the text however, nothing further is implied here 
than the thought that the organs, manas, prana and speech 
0 
have been derived by means of food, water and heat (Chan. 6.5); 
from the 'one being without a second'; at death they are again 
res6lved into it as the supreme godhead. 
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Another important passage in the Bfhadaraqyaka (Brh.4.4.5) 
runs thus - "In truth, this self is Brahman, consisting 
of knowledge, manas, like, eye and ear, consisting of earth, 
water, wind and other, consisting of fire (and not of fire) 
of desire and not of desire, of anger and not of anger, of 
justice and not of justice, consisting of this or that, exactly 
as he acts, exactly as he moves, so will he be born; he who 
does good will be born good, he who does evil will be born 
evil, he becomes holy by holy deeds, evil bY, evil". This 
passage enumerates as the permanent companions of the soul 
the organs and the five elements, as changing factors, the 
moral qualities. This is an evident instance of the develop-
ment of the idea of the subtle body. We may also cite 
an~ther verse to explain (Brh.IV,4.6.): 
'To this he clings, after this he aspires by his 
actions. Whereby this inner self (lingam) and 
his des ire ( manas) abide' . • 
Here we find the mention of the technical term 'lingam', 
I 
which is used mainly by Sa~khya to mean the 'subtle body'. 
/ -The li~gasarira is described in Sarvopani~at 16 as the vehicle 
of the organs, the pra~as, the gu~as and the ethical 
qualifications and accordingly is identified with the bands 
of the heart. That the actions or karma determine the form-
ation of the next life, is often emphasized in the Upanisads 
" 
(B7hadarar:yaka 3.2.13; 4.5-$, Chand.3.14.1, Kaijha 5.7., fga 
17 and so on). The gross body which abandons the soul at 
death, as the mango fruit its stalk, must be distinguished 
from the subtle body which as a vehicle to the psychical organs, 
accompanies the soul on its wanderings till the time of 
release. 
So far I have discussed the fragments from the Vedas 
and the Upanisads, which enumerate the conception of human 
.. 
personality in the Vedic literature. The Vedanta system 
has evolved directly from the Upani9adic philosophy. So 
this will give a background to the further systematization 
and development of the concept of human personality in the 
Advaita Vedanta system, which follows next. 
Section B - VEDANTA CONCEPTIONS IN GAUDAPADAS'S MANDUKYA KARIKA 
.. 
According to the Vedantic tradition, the first available 
treatise on Advai ta Vedanta, is the Karikas on the I.Vla.l)dukya 
Upanisad, written by Gauqapada. His work - the Mandukya 
u fjL 5' 
Karika, is one of the earliest embodiments of the doctrine of 
.,.. 
strict monism. Samkara cordially welcomes him as his 
a 
paramaguru (predecessor) and deilares that to him is due the 
credit of recovering and restating the absolutist creed which 
he holds to be the true teaching of the Veda. Gauqapada sets 
forth at times in a rather extreme form, what later becomes 
some of the main principles of Classical Advaita. It is 
acknowledged on all hands that Gau9apada was greatly influenced 
by the Buddhistic philosophy of Vijnanavada and Sunyayada. (l9) 
The main doctrine that Gaugapada puts forth is called ajativada -
the theory of no origination. According to ajativada the 
entire world of duality is merely an appearance: nothing 
ever really comes into being, for nothing other than Brahman 
really exists - the whole world is an illusion like a dream. 
Gau~ap~da~a work is divided into four chapters~ In the 
first chapter, he begins with the four apparent manifestations 
of the self. When the self knows the external object~ in the 
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waking condition, it is called Visva. It is Taijasa in 
the dream state; it knows dream-cognitions. It is Prajna 
in the dreamless sleep. . / The V1sya stage enjoys gross 
objects; the Taijasa enjoys subtle objects, and the Prajna 
enjoys bliss. But the itman is beyond them all; it is 
subject-objectless transcendental consciousness. Gaugapada 
describes the fourth state of the self as unseen (adrsta), 
j' •• 
unrelationamle (avyavaharyam), ungraspable (agrahyam), 
unspeakable (avyapadesyam), the essence as oneness with the 
self, as the extinction of the appearance, and quiescent 
(santam), - the good (sivam) and one 
(advaita). The world appearance would have ceased if it 
had existed, but all this duality is mere maya (illusion). 
The one is the ultimate real. 
In the second chapter, Gauqapada explains what unreality 
of the world means. That, which neither exists in the beginning 
nor:;_in the end, cannot be said to exist in the present. The 
appearance has a beginning and an end, and is therefore 
false. There is first the imagination of a perceiver, a soul, 
and then along with it the imaginary1creations of diverse 
inner states and the external world. Just as in darkness the 
rope is imagined to be a snake, so the self is also imagined 
by its own illusions in diverse forms, 
In the third chapter, Gaugapada sa,ys that truth is like 
the void (akasa) which is falsely conceived as taking part in 
birth and death, coming and going and as existing in all 
bodies. Duality is a distinction imposed upon the Advaita by 
Maya. In the fourth chapter called Alatasanti, Gau~apada 
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further describes the final state. The existence of all 
things is like a magical illusory elephant (mayahasti) and 
exists only as far as it merely appears or is related to 
experience. All things are regarded as being produced 
from a relative point of view only (samvrti);there is therefore 
nothing permanent. At times Gaudapada blurs the distinction 
. 
between waking and dream consciousness, a.distinction which 
,.. 
Samkara later insists upon, and suggests that the whole of 
• 
our waking experience is exactly the same as an illusory and 
insubstantial dream . 
. The empirical world is said to have for it's substratum, 
the Atman, which in reality is a non-cognition of all duality 
( MK 1. 13.17). "The world of duality is mere maya, the real 
/ 
being the non-individual" (MK II.17). Sal!lkara says - "The 
variety of experience subsists in the Atman, as the snake does 
in the rope" (SB on MK II.l2 ,19). We should not say that the 
Atman converts itself into the world. It gives birth to 
things, as a rope does to a snake, and not in reality (SB on 
MK III.27;2.17). It appears to become many only through maya. 
According to Gaugapada, if the world is the objectivisation 
of the mind (cittadrsyam) imposed on the absolute Atman, so 
. 
is the jiva. The individuation of the Atman into the many 
jivas is only apparent. Atman is compared to universal space, 
and the;~~qi::va, the same enclosed in a jar; and when the 
enclosure is destroyed, the limited space (ghatakaS'a) merges 
Q 
into the universal space itself. Even as we cannot say that 
the limited space is either a part (avayava) or an effect 
(vikara) of universal space, we cannot say that the jlva is 
either a part or an effect of the Atman. · The two are one, 
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and the differences are apparent, though for practical 
purposes we!· have to treat the two as distinct (MK III. 3-14). 
Thus, in Gau~apad4's view, jiva is not anontological reality 
but an empirical reality. Under the veiling influence of 
beginningless maya or cosmic nescience, jiva believes itself 
to be real; but when it revives from the influence of maya, 
it realizes its eternal non-dual. nature. The jiva is an unreal 
appearance. The world-appearance is infected with duality. 
All duality is a mere appearance; non-duality is the ontological 
reality. If the w:orld-appearance were existent, it could be 
destroyed; but it is an unreal appearence (MK.I.17-18). 
Brahman or Atman is the ontological reality. Neither the 
jiva nor the world is real. 
Thus Gau~apada lays the foundation of Advaita Vedanta which 
,.. 
was elaborated by Samkara and his followers later. Nagarjuna 
/ . 
called the ontological reality sunya (vo1d), which is the 
. 
predicateless absolute. Gauqapada calls the same conception 
Brahman or Atman, which is one, eternal, non-dual, pure 
consciousness. Gauqapada, like Nagarjuna, distinguishes between 
the two degrees of the truth, viz. , ontological trruth and 
empirical truth (i.e. samvrti 
. 
satya - veil of appearence) 
(MK I.17; 2.1; 4. 32). 
Gauqapada, like Vijnanavadins, argues that empirical objects 
are the subjective creations of the mind (citta). These 
illusory objects have no existence apart from the mind. It 
cannot apprehend an object either in the past, or in the present 
or in the future. So its cognitions are objectless, uncaused 
and illusory. All empirical objects are unreal like dreams 
because they are due to samvrti. The mind is simply nirvisaya 
" 
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or objectless- it is always unattached (asanga). The empirical 
J 
mind (grahaka) and the empirical objects are due to agitation 
of the mind (MK . IV.72). All are appearences of one eternal 
pure consciousness - Brahman or Atman (MK IV.6?). It is 
the argument of the Vijfianavadin, that the Atman is neither 
a substance:; nor a non-substance, so it can be neither a cause 
nor an effect. Empirical minds are not produced by the mind 
(citta). Causality is an appearence. So long as the intellect 
views the empirical world through category of causality, 
empirical life persists. Nagarjuna also holds the same view. 
Only he substitutes the sunya for Brahman; empirical objects 
• 
are not really produced; their production is illusory like 
magic or maya, and maya is not real. eaugapada converts the 
~unya of Nagarjuna into Brahman, though he uses the same 
' 
language and the same arguments. 
Gaugapada has mentioned different theories of creation. 
He maintains that it is the inherent nature (svabhava) of God 
that He should create the world. He is eternally fulfilled 
and so cannot have any desire. Brahman associated with maya 
produces all jlvas or individual souls (MK I.?-9). Brahman 
is unconditioned and conditioned(para and apara). Unconditioned 
Brahman is the one eternal consciousness beyond space, time, 
and casuality. Conditioned Brahman is God, who is transcendent 
to and immanent in all creatures. God is Brahman associated 
with maya. By His own magical power (svamayaya) He imagines 
the multiple worlds as souls. He imagines the variety of 
cognitions and the variety of objects. He creates objects 
through His power of maya and is deluded as it were, by His 
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own creation. The world is neither different nor non-
different from Brahman. One Brahman is equally present 
everywhere. All things are uncaused (ajati) eternal 
Brahman. Creation is thus not real. 
The jlva or individual soul is said to be born as it 
were from the universal soul or Brahman in conjunction 
with body (samghata) which is its adjunct, even as the ether 
I 
limited in a jar is said to be born from the ubiquitous 
ether (mahaka{a) though in reality, they are identical with 
each other. When the jar is destroyed, the ether in it is 
merged into the ubiquitous _ether. So when the body is 
destroyed, the individual soul becomes the universal soul. 
']he:,adj unct of) body. individualizes the ,j iva. l.rJhen the 
limiting adjunct is destroyed, it realizes its identity with 
Brahman. Though the universal soul is one, the individual 
souls are many owing to their limiting adjuncts. When one 
-individu~ soul feels pleasure or pain, other jivas do not 
feel pleasure or pain, even as the ether limited by one jar 
soiled by dust, smoke arid the like, does not soil the ether 
limited by any other jar. Ether is one, but its differences 
are due to its limiting adjuncts. Likewise, Brahman is one; 
its empirical pluralityPas jivas~is due to its limiting 
adjuncts. Just as the , .ether limited in a jar is neither a 
part nor a modification of the ubiquitous ether, so the jiva 
is neither a part nor a modification of the Brahman. Just as 
the ubiquitous ether appears to be soiled with smoke to 
ignorant persons, so the universal soul appears to be subject 
to birth and death to ignorant persons. All adjuncts of body 
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and the like are the products of avidya of the individual 
soul (atma-maya). They are not ontological realities. 
They are imaginary creations of the jiva deluded by avidya. 
The universal soul (paro jfva) is the self of the five 
sheaths - the bodily sheath, the vital sheath, the mental 
sheath, the intellectual sheath and the blissful sheath. 
Identity of the individual soul with the universal soul is 
real. Difference between them is accidental. Their 
difference is due to the limiting adjuncts of the bodies and 
the like. When the jivas are said to spring out of Brahman 
like the sparks of a fire, their non-difference from It is 
emphasized. There is absolutely no difference between them 
(MK III. 3-14). When the jiva breaks the delusion of avidya, 
it realizes its identity with the Brahman (MK I.16). The 
jiva is never born. Dr. Dasgupta comments - "It is so obvious 
that these doctrines are borrowed from the Madhyamika doctrines, 
as found in Nagarjuna's karikas and the Vijnanavada doctrines, 
as found in Lankavatara, that it is needless to attempt to 
prove it. Gau~apada assimilated all the Buddhist sunyavada 
and Vijnanavada teachings and thought that these held good 
of the ultimate truth preached by the Upani~ads". (20) 
However, Gau~apada's doctrines of Brahman and Maya and 
the identity of the world appearence and the jivas with 
Brahman are derived from the Upani~ads. He says - "This was 
"" not spoken by Buddha". Sarokara says - "The non-dual ontological 
reality devoid of cognitions, congnized objects and cognizer 
was not taught by Buddha. It is the teaching of.the Vedanta ... (2l) 
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Section C - THE VEDANTA SUTRAS OF BADARAYANA 
The Vedas have been investigated systematically in 
two different directions, viz., the PITrva-mfmansa of Jaimini, .;;;.....;;..;.;;;;.....;.~-----
dealing with the ethical side of the Vedic literature, and 
the Uttaramimansa of Badaraya~a, investigating the theological 
and philosophical side of it in the Upani~ads. Badarayaqa's 
work in known as Vedanta-Sutras. He tried to systematize 
the various strands of the Upani~ads which form the back-
ground of the orthodox systems of thought. The Vedanta~sUtras 
is also called BRAHMA-SUTRA because it is an exposition of 
the doctrine of the Brahman. It is officially called -
Sariraka-m1mansa-su-tra, meaning the 'threads of the €nquiry 
into that which is embodied' (taking the members of the 
compound backwards). It deals with the embodiment of the 
unconditioned self. 
The Vedanta-sutras are based on the Vedic texts and are 
thus self-validating. The commentators of the Brahma-sutras 
agree that it was intended to be a summary of the Upani~ads. 
The sutras were intended to be a collection of short sayings 
in which the essence of the Vedanta was to be preserved; as 
/ 
Sa~kara puts it - 'they string together the flowers of the 
Vedanta passages'. (22 ) Badaraya~a's systemization removes 
apparent contradictions in the doctrines, binds them systematically 
together and is specially concerned to defend them against 
the attacks of the opponents. The mantras from the Upani~ads 
were moActed into signifying the different trends of thought 
in one system, called Vedanta. 
The Vedanta-sutras of Badarayaqa were written probably in 
the early 1st century B.C. ~ere are numerous commentaries on 
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the sutras from the very early days. There is reason to 
believe as mentioned by Dasgupta, that the Brahmasutras 
were interpreted first of all by some Vaisnava writers who 
held some 'modified dualism'. Everyone claimed that his 
interpretation of the sUtras was the only one which was 
faithful to the sutras. However, there are two different 
interpretations of the Brahmasutra - one dualistic and the 
other monistic. Dasgupta believes that the dualistic 
interpretation of the sutras were probably more ·faithful to 
the sutras than the interpretations of Samkara. ( 23) The pure 
monism of the Upani~ads, scattered here and there, were not 
supposed to formulate a definite monistic system. There were 
I - I 
the dualistic tendencies all along in the Svetasvatara 
Upani9ad and the like. The epic Sa~khya developed from the 
dualistic literature. The Brahmasutras by themselves do not 
follow the monistic trend wholly. 
We shall here discuss the contents of the Vedanta-sutras 
/ 
in order to understand Samkara-Vedanta properly. The Vedanta-
sutra has four chapters. The first deals with the theory of 
Brahman as the eternal reality. Here, there is an account 
of the nature of Brahman, its realtion to the world and the 
individual soul. The second meets objections brought against 
this view and criticizes rival theories. It also gives an 
account bf the nature of the dependence of the world on God 
and the gradual evolution from, and reabsorption into him; in 
the latter part (VS III.15) there are interesting psychological 
d~scussions about the nature of the soul, its attributes, 
its relation to God, body and its own deeds. The third 
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discusses the ways and means (sadhana) of attaining Brahma-
vidya. We have in it an account of rebirth and minor 
psychological and theological discussions, together with 
many exegetical comments. The fourth deals with the fruits 
of Brahma-vidya. 
According to the Vedanta-siitra, the Purusa and Prakrti 
of the Samkhya are not independent substances, but 
" 
modifications of a single reality. A plurality of true 
infinites is not possible. The one infinite substance, 
Brahman, is identified with the highest reality set forth in 
the Upanisads. In the first chapter we have a discussion of 
. 
the several descriptions of Brahman given in the Upanisads 
"' 
(VS I.2.J). He is the origin, support and end of the world 
(VS !.1.2), the efficient and the material cause of the 
universe. He creates witho~implements (VS !!.1.23-27). A 
psychological proof of the reality of Brahman is offered on 
the evidence of dreamless sleep (VS !.1.9). Brahman is not 
to be confused with the unintelligent pradhana, or the 
individual soul. He is p:ossessed of all dharmas. His cosmic 
aspects are also brought out. He is the cosmic light, the 
golden person in the sun, the cosmic space or aka~a and the 
cosmic breath or air or prana. He is also the light in the 
" 
soul. He is to be contemplated as residing in the heart of 
man (VS !.2.7), and we are allowed to look upon the omnipresent 
God as occupying a limited space. The ultimate ground of 
things is a single supreme spirit, which is the source of 
everything and an adequate object of unqualified adoration 
and worship ( VS I. 1·; 7). 
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How unintelligent things and intelligent souls can be 
related to the one supreme? The sutra does not give a clear 
lead. The vagueness of the Upanisad's view of creation 
? 
remains in it. Brahman itself uncreated and eternal, is 
the whole universe (VS I.l.5; 2.1). Every material element 
is created by Brahman (VS II.).7.). If it is assumed that 
through the activity of the primary elements the evolution 
of the world takes place, even then it is Brahman that confers 
the-; power, through the exercise of which the evolution takes 
place. As it is said, Brahman after creating the elements, 
enters them, and it is Brahman dwelling in the elements that 
effects the production of other things (VS II.J.lJ). 
' Badarayaqa believes that the power of creation belongs 
to the pure, stainless Brahman, even as heat belongs to fire 
(VS I.J.l). Brahman for its own sport develops itself into 
the world without undergoing the change ~nd without ceasing 
to be itself. Badarayana says that the soul is jna, which 
"" 
,. 
Sa~kara interprets as intelligence. The individual soul is 
an agent (karta) (VS II.J.JJ-39). Birth and death refer to 
the body and not to the soul, which has no beginning. It is 
eternal (VS II.J.18). The jivitman is said to be anu (atomic). 
/ 
Samkara is of the opinion that the soul is all-pervading or 
vibhu, though it is considered to be atomic in the worldly 
condition. Badarayarya holds that Brahman is in the individual 
soul, though the nature of Brahman is not touched by the 
character of the soul. As the jiva and Brahman are different 
as the light of the sun and the sun, and as when the=llight is 
covered by clouds the sun is not affected, even so when the 
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-jiva is subjected to pain, Brahman is not. The statements, 
'That art thou' and 'This Atman is Brahman', attempt to 
show that the two Brahman and Atman, God and man, are in 
reality one. If Brahman be the cause of everything, it must 
be the cause of the individual soul as well. Every 
individual shares in the spirit of God. It is not clear, 
from Badaraya~a's account, in what exact manner the individual 
is related to Brahman as a part (amsa) or reflection (abhasa) 
-.-
of the universal self (SV II.2.48 & 50). Badarayana looks 
upon the difference between Brahman and the individual soul 
as ultimate, i.e. something which persists even when the 
soul is released. The jiva, though minute in size, pervades 
the whole body even as a little sandal ointment refreshes the 
whole body (VS II.J.2J). When the jlva passes out of the 
body, it does so, enveloped by the subtle senses, mind (manas) 
and the chief pdina ( VS III. I. 1-7; IV. 2. 3-21). It takes 
' 
rebirth along with them. 
Thus Badaraya~a conforms to the Upani~adic teachings to 
a great extent. The human personality, according to him, is 
nothing but the Brahman in_reality. The example of the 
relation between Brahman and the individual self as that 
between the sun and its rays establishes it. Yet there is 
something which stops the individual self to be Brahman. 
That is its conjunction with the physical entity. These early 
literatures on Vedanta helped quite a lot to give rise to 
the later systematic Advaita-Vedanta. 
-61-
/ -Section D - ADVAITA VEDANTA OF SAMKARACHARYA 
" / 
According to the Vedantic tradition, Sa~kara is the real 
/ 
founder' of the Advaita-Vedanta system. Samkara (788A.n. to 
• 
820A.D.) wrote a commentary on the Vedanta sutras of 
Badarayana and a number of commentaries on different 
.. 
Upani~ads. 
In the words of Van Buitenen- 'Advaita Vedanta'is that 
school of Ved~nta, which affirms that Reality or Brahman is 
non-dual (a-dvaita), that the world is false (mithya) -
the product of a creative illusion (maya), and that the 
human being is essentially non-different from Brahman. 
Advaita-Vedanta has occupied the dominant position in Indian 
philosophy from the time of Samkara (ninth century) to the 
" 
present day. It's prestige in fact, has been such that the 
very term Vedanta is often made synonymous with it. <24 ) 
; 
Sa~kara emphasized on the monistic trend of the Upani~ads 
and developed it into a systematic Advaita-Vada. He tried 
to show that the Upani~ad passages could be coherently 
interpreted only on the basis of non-dualism and that any 
other interpretation of the ideas of the Upani~ads was open 
to objections. Samkara is described as a 'rigorous monist' 
by Kirtikar, ( 25) and perhaps such a phrase gives us most 
concisely the key-note of his teaching. He asserts one 
reality, and only one, for there is no such thing as plurality 
or difference anywhere. 
--From Sa~kara's commentaries on the Brahma-sutras and 
the Upani~ads, it becomes obvious that he is controverting 
dualistic interpretations of the teaching of the Upani~ads. 
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_, 
Samkara himself says that he is attempting the commentary 
• 
to demonstrate the unity of the Self (itmaikatva).< 26 ) It is 
called the 'idealistic monism' by K. Werner. (27) He 
emphasizes the reality of the unconditioned and unqualified 
(nirguna) Brahman, and regards f6vara (God), jiva (the 
. 
individual soul) and jagat (world) as appearances due to an 
undefinable principle called Maya, which is neither real nor 
unreal, nor both, nor neither (and thus anirvacani~). God 
is said to be Brahman associated with maya in its excellent 
aspect. Jlva is Brahman associated with avidya in its inferior 
aspect. Jiva is in essence, identical with Brahman or Atman. 
Brahman is the only reality. It is one, eternal, pure, 
transcendental consciousness. It transcends the duality of 
subject and object. It transcends the empirical categories 
of space, time, substance, causality, change and the like. 
It is one homogenious consciousness. He advocates the 
ontological reality of the unconditioned and unqualified 
Brahman only. The world is only an appearance of Brahman. 
/ 
Sa~kara recognized the empirical reality (vyavaharikasatta) 
of the individual souls (jiva) and the world-appearance, for 
practical purposes. He advocates 'vivartavada' in his theory 
of causation. The effect is an appearance of the cause. Thus, 
Brahman as the cause is real. The world as the effect is 
its appearance. ./ The main contention of Samkara's conception 
~ 
of the human personality is that it is ontologically unreal 
and thus is a mere appearance of the ultimate reality. 
I - BRAHMAN: 
/ 
Brahman is the only ontological reality in the Samkara-
Vedanta (eka-meva hi paramarthasatyam-Brahma: SB Taitt.Up II/6). 
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It is the supreme, perfect and absolute reality. According 
/ 
to Samkara, ~rahman is the cause of the origination, 
0 
subsistence and dissolution of the world, which is extended 
in names and forms and which consists of many agents and 
enjoyers (SB I.1.2) such as, - (1) this world must have been 
produced as the modification of something which is itself 
unproduced. Brahman is the source and if it is produced from 
something else, we will have anavastha or regress-us ad 
infinitum; (2) the world is so orderly that it could not 
have come forth from a non-intelligent source. Brahman is 
the intelligent source; (J) this Brahman is the immediate 
consciousness (saksin) which shines as the self and also 
through the objects of congnition which the self knows. Even 
when we deny it, we affirm it. Moreover, the existence of 
Brahman is proved as the self of all beings. Everyone knows 
the existence of his own self. No one knows that he does not 
exist. The existence of the self (atman) which is self-
existent and self-proved, proves the existence of Brahman 
(SBS I.l.l). Sa~karacharya has shown in his commenatary on 
the Vedanta-sutra (SB III.2.22) how the contemplation of 
finite things leads to a direct discernment of the supreme as 
~ 
their absolute source. Sa~kara says - "whenever we deny 
sometfu~ng unreal we do so with reference to something real. 
The unreal snake, for example, is n~gatived with reference to 
the real rope. But this is possible only if some entity is 
left. If everything is denied, then no entity is left, and 
if no entity is left, the denial of some other entity which 
we may wish to undertake becomes real and cannot be nagatived." 
(SB.III 2.22). (2B) 
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The question now arises - what is the nature of Brahman? 
Brahman is Truth or Existence, Knowledge and Infinite: 
satyam jnanam anantam Brahma (Taitt. II.l.l). Brahman is 
Knowledge and Bliss: vijnanam anandam Brahma (Brh. III.9.28). 
It is eternal, infinite and supreme Bliss. Brahman is 
immortal (amrta) and imperishable (aksara); it is not limited 
by time, space or objects. It is certainly fulfilled 
(nityatrpta), and so it is of the nature of Bliss. Thus, 
s 
Existence, Knowledge and Bliss constitute essential characters 
(svarupalaksana) of Brahman. They distinguish Brahman from 
the world-appearance which is unreal (anrta), non-intelligent 
' 
(ja1a) and of the nature of pain (dukha) (SBS I.J.9,10). 
Brahman transcends the past, present and future, and also 
transcends causes and effects which are empirical phenomena. 
It further transcends all empirical existence (SB Ka~ha.Up. 
I.2.14); it is attributeless (nirguna) and indeterminate 
• 
(nirvisesa) real being (sat) (SB Ch.Up.VIII.l.l). Yet Brahman 
appears to be qualified by attributes (saguna) to the intellect 
. 
perverted by ignorance (avidya). 
The nature of Brahman is difficult to comprehend. It is 
the negation of all attributes which we attribute to the 
,. 
world of experience. The Upanisads, as well as Samkara 
' v 
(SB.Prasna Up.IV.l) deny Brahman both being and non-being of 
the type with which we are familiar in the world of experience. 
We can at best say what Brahman is not, and not what it is. 
It transcends the opposition of permanence and change - whole 
and part, relative and absolute, finite and infinite, which 
are all based on the oppositions of experience. Brahman is 
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infinite and it is 'not a person, since personality cannot 
be realized except under the limiting condition of a non-ego'. (29) 
When the 'absolute' is said to be nirguna, this only means that 
0 
it is trans-empirical, since gunas are products of prakrti 
• G 
and the 'absolute' is superior to it. The'absolute' persists 
as the permanent among all the changes. So it transcends the 
gunas or the phenomenal being. 
9 
The Upanisads say nirguno 
~ . 4 
-gu~i, to establish that. On that account it is not to be 
regarded as a mere blank. Brahman is of the nature of ultimate 
consciousness and yet knows nothing, since empirical 
cognition is a modification of the internal organ. Knowledge 
in fact is its essence and not its property. 
Brahman is thus the supreme reality - it is noumenal 
and immutable. It appears as mere names and forms in the 
universe; this entire universe is Brahman itself (SB Mund.Up 
J 
II.2.12). Brahman is one; it has no genus (samanya) or species 
(viiesa); it has no activity or quality; it is indefinable; 
it is devoid of the homogeneous (sajatiya), heterogeneous 
(vijatiya) or internal difference (svagatabhedaJ. It is 
distinctionless; it is not an enjoyer of joy and sorrow, since 
it is devoid of merits and demerits. 
The Upanisads speak of the higher Brahman (parabrahma) 
and the lower Brahman (aparabrahma). The former is unconditioned, 
indeterminate and attributeless; the latter is conditioned, 
determinate and qualified by attributes; the former is trans-
empirical and non-phenomenal; the latter is empirical and 
phenomenal; the former is transcendent; the latter is both 
transcendent and immanent. Existence, consciousness and bliss 
constitute the essence of the 1ndeterminate Brahman. Omnipotence 
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and omniscience are the characteristics of the determinate 
Brahman, conditioned by avidya or maya: he is the empirical 
lord of the world of phenomena; he is the intermediate· 
principle between Brahman and the empirical world. This 
-I principle (viz. ~ara Brahman) is called Isvara (God). 
_I 
II - ISVARA: 
- _, 
In Sa~kara-Vedanta, Isvara occupies a vital position as 
the intermediary between the transcendent Brahman and the 
/ 
empirical world. Samkara gives the cosmological, teleological 
, 
and moral arguments for the existence of God. 16vara is the 
cause from which proceeds the origin, subsistence and 
dissolution of the world of appearances (SBS I.l.4,5) which 
are differentiations of names and forms, with many agents and 
enjoyers, which is the abode of the fruits of their actions, 
and so on. Omniscient and omnipotent God is the cause of the 
world (SBS I.l.2). He is both the materi~l cause and the 
efficient cause of the world (SBS I.l.5; X.2.2). 
ISvara is the determinate Brahman. He is Brahman conditioned 
by maya or the cosmic neiscience. Isvara is a phenomenal 
appearance; He is eternal, pure, conscious, free and omniscient. 
But He is conditioned by the pure sattva of maya (which is 
composed of the triple qualities of sattva, rajas and tam~). 
He is not an enjoyer; he is only an onlooker, He is of the 
nature of pure consciousness, but he produces multiform objects 
with the aid of the different impure adjuncts of names and 
forms (SB.Katha.II.2.12). He is inactive in his essential , 
nature, but active in association with maya (SBS II.2.?). 
He is independent of the body and sense organs (SBS I.1.5). 
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/ -/ Samkara sometimes uses the term Brahman to denote Isvara, 
• 
but the differences between them are too great to be confused 
with each other. While Brahman is the 'trans-personal 
ground and abyss of everything personal', Isvara is the 
'Personal God'. While Brahman is object of nirvikalpa samadhi, 
-,-Isvara is the object of sa-vikalpa samadhi. 'In the concept 
of Isvara the Absolute is brought into closer relationship 
with the world'. (JO) Brahman and Isvara are not distinct 
entities but different aspects of the same reality. Brahman 
is Isvara 'when viewed as creative power'(AbadhUta Gita 1.)). 
Brahman is the pure, transempirical, unconditioned, indeterminate, 
eternal, subject-objectless consciousness. isvara is the 
supreme person. He is the intermediate principle between 
Brahman and the empirical world. His creation of the world 
depends on the differentiation of the seeds of empirical 
names and forms, which are of the nature of avidya (SBS II.l.14). 
He controls and guides the empirical selves - which depend 
on the adjuncts of the body, the sense organs, manas, buddhi 
and the like, in their empirical life which are the products 
of avidya. Brahman is called the causal-Brahman (karana Brahma) 
and Isvara is called the effect-Brahman (karya Brahma) in 
the SB.Brh.Up.V.l.l. Brahman is inactive but Isvara is active. 
As Brahman answers to the content of the turiya or the trans-
cendental consciousness, isv~ answers to the su~upti or the 
consciousness of deep sleep. 
III - ATlVIAN: 
... 
The main concept of Samkara's Advaitic philosophy is 
<J 
that the ultimate and absolute truth is th~ self or Atman, 
which is· one, though appearing as many in different individuals. 
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The outside world also has no reality and has no other 
truth to show than this self. The famous Vedanta text says, 
/ 
'That are thou, 0, Svetaketu~· This comprehension of one's 
self as the 'Self:, as the ultimate truth, is the highest 
knowledge. For when this knowledge is once produced, our 
cognition of world-appearances will automatically cease. 
'The self is an independent entity underlying the conscious 
personality and the physical frame. The natural_ man is 
alienated from the self in him. All that we know and express 
about the self belongs to the world of change, of time and 
space, but the self is for ever changeless, beyond the:·world 
of space, time and cause. ,{Jl) 
/ 
Samkara opens his commentary on the Brahma-sutra with a 
,f 
distinction between subject and object, atman and anatman, 
with the formulation of the absolute disparity between 'I' 
and ~Thou', asmat and yusmat. The pure subject is distinguished 
from the ego, i.e. the psychological or sociological self 
which is a part of the objective world. In the very core of 
his existence the self continues to be himself. Of this self, 
, 
Samkara says, "The unconditioned, markless, free from 
• 
characters of existent and non-existent, is real me.ta-physically" 
(SB on Ka1(ha. VI.lJ). Consciousness is the very essence of 
self. While the content of experience changes, the consciousness 
does not. Even when there are no objects to be known as in 
deep sleep, consciousness is present (SB II.20.J). The Atman 
is one eternal homogeneous consciousness in its essential 
nature. It is the witness of all cognitions; it is their 
knower; it reveals all cognitions; it reveals all objects which 
cannot reveal themselves; it~ neither subject nor object. 
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The Atman is not an enjoying and active agent (kartr); it 
is devoid of merits and demerits; it is inactive since it 
is immutable; it is not subject to birth and death. Atman 
in itself, unconditioned by an adjunct is not an enjoyer. 
Being limited by the ad~uncts of buddhi and the like, it 
becomes an enjoyer as it were. Pleasure, pain, desire, 
activity - all appear and disappear but do not belong to the 
eternal Atman. 
The Atman, according to Sa~kara, is one with the universal 
self. Atman is in reality Brahman, the 'absolute'. Jiva is 
the individual empirical self, limited by the body, sense-
organs, manas, buddhi, and the like, which are its limiting 
adjuncts (upadhi). Atman is the transcendental, non-empirical, 
metaphysical self, while jiva is the empirical, phenomenal 
and psychological self. Atman and Brahman have the same 
characteristics of being, consciousness, all-pervadingness and 
bliss. Atman is Brahman. The purely subjective is also the 
purely objective. Brahman seems to be mere abstract being, 
even as Atman seems to be mere abstract subjectivity in the 
eyes of the intellect. 
IV - ATMAN AND JIVA 
The term Jiva is used to indicate the empirical personality. 
The atman is the supreme, universal self; it is non-dual or 
one; it is partless (niravayava) and omnipresent (bibhu). 
Jiva is the atman limited or individuated by adjuncts of the 
body, the sense organs, manas, buddhi and ahamkara. It is the 
psycho-physical organism; it is the empirical self or ego. 
Though the atman is one, it appears to be many individual 
selves owing to the different limiting adjuncts (SBS I.2.6; 
SBS I.l.2.20; SB Man~ I. III.)). 
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-Atman is the kernal of the human personality. The internal 
organ (antahkarana) is the adjunct of the Atman. It takes 
the forms of manas, buddhi, vi,jnana and citta. Vi,jnana 
refers to ahamkara. Thus, the internal organ in its fourfold 
form is the individuating principle of the atman. The 
individuated entity is· called ,jiva. It is the individual 
-empirical self, compared to Atman, which is the transcendental 
universal self. It is neither a part nor a modification 
of the atman (SB.Mand.K III.?). It is only an appearance. 
The adjuncts of the body and the antahkarana are creations of 
avidya (SB.Man~LK III.l5). They are not real. The jiva is 
a construction of maya or avidya. As soon as avidya is 
destroyed, the ,jiva remains in its essential nature as the 
atman, which is its reality. 
Jiva is the knower (pramatr), enjoyer (bhoktr), and active 
D 
agent (kartr). It acquires merit and demerit, and experiences 
their fruits. The difference between atman and Jlva is not 
real (paramarthika) but phenomenal (laukika). The origin of 
the jiva from atman is not real; on the destruction of the 
psychophysical organism the jiva merges in the atman or the 
supreme self (SB.Man~.K III.J.4). The relation between atman 
and the adjunct or buddhi is due to false knowledge. It does 
not cease until the knowledge of identity of the jiva with 
the ultimate Brahman is realized. 
The embodied self has three parts, viz., the gross body, 
a::subtle body and the causal body. The gross body is made 
of five gross elements, sense organs and the vital forces. 
The subtle body is made of the seventeen elements, the five 
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organs of perception, the five organs of action, the five 
vital forces, manas and buddhi. Jiva transmigrates with 
the subtle body, which is the basis of its moral equipment. 
The causal body is made of avidya or false knowledge, of 
the not-self as the self. There can be three states of the 
sel~-waking, dreaming and dreamless sleep. The waking self 
knows external objects through the sense-organs; the dreaming 
self knows the dream cognitions through the manas; the 
sleeping self is one homogeneous mass of consciousness and 
bliss. The intuitive self is the atman, which is unconditioned 
(nirupadhi), non-dual, homogeneous, distinctionless. It is 
present in the waking, dreaming and sleeping self. It is 
the ultimate reality. It is the universal self. It is the 
eternal consciousness which comprehends all. 
The jiva is an object of self-consciousness (ahampratyayav-
isaya). The atman is the witness (saksi), which reveals the 
0 
jiva; it is the pure self; it is self-luminous; it is 
apprehended by intuition. The jiva is its limited form 
(upahitarupa), though there is ontological identity between 
them. The empirical self is an object of self consciousness 
(asmatpratyaya-v~aya). Atman, the eternal, universal self 
in jiva, is considered as sak~in or witness of all cognitions 
~ (sarva-pratyayasaWin) or witness of the mental modes. The 
atman reveals the self-consciousness. Vacas~ati also regards 
atman conditioned by the mind-body-aggregate as the jTva and 
the pure atman as its witness (SBS I.l.4). Therefore, the 
pure transcendental unconditioned atman is the witness self, 
which is the ontological reality in the empirical self. 
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V - ISVARA AND JIVA 
-- I Both Isvara and Jiva are empirical realities. - I Isvara 
is limited by the excellent adjunct of the pure sattva of 
maya. But jivas are limited by the impure adjuncts of avidya, 
-t -
the mind-body aggregate. So Isvara rules the jivas (SBS II.J.35) 
Jivas are not parts of God, but they share the pure conscious-; 
ness with God. Brahman is the essential reality in both, 
-I Isvara and jiva. God and the individual souls are the 
phenomenal appearances. When Brahman is limited by the pure 
-t 
sattva of maya, it appears to be Isvara; when it is limited 
by impure adjuncts of avidya and the psychological organisms, 
it appears as jivas. -!" Isvara as well as jivas are Brahman in 
their essential nature (SBS II.J.43). - / But Isvara is not 
deluded by the influence of maya, and therefore, not subject 
-
to empirical life and consequent misery (SBS II.l.9). Jivas 
feel misery of empirical life~owing to non-discrimination 
between the self and the not-self, or its adjuncts (SBS II.J.46). 
-Jivas are neither the supreme self nor different entities, 
but are its reflections (SBS II.J.50). -I Though Isvara and 
jivas are appearances of the same Brahman, they are not 
identical in nature with each other. - J Isvara is omniscient, 
omnipotent and perfect; jivas have finite knowledge, limited 
powers and imperfections; f§vara is eternally enlightened and 
liberated; jivas are bound and liberated by right knowledge 
only; ISvara is the directive cause (karayini) of human actions 
and enjoyments and sufferings; jivas are active agents and 
enjoyers (SBS I.2.11). -I Isvara is not affected by the 
-
enjoyments of the jivas, since he has eternal right knowledge 
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and so he is not subject to the empirical life. But due 
to the false knowledge, jivas undergo miseries of empirical 
life. The divine nature of the jfvas is manifested when the 
right knowledge of their identity with Brahman dawns upon 
them. Thus the difference between I~vara and j~as is not 
real, but apparent, due to false knowledge (SBS 1.3.19). 
Radhakrishnan has summed up the stages of emanation of the 
human entity from the supreme reality of Brahman thus-
''The individual soul, as identified with the material body 
-
is the j~ or the dehin or the embodied. The unity of all 
these jTvas the collective or cosmic self in the waking state 
~ 
is viraj or vaisvanara. As idenitified with the subtle body 
as in the dream state, the individual is the lingin or 
taijasa. The unity of all the taijasas or subtle selves is 
Hiranyagarbha or sutratman (SB II.3.15). Lastly, as identified 
• 
with the karanasarira, the individual is called Prajna, and 
the unity of all Prajnas is I~~ara". (3 2 ) 
VI - BRAH~MN AND JIVA: THE EMPIRICAL PERSONALITY 
-, -After discussing the reality of Isvara and Jiva, we may 
now turn to the more important subject of the relation between 
-Brahman and Jiva; such relations are mainly explained by 
similes. There are mainly three theories in this regard in 
the Advaita-Vedanta, as follows; (i) According to Asmarathya, 
the jiva is partly different and partly non-different from 
Brahman, as the sparks are partly different and partly non-
different from fire. The sparks are not absolutely different 
from the fire, as they are of the same nature of fire. They 
are absolutely non-different neither, as in that case they 
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could be distinguished neither from the fire nor from one 
another. In the same way, the jivas are not essentially 
different from the Brahman, being of the same nature of 
consciousness; nor absolutely non-different, because in that 
case, they would have been identical with Brahman and with 
one another. Hence, the jivas are different and non-different 
from Brahman (Bharati SBS I.4.20); (ii) Audulomi regards the 
jiva as different from Brahman when it becomes impure in 
contact with the adjuncts of body, sense organs, manas, and 
buddhi. But he regards it as non-different when it is divested 
of the limiting adjuncts by right knowledge and mediation. 
Thus, the bound jiva is different from Brahman; but the 
liberated jiva is non-different from it (SBS I.4.21). (iii) 
Kas'akrtsna regards the .;iva as identical with Brahman. The 
- -/ jiva is not different from the immutable Isvara or Brahman 
(SBS I.4.22). rasakrtsna's view is in keeping with the Sruti 
which says - 'Thou art that' - the jTva is identical with 
Brahman. It is not a modification, since if it were so, it 
would be merged in prakrti or maya in dissolution and would 
• 
not be immortal (amrta). So the names and forms which subsist 
in the adjuncts are attributed to the jiva. It's origin from 
Brahman like that:of the sparks issuing from fire is really 
the origin of its limiting adjuncts. 
Sa~kara has adopted mainly Kasakrtsna's view. He further 
pronounces it to be the only authoritative interpretation 
acceptable to all Vedantins, that the difference between the 
finite individual and the ·'absolute' is not a metaphysical, 
constitutive or real one, but is due to the limiting adjuncts 
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of body, senses, manas and forms imagined by avidya. That 
jivatva or individuality is an adjunct is further emphasized 
in the commentary of VS II.III.17 - "This one Supreme Being 
/ 
has no intrinsic differentiations as evidenced by the Sruti 
text: 'One Supreme Lord, all-pervasive, and all-abiding as 
the soul of all souls lies hidden in all beings'. The 
appearance of its division in many is conditioned by (its 
association with) adjuncts like the apperceptive function 
(of the psychical mechanism), just as the limitation of space 
due to association with jars etc.". Thus according. to 
Samkara, the differentiated Brahman appears as jiva or the 
finite individual. 
-The jiJLa is ·not a part of Brahman, since Brahman is 
devoid of parts. It is not a modification of Brahman, since 
Brahman is unchangeable (SBS IV.J.14; SB Mand.K.III.?). 
Brahman, the eternal, transcendental consciousness is the 
substratum of the empirical selves and the entire empirical 
universe, which cannot exist apart from it (SB.Mund, II.2.1). 
The jiva limited by the adjuncts of body, vital forces, senses 
and the like, subsists in Brahman. It is the reality of the 
/ jiva. The Sruti praises non-di!ference of the jiva from 
Brahman and condemns their difference. The difference between 
them is not real. Just as the space limited by a jar is non-
different from the infinite space, so the empirical self is 
non-different from Brahman. "So far as the finite or empirical 
/' 
self is concerned, Sa~kara is emphatic on the p0int that it 
is the 'psychological Me' the object of self-consciousness 
(ahampratyayavisayah), the active and enjoying self and not 
' . 
-76-
the witnessing consciousness (s~k~I), which is the 
presuppositon of all finite experience (VS. I.l.4). Thus, 
all agency belongs to self or atman so far as it is limited 
and individuated by the adjunct of buddhi: and others, and 
not intrinsically. (Com.on VS III.2.8-10)".(33) 
The Advaita Vedanta concept of the empirical self is 
based either on the theory of reflection or on the theory of 
limitation. The theory of reflection is again divided into 
two sub-theories namely abhasavada and pratibimbavada. 
Both Suresvara, the author of Brhada-ranyaka-bhasya-vartika 
.. • (#" 
and Prakasatman, the author of Pahcapadika-vivarana accept , 
-the position that jiva or the empirical se1f is the reflection 
of the Brahman or the transcendental consciousness in 
neiscence (ajnana) limited by antahkarana. , Suresvara thinks 
that a reflection is unreal and as such·'jlva or the empirical 
self is not a reality. This is called abhasavada 
Frakasatman on the other hand thinks that a reflection is 
also a reality, being identical with the original, that is 
·-
reflected, and as such jiva is not totally unreal. Pratyagatman, 
the author of Samksepasariraka, takes the-position that 
• f 
jiva is t~e reflectfon of pure consciousness or Brahman in 
buddhi (intellect). 
Vacaspatimi~ra is the advocate of avaccedavada. According 
to this theory, the substratum of ajnana is not the Brahman 
l ·-
.p') tA.t jiva. Jiva is consciousness limited or circumscribed 
by antahkarana, which is an evolute of ajnana. Both ajnana 
-
and antahkarana differ from one-jiva to another. As the 
• 
substratum of a particular ajnana, each j"iva creates his own 
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material cause. The seeming oneness of a material object 
appearing before different individuals is due to sense of 
similarity imposed by the fundamental avidya. These 
different AV. concepts of the empirical self based on 
different theories of reflection and limitation have been 
precisely and succinctly summarized by Madhus~danasaraswati 
in his Siddhantavindu. (34 ) 
There are two more views regarding the nature of jiva: 
the 'One-Soul' theory or ekajivavada and the 'Many-Souls' 
theory or anekajTva-vada. Accord1ng to the first theory, 
there is but one jiva, and one body, and that all the world 
-as well as all the jivas in it are merely his imaginings. 
This is the view of those who maintain that jiva is only one. 
These dream-jivas and the dream-world will continue so long 
-as the super-jiva continues to undergo his experiences. The 
cosmic jiva is alone, the awakened one, and all the rest are 
but his imaginings. The opposite of this doctrine is the 
theory held by some Vedantists that there are many individuals, 
and the worl_d appearance has no permanent illusion for all 
people, but each person creates for himself his own illusion, 
and th·ere is no objective datum, which forms the common 
ground for the illusory perception of all beings; just as when 
ten persons see in the darkness a rope and having the illusion 
of a snake there, run away and agree in their individual 
perceptions that they have all seen the same snake, though 
seen 
each relly had/his own illusion and that there was no snake 
at all. According to this view, the illusory perception of 
each happens for him subjectively and has no corresponding 
objective phenomena as its ground. 
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According to another view, phenomena are not objectively 
existent, but are only subjectively imagined; so that the 
jug I see had no existence before I happened to have the 
perception that there was the jug; as soon as the jug-
illusion occurred to me, I said that there was the jug, but 
it did not exist before. As soon as I had the perception 
there was the illusion, and there was-no other reality apart 
from the illusion. It is, therefore, called the theory of 
drsti-srsti-vada i.e. the theory that the subjective 
perception is the creating principle of the objects and that 
there are no other objective phenomena apart from subjective 
perceptions. 
According to the normal Vedantic view, the objects of 
the world are existent as phenomena. Subjective perception 
is created by the sense-contact with the objects. The 
objective phenomena are nothing but the modifications of 
ajnana, which exist as the common ground for the experiences 
of all. This view,therefore, has an objective epistemology, 
where as the Drs~i-S~~~i-Vada has no proper epistemology, 
for the experience of each person is determined by his own 
subjective avidya, and the previous impressions as the 
modifications of avidya. 
VII - MAYA AND AVIDYA: 
~ 
Sa~kara uses the two terms Avidya and Maya indiscriminately, 
but the later Advaitins draw a distinction between the two, 
in as much as Brahman and Atman are one, and so are Maya and 
Avidya. The tendency of the human mind to see what is really 
one as if it were many, is called Avidya. This being common 
to all individuals, Avidia is thus connected to the individual 
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phenomena. Maya, on the other hand, is the power (dakti) 
-/ -; 
of Isvara. Omniscience and creatorship of Isvara depend 
on the manifestation of the seeds of the world as names 
and forms which are of the nature of avidya (SBS II.l.14). 
Isvara himself imagines different forms in himself through 
his own maya (SB.Ma~~.K.II.12). Names and forms are germs 
" of the empirical world. They are not re~l in themselves. 
Their reality is Brahman. The world appears to be born owing 
to maya (SB.Mand.K.III.27). All empirical objects are 
generated by avidya (samvrti). They are created and destroyed 
from the empirical standpoint; but ontologically they are 
eternal Brahman (SB.Mand.K.IV.5?). Here we see that most 
,-
often Sa~kara has used both the terms avidya and maya to 
signify the same conception. ~~ya is avidya (avidya-lak~ana 
anadimaya : SB.Manq.K.III.J6). Maya is neither being nor 
non-being, but indefinable. The omnipotent r£vara through his 
infinite magic powers (maya{akti) can create the world out 
of the unmanifested seens of names and forms (SBS.II.l.Jl). 
- / Isvara is inactive in his essential nature, but he becomes 
active in relation to his maya (SBS.II.2.?). Maya is cosmic 
nescience; it is also called Mahamayl!. Isvara is called 
Mahamayin (SBS.II.l.J?). Maya is not an independent principle 
like Prakrti of the Samkhya. 
• 
I - I It is dependent on Isvara; 
/ 
it is his energy (sakti). Maya is often called avyakta 
(unmanifested), since it cannot be defined as real or unreal 
(SBS.I.4.J). It is called avyakta also because it consists 
of the unmanifested subtle essences of the elements. 
Avidya is false knowledge or the absence of true knowledge. 
It is non-apprehension of the reality; it is beginningless; 
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it is the cause of samsara; it exists in the form of seeds 
or karmas in the .;ivas (SB.Mand.K. !.16). Avidya veils the 
nature of Atman or Brahman (SB.i£a Up.3). The .;fva subject 
to avidya cannot know its inner self. Brahman , within it 
(SB.Mund.Up.III.l.7). 
Radhakrishnan puts the difference between avidya and 
maya as the 'subjective and the objective sides of one 
fundamental fact of experience. It is called avidya, since 
it is dissolvable by knowledge; but the objective series is 
called maya since it is co-eternal with the supreme personality. 
/' 
Sa~kara admits its existence even in the state of pralaya or 
destruction. - / Isvara, the omniscient, who controls his maya, 
/' 
has no avidya, and if Saipkara here and there lends countenance 
to a different theory, it is in the figurative sense that 
isvara has the power which leads to avidya in the individual'. (35) 
In fact the connection between avidya and maya is so close 
that it is difficult to distinguish between them. Thibaut is 
inclined to identify them, and in Dasgupta's opinion, 'to 
/ 
Sa1pkara, maya means both a principle of creation and the result 
of this creation'. (36 ) Deussen prefers to regard avidya as 
the causal principle and maya as the effect. Avidya works by 
the ascription of upadhis or 'limiting adjuncts', and maya is 
the resulting totalization of these upadhis, inclusive of the 
ideas of a personal God, the world and the individual souls. 
We find also occasionally a disposition to distinguish between 
avidya and maya on grounds of valuation, the product of the 
latter being regarded as having a more elevated character than 
the former. In a later passage, Dasgupta points out that 
according to some Vedantists may~ is more distinctively the 
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projective creative force (viksepa) and thrusts into 
.. 
embodiment the higher attributes, whereas avidya is rather 
of the nature of a concealing power (avarana) and is 
responsible for the less worthy attributes. Further, it is 
sometimes indicated that the pure intelligence of the 
'Absolute' in relation with maya_produces first of all 
-/ -Isvara, or the personal God, whilst in relation with avidya, 
it produces the individual soul. Too much stress however 
should not be1laid on these minute distinctions, seeing that 
the Vedantist writers themselves do not always observe them, 
and for all practical purposes avidya and maya may be taken 
as imply slightly different ways of describing that mysterious 
power which produces the more or less unreal world of ordinary 
experience. (37) 
VIII - EVOLUTION: 
According to the Advaita-Vedanta, the e~pirical world 
(samsara) is the unfoldment of undifferentiated names and 
forms, which are the objects of avidya or false knowledge. 
The world consists of formed and formless objects, imagined 
by avidya. It is superimposed on Brahman or Atman. Brahman 
,. 
is different from the empirical world. Sa~kara has offered 
a cosmology of the Vedanta from the orthodox standpoint. 
At the beginning of a particular cycle of existence, the 
entire world is supposed to have been lying dormant in 
Brahman as the result of the periodic re-absorption or 
dissolution of the world therein. The creative power of 
Brahman reveals itself in malcing manifest the seeds of things 
and the individual souls as so many karmic potentialities or 
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forces constituting the body,)of Brahman who is the material 
as well as the efficient cause of the world. Different 
Vedantists have given diverse theories of cosmology. I 
/ 
shall, however, concentrate mainly on sawkara's stand-point. 
In the beginning of a particular cycle, the entire world is 
supposed to have been covered up by death as the result of 
the periodical reabsorbation of the world in Brahman. 
Creation is indicative of the disturbance in the temporary 
equilibrium from within by an inner necessity of a self-
determination on the part of the Creator, who is then called, 
not Brahman, but Paramesvara. 
Maya is the energy of Ysvara. - I Isvara is the creator, 
preserver, and destroyer of the world. The world exists in 
the effect state (karyavastha) after creation. It exists in 
the causal state (karanavastha) after dissolution. - ~ Isvara 
creates the empirical objects for the enjoyment and sufferings 
/ 
of the individual selves. Samkara has attempted to show how 
0 
each appearance endeavours to reveal the character of reality 
which is its ground. Since the inexhaustible Brahman stands 
at the root of all, continuously higher and higher expressions 
reveal themselves in the world (SB.I.l.ll). Again, as in 
the series of beings which descends from man to blades of 
grass, a successive diminution of knowledge, power and so on 
is observed - although they have all the common attributes 
of being animated - so in the ascending series, extending from 
man up to Hiranyagarva, gradually increasing manifestation of 
' 
knowledge, power, etc. takes place (SB.I.l.l). We can 
distinguish in the world of phenomena the following - (i) 
-, 
The Isvara or God who is the origin of the world; (ii) the 
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- - """ extension of nature or the nama-rupa-prapanca, i.e. the 
name-and-form world; and (iii) the plurality of the 
individual souls, subject to the limitation of individuality. 
The material world is called ksetra, since it is the 
environment where the individual souls can act, realizing 
their desires and fruits of their past karma (SB.Mund. III.l.l). 
The world or samsfira consists of various orders of 
beings with different modes of existence. (SB.I.J.lO). The 
evolution of the universe obeys an order (SB.II.24-25). The 
entire world springs from Isvara or paramesvara. All the 
elements spring from Isvara (SB.II.J.?). Paramesvara is 
the direct creator of the five subtle body (lingasarira), and 
of the Hiranya~rbha, the first born or the first created 
J --
being (prathamo jlva or sar1ri prathamah), and is indirectly 
v 
through Hiranyagarbha, the author of the manifold or concrete 
» 
things (Vedantaparibhasa chap. VII). The inorganic nature 
consists of the five elements which are called suksma-bhU.tas 
or subtle matter, and they originate in continuous succession. 
Akasa is the first evolute to come into being from the self-
alienation of Brahman. - -1 From akasa originates vayu; from vayu -
tejas; from tejas - .§:_Q, and from .§:.:2 - earth or prthivT 
• 
/ (SBS.II.J.8-1J). Sa~kara rejects the Buddhistic view that 
akasa is a negative entity, the mere absence of obstruction. 
It is, on the other hand, a positive entity which is inferred 
from the quality of sou~d (SBS.II.2.22,24). It is not eternal 
as the Nyaya-Vai;esika maintains. 
Q4 
,/ 
Sa~kara recognizes the distinction between the subtle 
elements (suksma-bhutas) and the gross elements (mah~bhutas), 
t> 
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like the Samkhya. The Upanisads mention the five subtle 
,j 
elements (tanmatras) (Pr. Up. IV.8-SB). All these subtle 
elements enter into the composition of the gross matter 
which is made up of the varying combination, in different 
proportions of the subtle matter - the process of this 
materialization being known as pancikarana. From the maya 
" 
-I 
of Isvara, the matrix of unmanifest (avyakrta) names and 
d 
forms, is generated the subtle essence of sound (sabdatanmatra). 
It is the subtle element of ether. It has the quality of 
sound only. The subtle element of air is generated from it. 
Its essence is touch. The subtle element of fire is generated 
from them; its essence is colour. The subtle element of 
water is generated~from them; its essence is taste. The subtle 
element of earth is generated from them; its essence is smell. 
Ether has sound; air has sound and touch; fire has sound, 
touch and colour; water has taste in addition to all these 
qualities. 
Gross elements are generated from the subtle elements by 
quintuplication (panclkarana). The doctrine of quintuplication 
• 
has its earliest indication is the Chandogya in the doctrine 
of triplication, where the elements of tejas, ~and prthivi 
~ 
are compounded to produce the gross elements. In the later 
1'-
Advaita Vedanta works, like Pancadasi and Vedantaparibhasa, 
"' 
the theory of quintuplication is authoritatively accepted. 
The Vedanta-paribhasa Chap. VII clearly affirms that 'the texts 
bearing on triplication imply quintuplication'. 
According to the panclkarana theory, the five subtle , 
elements, soon after their origin are disintegrated into parts 
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and seek to recombine in the form of manabhutas. Having 
bifurcatedinto two equal parts, of which again, one part is 
divided into four equal parts, and re-combined each of these 
four equal parts with the other four halves of the suksma-
. 
bhutas, we have the five sthulabhUtas~ The Pancikarana 
theory could as well be schematised thus: -
Gross ether = t ether essence + 1/8 air essence + 1/8 fire essence 
+ 1/8 water essence + 1/8 earth essence 
Gross air = t air" + 1/8 ether" + 1/8 fire" + 1/8 water" 
+ 1/8 earth " 
Gross fire = t fire " + 1/8 ether " + 1/8 air " + 1/8 water " 
+ 1/8 earth " 
Gross water = t water " = 1/8 ether " + 1/8 air " = 1/8 fire " 
+ 1/8 earth " 
Gross earth = t earth " 1/8 ether " + lL8 air " + 1/8 fire " 
+ 1/8 water ". ( Pan'cadasi I. 27) 
Thus the gross elements (mahabhutas) are compounds of the subtle 
elements. B.N. Seal has explained the contest thus: - "The 
Suksmabhutas are forms of homogenous and continuous matter, 
without any atomic~y of structure; the mahabhutas are 
composite; but even these are regarded as continuous and without 
any atomic structure. The Vedanta speaks of anu not as an 
ultimate indivisible discrete constituent matter, but as the 
smallest conceivable quantum of m~tter". (38 ) 
Different kinds of substances are produced from the gross 
elements by transformation. Matter is constantly undergoing 
change of state. Changes may also be induced from without. 
r' 
Samkara speaks of a cosmic vibratory motion (sarvalokaparis-
" 
pandanam). -/ Isvara himself creates the subtle and gross elements 
out of his maya by volition, as these elements are non-
intelligent and cannot, therefore, bring about their own 
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development (SBS.II.J.lJ). In dissolution, the earth 
becomes water, water - fire, fire - air, air - ether, and 
' / 
ether is reabsorbed in Isvara (SBS.II.J.14). 
IX - CONSTITUENTS OF HUMAN PERSONALITY: 
The individual soul is constituted - or disguised, according 
/ 
to Samkara, by the upadhis or adjuncts or empirical conditions. 
" 
Of these, the first is the condition of the gross body, 
which is completely left behind in the migration of the soul. 
Thus, the soul changes different bodies through numerous 
lives. The unchanging part is the 'subtle body' (suksmas'arira) 
which is made up of the extremely subtle counterparts of 
the gross elements. It has a persistence which enables these 
subtle elements to continue after the death of the gross 
body. 
The physical organism is made of all the five gross 
elements. The different parts of the physical body or sthula-
/ 
sarira, are consitituted of dif-ferent elements. The psychic 
/ 
organ like manas is assumed by Samkara 
d 
to: be of like nature 
with the physical elements. The human organism is composed 
of the three elements of earth, water, and fire respectively 
/" 
(SB.II.4.20). Samkara admits that they are sometimes regarded 
~ 
as different in kind from the physical elements and are 
produced before or after them. In any case, they as well as 
the elements, are in themselves lifeless and are produced as 
means to ends. Inorganic nature is parartha, i.e. it serves 
a purpose which lies beyond it (SB XIII.22). There is 
uniformity of nature in the inorganic world (SB.Taitt.Up.II.B). 
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The chief prana, the cosmic life, which is the energy 
J 
- ~ 
inherent in all natural forces is a creation of Isvara. 
Frana is the energy inherent in the physical organism. It 
is neither air nor activity of the sense organs. The organs 
of knowledge and the organs of action cannot produce the 
vital force of the organism as the ~~~khya holds. Life is 
a subtle physical for~e (adhyatmavayu) pervading the organism. 
It is prior to the senses and regulates the development of 
the organism (SBS.II.4.9). It is subtle and pervades the 
body (SBS.II.4.1J). The word 'Frana' has been used in 
different senses: _(39) (i) Frana is Brahman. All the devas 
and all the sense carry oblations to Brahman which is prana. 
J 
Frana is the inmost being. It exists behind the senses and 
the manas (kausitaki,Chap.2); (ii) Frana is the cosmic energy. 
/ It is the support of creation (Prasna, Ch.II). This Frana 
originates from atman. The devas, the natural forces and the 
indriyas derive their capacities and powers from Pra~a; 
(iii) Samkara holds Frana to have originated from atman, and 
it should not be confounded with mula prakrti (BS.II.4.2). 
0 
This Frana manifests itself chiefly in two ways: (a) as the 
energy inherent in all natural forces, and (b) as the energy 
inherent in the inner organism, the vital forces, the energies 
r 
of the indriyas, and of the active organs (Samkara Bhasya Brh. 
~ 0 A 
Chap. I. 5,6,7,8; Chap. II. III). The former may be called 
adhi-bhuta prana, the latter adhyatma prana . 
• 
There are five vital forces in the physical organism, 
namely prana, apana, vyana, udana and samana. Frana is said 
• 
to reside at the nasal cavity; it regulates inspiration and 
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expiration. Apana resides at the anus; it helps evacuation. 
Vyana pervades the body; it sustains the whole organism. 
Udana resides at the throat; it has upward movement. Samana 
resides at the navel; it digests and assimilates food and 
drink. The five vital forces arise from the five subtle 
elements collectively with the excess of rajas (SB.II.4.12). 
The physical body, with its appetites originate out of 
the mahabhutas. The gross earth transforms into bone, flesh, 
nerves, skin and hairs; the~ into bile, blood, secretions 
and sweat; the tejas into hunger, thirst, sleep, beauty and 
indolence; the vayu into contraction, expansion and motion; 
the akasa in spaces of the stomach, heart, neck and head. 
There are five organs of knowledge (jnanendri~) and five 
organs of action (karmendriya). The organs of knowledge -
ears, skin, eyes, tongue, and nose arise from the five subtle 
elements of ether, air,fire, water and earth, individually 
with the excess of sattva, which manifests objects. The five 
organs of action - vocal organ, hands, feet, excretive organ 
and generative organ arise from the subtle elements individually, 
with the excess of rajas, whose function is activity. The 
external sense-organs are called bhautika or physical. 
X - MANAS: 
The Vedantic psychology conceives the existence of manas 
as the central organ of the soul. It is supplied with 
knowledge of objects through the sense-organs. The sense-
organs.are the outlets through which the mental consciousness 
can go out and perceive external objects. These sense-organs 
are five in number, as we have already described, viz. the ears, 
skin, the eyes, the tongue ·and the nose. Corresponding to 
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these five senses there are five kinds of perceptions 
according as their object is, sound, touch, form, taste or 
smell. These are the organs of sensibility supplying the 
material content of knowledge. 
The distinction between adhyatma adhibhuta and adhidaiva 
are clearly borne out. The sense-organ is adhyatma, its 
object is adhibhuta, the corresponding cosmic force is 
adhidaiva. This distinction has also been extended to the organs 
of action - speech, hand, feet, the organs of generation and 
evacuation - are adhyatma corresponding to the respective 
adhibhutas - speech, etc.; Agni; Indra, Visnu, Prajapati and 
Death preside over them. These senses are not mere outlets 
~hrough which the inner senses of Antahkarana goes out. Every 
sense is endowed with power, such as, the skin as an indriva, 
is not a mere outer surface of the body. The capacities 
of the indriyas are something different from the surface-
existence of the senses, though they are inherent in them. 
These senses are inert. These indriyas cannot give us any 
knowledge unless they have in the background the light of 
consciousness. 
The pranas and indriya-s'aktis are subtle and escape 
I 
direct perception. But they are not all-pervasive. Vedantism 
does nbt accept the conclusion of the Samkhya that they are 
.. 
all-penetrating, being all pervasive. Had they been so, they 
would have given us the knowledge of distant but small things. 
The author of the Vivaranaprameya-samgraha has denied the 
U G 
possibility of indriyas going out everywhere in the company 
of body, for the body is inert, and it can move only in 
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association with prana. The name indriya appears first in 
• 
the I~tha and the Kena. Other texts call them prana. The 
D 
enumeration of the ten indriyas occurs in the Brhadaranyaka 
• d 
(Chap. II,IV,V.12). It adds manas and heart. We have 
also reference to manas as the central organ of cognition and 
action (Brh.I.V.J., IV.l.6) 
The mind-stuff or antaQkaraoa is the inner organ. It is 
called the eleventh sense. It is to be distinguished from 
the organs of senses and the organs of action. Its special 
function is to give us the knowledge of manifold things, one 
by one in succession. The antahkarana is the name given to 
the totality of vrttis or semi-spiritual functions. Manas 
~ 
is the faculty of reflection. When the antahkarana is in 
state of doubt due to its inability to make out the true 
character of anything and to arrive at a clear judgement, it 
is called manas. This manas is on the one hand regarded as 
the organ of volition, and on the other hand regarded as the 
central organ of perception. The sense-organs cannot give 
us knowledge if the manas is not active. The functions of 
the mind have been localized in different parts of the body. 
Manas has a limited or measurable magnitude. If it were 
infinite 1n magnitude, then atman would experience all things 
at once. In the earlier texts, manas, vak and prana are 
affirmed to possess infinite magnitude. Vak is the RK, manas 
-~-
is the Yajur, prana is Saman; vak is the devas, manas the 
~ 
fathers, pra0a the men. Prajapati is represented to be vak, 
manas and prana. Here we are to take manas in the sense of 
• 
collective mental consciousness which is all-pervasive and is 
a-
the upadhi of Hirhyagarbha or prana. 
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The later Vedantism holds that apart from the cosmic manas. 
there are manas-units appropriated to individuals. The 
Vedantists agree in holding that manas or antahkara~a has 
the capacity of expansion and contraction. No doubt it 
is of limited magnitude, but it has no limit in this direction. 
It can take the form of anything large or small. 
The upadhis, which condition the individualisation of the 
soul, may be classified in the following way: - (I) The 
coarse body, the fleshy covering which the soul casts off 
at death. (II) The body that accompanies the soul beyond and 
which includes the subtle body or the finer body consisting 
of (i) the life organs - prana and so on- the vital currents 
" 
supporting and preserving the organic existence; (ii) the 
five organs of action including the tongue, the hands, the 
feet, the organs of generation and evacuation; (iii) the 
five sense-organs including the organs of hearing, seeing, 
touching, smelling and tasting; (iv) the central organ of 
conscious life, directing the organs of perception and the 
organs of action - called antahkaranam, which again is chiefly 
' . 
taken as manas and buddhi. 
The coarse body is purely flesh. It is the dense cover -
annamaya kosa. The subtle body is divided into three-fold 
sheath of prana, manas and vijnana. The organs of vitality 
and the organs of action combine to form the pranamaya kosa, 
' 0 
i.e. the vital cover. Buddhi with the senses forms the still 
deeper covering, the vijnanamaya kosa, i.e. the intelligence 
J 
cover. 
XI - THE SUBTLE BODY: 
It is composed of the five organs of knowledge, five 
organs of action, the five vital forces, manas and buddhi. 
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The subtle body is made of the five subtle elements; it 
clings to the jlva till it attains liberation; it helps its 
transmigration from one body to another (VSP.l7). The 
causal body (karanasarfra) is the cause of the subtle body 
and the gross body. It is the individual nescience (ajnana) 
which is an appearance of the ~ternal consciousness. It 
is not ontologically existent, since it is destroyed by the 
knowledge of the atman. It is not absolutely non-existent, 
since it is known by perception and capable of fulfilling 
our practical purposes. It is not both existent and non-
existent, since it is self-contradictory. It is not different 
from the atman, which is the only reality. It is not non-
different from it, since it deludes the jlva, and veils its 
real nature. It is not both different and non-different from 
the atman since it is self-contradictory. It is not 
divisible in parts, since it is not an effect. Nor is it 
indivisible and partless, since it is modified into the body, 
the senses, manas and buddhi. Nor is it both divisible and 
indivisible since that is self-contradictory. It is thus 
indefinable (anirvacaniya). It is destroyed by the knowledge 
of the identity of the atman with Brahman. The entire 
aggregate of effects and organs is of the nature of names and 
forms. They are assembled to serve the ends of individual 
selves. This subtle body, while material, is also transparent, 
and so is not seen when jiva migrates. ij\lhile the subtle body 
-
and the vital forms persist as permanent factors of the soul 
until liberation, there is the varying factor of moral determin-
ation (karma~raya), which accompanies the soul in each life 
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as a new form not previously existing (SB.II.4.8-12). The 
basis of individuality is to be found not in the Atman or 
the adjuncts, but in moral determination, which is a complex 
of knowledge (vidya) works (karma) and experience (prajna) 
(Bfh.IV.4.2). The vital forces continue to exist like the 
subtle body, which carries them, as long as sa~sara endures, 
and accompany the soul inseparably even if it should enter 
a plant, in which case, the internal organ and the senses 
cannot naturally unfold themselves. As samsara is beginningless, 
the soul must have been equipped with this apparatus of 
vital forms from eternity. A third, karana sarira, is 
sometimes mentioned and identified with the beginningless 
indefinable avidyi. The causal self (k~rana-~tmi) is the 
relatively permanent human self, which persists through 
successive rebirth, determined by the law of karma. 
XII - CONCLUSION: 
The AV. conception of human personality, as we have seen, 
comprises of a subject-object complex. The subject element 
is pure-consciousness (saksin). The object element is the 
internal organ (antahkarana) which undergoes constant 
configuration through its contact with the external objects. 
As according to AV. the antire objective world except the 
pure consciousness, envisaged in Brahman, is illusory, thus, 
the antahkarana togather with the vrttis is considered 
illusory and as such unreal. Hence, the empirical personality 
does not remain a basic reality according to AV. conception. 
It is only the jivatman or empirical self, which enters into 
a subject-object relation, without which empirical cognition 
~94-
~ 
is impossible. The jivatman is Brahman itself. It is 
through the borrowed conscio~sness from the transcendental 
self (Brahman) that the material buddhi receives its 
illumination and thus illumines the object of experience. 
The empirical personality entirely depends on the transcendental 
consciousness of Brahman for its relative reality, which is 
captured in the subject-object relational complex. Thus, 
according to AV, the jlvatman or the personal self, which in 
its fundamental aspect is also the transcendental self or 
pure universal consciousness -- in the empirical stage i.e. 
while reflected in the internal organ is circumscribed by 
the ego. 
In the state of emancipation, the pure light of Brahman 
as the identity of pure intelligence, being and complete bliss, 
shines forth in its unique glory, and all the rest vanishes 
as illusory nothing. The Being of Brahman is not an abstraction 
from all the existent beings (as the satta of the NV),but the 
concrete, the real, which in its aspect as pure consciousness 
and pure bliss is always identical with itself. 
AV. believes that the state of emancipation is not a 
state of release from pain and suffering b~ is a positive 
state of happiness. The Advaitins argue that the state of 
emancipation is the state of Brahmahood, in which bliss and 
consciousness are identified as 'One Being'. Knowledge of 
Brahman, which leads to eternal bliss, does not depend on the 
performance of any act, for Brahman is already an accomplished 
fact. Knowledge of Brahman depends on Brahman itself. This 
knowledge is not mental activity, because it depends not on 
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mind but on the existent fact. (40) There is also no 
succession of knowledge. Once it dawns, it dawns forever 
and at once removes all ignorance and consequently all bondage. 
Liberation, therefore, means removal of ignorance by knowledge. 
Vedanta believes that even when the true knowledge has once 
been attained, the body may last for a while, if the individuals 
previously ripened karmas demand it. This is .if vanmukti. 
/ 
The Sruti says - 'The only delay for him is the death of the 
body.' Just as a potter's wheel goes on revolving for sometime 
even after the push is withdrawn, similarly the body may 
continue to exist after knowledge has dawned, though all 
attachment with the body is cut off. (4l) 
The question of emancipation is discussed in the 
concluding chapter again. 
CHAPTER III 
CONCEPTION OF HUN~N PERSONALITY IN THE SAMiiliYA LITERATURE 
INTRODUCTION: 
Si~khya is undoubtedly one of the oldest systems of 
Indian philosophy. ~e find references of the Sa~kya 
doctrines in some of the Upanisads, e.g. the Chandogya 
• 
(VI.4,1), the Prasna (VI.2), the Ka~ha (I.J.l0-13) and 
particularly the Svetasvatara (IV.5.10,12,16). The 
Vedanta system of thought, which proved to be a powerful 
rival to the Sa~khya doctrines, over-shadowed it at a later 
stage. Sa~karacharya regards it as the main opponent of 
Vedanta. Both Sa~khya and Vedanta claim that most of the 
Upani~adic literature conform to their respective system 
of thought. After a thorough search into the problem, 
scholars have found out an innate affinity between the 
Upani~adic Sa~kya and Vedanta. A bifurcation or parting of 
the ways appeared only from the age of the epics, preceding 
the emergence of the Brahma-sutras. During the early stages, 
there was presumably a kind of peaceful co-existence which 
we find in the literature of the Mahabharata.(l) 
The point, that the early Vedanta and Sa~khya were not 
antagonistic to each other in the early Upani~adic period, 
can be supported by the evidence that Sa~khya and Vedanta 
stood for the some adjectives quite often as 'atma-vidya', 
'adhyatmajnana' ,'jnanayoga', 'vidya' and so on. In fact the 
name 'Sa~khya' appeared for the first time in the Svetasvatara 
~ Upani~ad (Sve.VI.22) and the name Vedanta in the Munqaka 
(Munq.III.26) - both of which are known to be comparitively 
later Upani~ads. We ought not therefore presume that the 
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Samkhya and Vedanta ways of thought did not exist prior to 
• 
the appearance of these terms. On the contrary, it seems 
rather proper to consider that the early speculations had 
everything in the making of both the later Sa~khya and Vedanta. 
There are certain technical terms like puru~a, buddhi, guga, 
etc. which are considered as the particular property of 
Samkhya; whereas others like atman, brahman, avidya, maya, 
I 
etc. belong only to Vedanta. Nevertheless, these terms are 
quite often used together in the earlier Upanisads as well. 
" 
The first clear elements of the dualistic preaching, 
which conforms to the Sa~khya Philosophy are found in the 
Katha Upani~ad (III & IV). In the Upani~ads with their 
main idealistic and monistic passages, the dualistic tre.nds 
are often present inter se. Although the leading Upani~adic 
conceptions are not in favour of extablishing dualism as 
primary and ultimate, without mentioning the specific terms -
Sa~khya and Vedanta, these two branches of philosophy progressed 
together; this assutp~ion reveals an absence of difference 
between them pointing towards a fundamental unity. Rao goes 
as far as to declare that it is not unreasonable to think 
that the rational analysis of reality was itself the Samkhya 
Q 
and it formed the very back-bone of the early Upani~adic 
Vedanta. ( 2 ) According to him, Sa~khya may be regarded as an 
off-shoot of the Upanisadic literature, but not the off-shoot 
d 
of the Upanisadic Vedanta, because as a 'method of enquiry', 
If 
the Sa~khya may be the 'logical antecedent' to the Upani~adic 
Vedanta. Furthermore, the Upanisads are not prerogative of 
0 
sectarian mono-philosophers. Finally, it may be said that 
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the S~mkhya analysis of experience, or its empiricism 
.. 
and rationalism and Vedantic idealism were integrally 
connected forming undifferentiated parts of a unified 
thought in the Upani~adic times.(3) 
The early Indian philosophical texts are often regarded 
as literary works rather than historical documents. If we 
say that the Upanisadic literature is the literature of the 
, 
Vedantic tradition, then it will make them sectarian irrespective 
of their historical valMe. The Upani~ads, on the other hand, 
are rep~itory of all the philosophical trends, like idealism 
and realism, monism and dualism, personalism and impersonalism. 
The obvious disagreement between the later Vedanta of the 
Brahma-sutras and the classical Sawkhya as expounded in the 
Karikas, developed after both the systems had undergone a 
very long process of systematization. Classical Sa~khya is 
- . - / 
regarded as "that formulation of Sal!lkhya, found 1n Isvarak:y;:ql}a's 
Samkhya-karika". ( 4 ) The precise date of the text is not 
determined. The Samkhya karika along with a commentary was 
3 
translated into Chinese by Paramartha sometime between AD 557-569. (~ 
Assuming then that the text was well known at that time, we 
can have an idea of its chronological place in the history of 
Indian thoughts. 
Any analysis of a specific system must include a careful 
examination of the history of the tradition which plays an 
important role in the development of the respective concepts. 
Like all the orthodox systems, c1assical Sal!lkhya owes its 
origin to the Upanisadic literature, but it followed a different 
0 
line of development than the Vedanta. I have already discussed 
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mainly the idealistic side of the Upani~adic philosophy which 
forms the background of the Vedanta system in the previous 
chapter. Now I have endeavoured to bring out how much the 
conception of human personality in classical SaiJlkhya owes 
to the Vedic and Upanisadic literature, to the epics and 
0 
finally to the preclassical Sa~khya literature. 
The history of the evolution of the Samkhya school of 
. 
thoughts begins with the dualistic preachings of the Upani~ads. 
There are occasional ~entions of the dualistic thoughts even 
in the Vedas. But the Upani~adic preachings are more explicit 
and can be called the origin of the Samkhya system of thought. 
0 
The Upanisads contain the idea of prakrti, purusa and 
• • 0 
jlva and held the view that the gunas of nature are responsible 
for the bondage of the individual souls. Since the whole 
world is the creation of these gunas, the individual soul, 
being bound by the gu~as enjoy the fruits of their various 
actions. In this stage of bondage, the individual self does 
not see the transcendental Purusa dwelling within himself. 
Both nature and jiva are modes of the.supreme transcendental 
spirit, and are therefore dependent on Him (Brahman). Individual 
souls are only the sparks of the highest Lord and have, 
therefore, no existence apart from Him. It is important to 
mention here that the sa~khya views, as we find in the 
Upani~ads, in the Mahabharata and in the Bhagavadglta lean to 
theism. Purusa and Prakrti are not independent realities here 
but only the modes of God. Edgerton remarks - "A study of 
the Epic and other early materials has convinced me that there 
is not a single passage in which disbelief in Brahman or God 
is attributed to the SaraJchya". (6 ) 
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In the Manabharata, reference of atheistic S8.IJ~khya is 
also available. Panca~~ha's teachings represent an important 
exposition of the atheistic school of Sa~khya, which recongnizes 
only twenty four categories. 
Kapila, the founder of the Sa~khya philosophy (whose 
detailed reference is found in the Bhagavata Pura~a) gives 
us a theistic exposition of the Sa~khya; but the sa~khya of 
the Caraka Samhita, which seems to be in line with the teachings 
of Pancasikha, represents a i or·m completely different from the 
traditional theistic school. Purusa and Prakrti, welded 
together in the avyakta category, are regarded as ultimate, 
-/ 
and there is no place for God or Isvara. Prakrti part of 
avyaktam is the cause of the evolution of all the categories. 
The self, in association with the physical organs appear as 
the knower or the enjoyer. 
The classical Samkhya may be considered as a further 
0 
development on the Caraka line, though these two differ in 
many areas. The classical Samkhya explicitly recongniz.es the 
" 
independent existence of the dual principles of Purusa and 
Prakrti, and as such the elements of dualism are very prominent 
.. 
here. The important affinity between the Caraka SamkhY§: and 
-, 
the classical Samkhya is that in neither of them Isvara has 
. 
been admitted as the Highest regulative principle of the 
universe. On the basis of these facts, we may divide the whole 
course of evolution of s·al!lkhya in three stages: - ( i) The 
theistic and monistic stage developed in the Upanisads, the 
" 
Mahabharata, the Pura~as and the Bhagavata (ii) Atheistic and 
semi-dualistic stage represented by Caraka and Pancasikha; 
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and .(iii) Atheistic and dualistic stage represented by 
Arada, i:svarakrsna and the author of the Samkhya-sutras. (?) 
• , 4i\ 0 
In the forthcoming sections I have discussed the development 
of the Samkhya conception of human personality in these 
' 
three different stages. 
Section A - PRE-UPANISADIC AND UPANISADIC LITERATURE 
From the previous discussions, we have come to a conclusion 
with a certain amount of certainty that the Samkhya philosophy 
0 
was rooted in the Upani~ads. Before going into detailed 
discussions about the Upanisadic Samkhya conceptions, I 
• • 
would like to put forth the trend of the dualistic outlook 
that is present in the Rg-veda itself . 
. 
I - PRE-UPANISADIC LITERATURE: 
The vivid pre-meditation of the Sa~khya is to be found in 
the Nasadiya Sukta (~V.X.l29) of the Rg-Veda. In the first 
five verses there are several important suggestions, which 
we may relate to the future Sa~khya system. In verse I, 
'asat' is characterized as 'something as noumenal, undifferent-
iated, unmanifest potential state; in the beginning there was 
neither asat (non-existence/non-being) nor sat (existence/being)'. 
We speak of a thing as 'it is' only in realtion to the things 
that are not elsewhere or in relation to another that is 
not there. On the other hand, we say of something as 'it is 
not' in relation to something which is there or so on. But in 
the absolute stage there is no change of being in either 
ways. This indescribable state of the noumenal condition 
exactly fits with the Samkhya description of Prakrti (the 
- . . 
primordial nature) as 'Sadasat' (Vyasa-Bha~ya II.l9). 'Tamas 
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evolved in tamas might be referred to the Sadrda-
.. 
parinama (homogeneous evolution) in the Samyavastha 
• 
(equilibrium state) of Prakrti. 'That which was to manifest 
~.,.. 
·had been concealed in nothingness', refers to the 
· Satkaryavada, with the possible manifestation of 'avyakta' 
as 'vyakta·'. 
The IJg- Vedic hymn declares, "from asat .issued forth the 
sat" (RV.X.72.2-3), and again 'from Aditi was born Daksah' 
where Aditi stands for infinity and Daksah for understanding, 
which are suggestive of the Samkhya idea of Avyakta and the 
" 
manifestations of Buddhi. In ~g-Veda X.l90-J, it says, 
'Dhatr' or creator fashioned the cosmic objects as previously 
(Yathapurvam) and AV.X.?-26 mentions that the Lord, while 
creating, 'rolled out what was old'. This evidently suggests 
the process of evolution and involution, as mentioned in 
Sa~khya. In ~v.I.164, the symbol of two birds can easily be 
interpreted from both the Sa~khya and Vedantic points of view. 
~V.X.l6.4 envisages an analysis of the empirical personality 
(the work of future Sa~khya and Vedanta), when it says, 'Agni 
consumes only the body and the departed soul (Ajobhaga - the 
unborn part) emerges out. Here lies the suggestion of the 
mortal and immortal aspects of the individual which is the 
initial conception of the Upani9adic Sa~khya and the Upani~adic 
Vedantic philosophies. Again, in the hymn X.5.6 it says, 
'the unborn part when departing from the body is furnished with 
a 'lustrous body'. Here we find the inchoate idea of the 
'subtle body' of Sa~khya and Vedanta, accompanying the soul 
·in'the cycle of transmigration. This idea is again suggested 
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in the hymn ~V.X.l6.3, where the departed soul is asked to 
go among other places to planets and stay there with bodies. 
The Purusa Sukta of the ~V.(X.90) is specially significant 
and. can be regarded as the basis of the conception of Puru~a 
in Sa~khya. This sukta starts with a description of the 
absolute as a 'great person' immense in size. From this 
absolute there arose a diversification, a Virat (what shines 
in a manifold way). This Virat became material for the 
creation is compared to a grand rituailil .. This conception of 
Purusa also tallies with the Vedantic doctrine of para-brahman. 
This trend started towards a greater synthesis in conceiving 
the identification of Atman (individual soul) and Brahman 
(absolute reality). These attempts of unification are found 
in the early Rg-Vedic passages ~V.I.89.10; 1.164.46; III.55.1; 
• 
X.90; and X.129.2. But those who were not after such a synthesis 
regarded these two principles independently and arrived at 
two-fold conclusions (utimates). It is highly probable that 
this analytic or dualistic attitude arose as a reaction to the 
efforts to identify. Thus Keith conjectures, " ... the s·a!f11chya 
is a conception based entirely on the view of the difference 
between the subject and the object and that this conception 
was formed independently of the existing Atman-Brahman 
philosophy, or at least in conscious reaction to it". (B) 
The dualistic tendency is clearly evident in ~V.I.164.4 
'the boneless soul inhabiting the bony cage' or in St.BR.X.6.II 
'ko nu atma kim brahmeti' (who verily is the soul) and also 
'Now indeed, there is this two-fold thing, the Eater and that 
which is eaten' (RV.X.6.2. ); 'Now this body is the food, and 
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that man in the right eye is the Eater, being concealed in 
the food, he shines' (RV.X.5.2,19) and so on. The Sa~khya is 
regarded as being developed from this second trend of thought. 
When the attempts to discover the basic principles of 
the individual and the cosmos were in progress, both the 
groups of men perhaps concurred with regard to the analysis 
of experience or reality into the mortal and immortal aspects 
of man, or into the transitory states in nature. On the 
subjective side of man they pitched upon by excessive steps, 
the five senses, the five breaths, the mukhya prana or the 
. 
priga and later discarded them as not constituting the most 
basic factor, and arrived at Atman or Purusa as the sat 
. 
(Chandogya VI.2.1-2; Rv.X 129.1; Rv.7.2.2-J). Atma-purusa 
• 
(Brh.I.2.1; 
~ 
. 14.17), i.e. as the ultimate principle of one's 
aife and personality, the ground on which any experience 
/ 
rests. As Sa~kar~ch~rya rightly describes - 'the Ktman is 
the basis (asraya) for the validity of proof. And because it 
is thus formed it is impossible to call it in question. For 
we may call a thing in question which comes up from withou~ 
(agantuka) but not our essential being' (Commentary Ved.Su.II 
3.7). Likewise, on the objective side, the recognition and 
elimination of fire, ·earth, water, air, and space, as 
constituting only the name and form aspect of the cosmos, 
precede the discovery and recognition of the nameless and 
formless principle in avyakrta or asat or Brahman as the most 
basic or ultimate. ('Asat' - Chan.6.2.1; Taitt.II.7; Brh I.2.1; 
RV.X.72.2-3; avyak~ta- B~h I.4.7; Brahman- B~h. 1.4.10.11). (9) 
It is important to remember that these two principles 
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represent the two spheres of experience - subjective and 
objective. If Sat is existence, the Asat is only 'Not-sat' 
(non-positive/non-existence). Thus it is clear that in the 
early philosophical speculations, the analysis went on 
without any specific distinguishing features. The dualistic 
and monistic tendencies developed into two specific systematic 
theories quite lately in the later part of the Upani~adic 
period. 
II - THE UPANISADIC LITERATURE 
The two major concepts of the S8.IJlkhya philosophy are 
that of Purusa (the transcendental self) and Prakrti (the 
" 
primodial nature), on which stands the dualistic speculation 
of the Sal!lkhya philosophers. The word Purusa is mentioned 
1n the Rg-Veda itself (RV.X.90) and throughout the Brahmanic 
0 
and Upanisadic literatures quite frequently. Compared to it, 
. 
the appearance of the term Prakrti is quite late. It is 
first mentioned in the Svetasvatara Upanisad (Sve.IV.lO) along 
' 
with the term 'SaiJlkhya'. But the conception of Prakrti is 
illustrated earlier under the heading avyakta. In fact, 
avyakta or prakrti may be considered as an objective principle 
while Purusa is in the Subjective side. 
In the Upani~adic philosophy, the monistic tone is 
predominant and the central interest lies upon the discovery 
of Atman (the inner self of man) and Brahman (the essence of 
the universe). A study of the early literature conveys the 
impression that Brahman was confined in the sphere of Object, 
the manifold universe. And likewise Xtman was confined purely 
to the sphere of the subject, i.e. the physical and personality 
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side of man. The early synonyms for these two principles 
seem to be (a) for Brahman - asat, aksara, and for (b) 
Atman - sat or puru?a· Those who considered the two realities 
as separate, became dualists - Samkhya; the others who 
believed in the merging of these two principles into one 
complete indentity became monists - Advaita Vedanta. According 
to some scholars, the conception of Atman led to the conception 
of Purusa and Brahman - the ultimate source of the objective 
sphere to the development of Prakrti - passing through the 
• 
successive stages of aksara and avyakta. (lO) 
. 
The dualistic tendencies can be traced even in the 
monistic speculations of the early prose Upani~ads. (ll) In 
the Brhadaranyaka Upanisad I.II.5 we find the 'food' and 'the 
. . . 
eater of the food' and ruther, it is the purusa who is 
5 
mentioned there as the 'eater of the food.' S8.IJ).khya also 
treats prakrti as 'bhogya' (to be enjoyed) and the purusa as 
b D 
'bhoktr' (the enj oyer). The Katha Upanisad explicitly mentions 
, . 
atman to be the enjoyer (Ka~ha I.J.4) and both these terms 
; I 
'bhogya' and'bhoktr' are met with in the Sve.Upani~ad. (Sve.I.l2). 
Rao has brought out three stages in the development of 
this line of thought. The first stage comprises of the older 
prose Upani~ads, namely BfhadaraQyaka, Chandogya, Isa, Kena. 
Munctaka, Ai tareya, Tai ttirlya and Kaus"I takl - which developed 
mainly in the monistic trend of identity. In the second stage, 
comprising of Munqaka and Kat;ha we see a tendency towards 
dualism along with monism and also the revival of theism. In 
/ ' the third stage belong Prasna and Svetasvatara, which are 
mainly dualistic. (l 2 ) 
During the first stage, Atman (or Purusa) and Brahman (or 
aksara) are conceived as representing the two sides (subjective 
and objective) of the same reality. Thus, the two aspects 
are often found being described in similar language viz. , 
Purusa or Atman, as - "This verily was Atman in the form 
~ 
of Purusa" (Brh.I.4.1); "This verily was the Atman in the 
6 
beginning" (Brh.I.4.17); " ... So much is His greatness, yet 
Purusa is greater than all this, 
All things are one fourth of Him 
The immortal is in Heaven" (Chand. I I. 6) 
Brahman is described as - "This verily is Brahman (in the 
beginning) (Chan.III.l4) 
"The knowers of Brahman describe it also as aksara. It is 
neither gross, nor fine, nor short, nor long .... nor is it 
consumed by any" (Bfh.III.8.8); 
Atman as "The (atman) was verily brahman at first, 
It knew itself as'I' am brahman' " (Bfh.I.4.10) 
"This atman is verily brahman (Brh. IV.4.5; also Chan.VI. 
8.7; Taitt.II.5). 
In these passages the two sides of realities Atman and 
Brahman are treated as identical. 
In the second state, we notice an evident development in 
the conception of the ultimate reality. Though, basically, 
the outlook seems to stand on the philosophy of the earlier 
stage, there appeared an apparent distinction between Atman 
and Brahman. Rao puts it in this way - "There is a tendency 
in these Upani~ads to treat the objective ultimate as a 
'lower' principle than the subjective one, the Atman."(l.3) 
For example,"The resplendent Purusa is higher than aksara" 
" 
( Mung . I I. l. 2 ) ; "The highest principle is Purusa" (mund.III.2.8); 
. 
"Higher than avyakta (i.e. aksara or brahman) is Pur usa; higher 
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than Purusa, there is nothing else .. ( Ka~ha. III. 2); .. Purusa; 
4 
higher than ayyakta" (Ka~ha.IV.8). Here, we definitely 
see a different gradation of the two principles which really 
occupied the same status in the early Upani~adic period. 
Rao suggests that this conscious distinction is aimed at 
between the two ultimates from two points of view, cosmological 
and theological. (l 4 ) Thus, Munqaka gives the cosmological 
reason in saying - "Purusa is the seed-giver, aksara is the 
yoni" (Mund. II.l. 2.). The Mundaka and Katha definitions of 
0 
Puru~a are theistic. Thus, we can say that the abstract 
idealistic monism of the early Upani~adic period is changed 
into a form of realistic theism in the second stage. 
The third stage of Svetasvatara is comparatively later, 
and is presumably even later than the Bhagvad-Gita. Purusa 
is mentioned here as Isa, Hara, Rudra and Mahesvara. The 
term prakrti also appears here. There are four passages in 
/ 
Svetasvatara (viz. I.9;IV.5;IV.6;V.l0) which maintained the 
duality of the subjective and objective principles. Here the 
supreme unitary principle is Brahman, who is the transcendent 
seer. The individual Atman is a.jna (ignorant) and "';"""/ an1sa 
(supreme). Purusa or the subjective principle has got a 
0 
very high position. Prakrti is referred to as 'the power of 
God (devatma-sakti)'. Purusa is all powerful. He is the 
jalavana (the schemer), the 'mayin (the magician), whereas, 
prakrti is only maya (the magical power). Purusa causes the 
6 
union. He is the samyoga-hetu (instrument for conjunction) 
between the individual self and prakrti. It is to be noted 
6 
that the objective principle has attained a feminine status 
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~ / / in Svetasvatara, being called as 'devatma-sakti', maya, and 
aja, opposite to Purusa being called as the retodah (the 
seed giver), and aksara as yoni (womb). This seems to be 
the background of the feminine conception of Prakrti. Thus, 
what was Brahman or aksara (neuter in the early philosophy) 
up to Mun~aka, remained avyakta (neuter) in the Ka~ha and 
/ 
became Prakrti (feminine) in the Sve. That is how we can 
conceive Prakrti from Brahman or aksara, the objective principle 
0 
of the early Vedic literature. Rao maintains that the 
Svetasv~tara is the basis of the atheistic Sa~khya. Because, 
for the first time, in this Upanisad, the power of creation was 
• 
transferred over to Prakrti. Puru~a attains the position of 
a passive ohlooker (mere spectator). (l5) 
Achieving the conception of an independent objective 
principle, the sages proceeded in considering the further 
analysis of the objective principle into sub-groups: (i) First 
emerged two groups - the higher objective aspect and the 
lower objective aspect, which were named differently in 
different Upani~ads, such as: 
in Mung - aksara and brahma respectively 
in Katha - avyakta and mahan-atma 
in GI ta - para prakrti and apara prakrti 
6 0 
(ii) Then came further eight groups - asta prakrtayah as b. 6 
( 
mentioned in the Gita, Mahabharata, Sve., Buddha Charita (XII), 
Caraka Samhita and Tattva Samasa. These are Prakrti as 
" 
ayyakta, buddhi, aha~kara, the five tanmatras. 
(iii) Then came further sixteen vikaras along with eight 
prakrtis; 
(iv) Lastly, sub-grouped into Prakrti, prakrti-vikrti and 
.. .. 
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vikaras - made the total of twenty-four in classical Samkhya 
• 
(the Samkhya Karika). 
Q 
In the Mundaka, the two aspects of aksara principle 
" 
are clearly distinguishable from each other, the Higher 
eternal and the lower non-eternal. The former is called 
aksara and the latter, Brahman. The inorganic matter comes 
out of aksara. 
"As the spider creates and withdraws the web as herbs 
sprung from the earth; as ha~r.s come out of the body of a 
/ living person, so from this aksara (even) the visvam (i.e • 
• 
the inorganic matter) has come out" (Mund.I.l.?). In these , 
verses, two different categories are being mentioned as 
being emerged out of the aksara: the bhutas (the organic 
creation) and the visvam (evidently the inorganic creation). 
These two categories of beings constitute the entire universe 
and thus the term Brahma is used in the next verse to 
comprehend both - "By heat (tapasa) (this) Brahma expands 
(ciyate), (from the root of birth 'ci' - to grow). Thus, 
what is born from aksara is the Brahma, which expands and grows 
0 
giving rise in turn to other things". " .... From that are 
born anna, from that prana, manas, satyam, lokah (the worlds) 
• 
and the endless karma" (Munq.I.l.8,9,10). Studying these 
verses, we see that aksara is the source of 'brahma', which 
expands and in turn becomes the source of nama (name) and rupa 
(form). This means that apart from Purusa as the subjeetive 
principle, we have aksara and brahma as objective principles. 
The Purusa is the efficient cause in regard to the creation, 
for he 'puts seed into the yoni', the aksara (Mun~.II.l.5). 
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The aksara is the material cause with respect to brahma (Mund. , 
1.1.6~8). Of these three principles the first two (~urusa 
and ak~ara) are eternal for Purusa is called aja (Mun?.II.l.2) 
and aksara is called agotram (unborn) and nityam (eternal) 
Gl 
(Mund.I.l.6). Brahma is non-eternal for it is said, "From 
~ . 
the aksara the varied creations (viv&hah bhavah) are born 
q 
and verily into it, they merge again (Mund.II.l.l). But again 
' 
the Purusa is regarded as the higher between the two eternals, 
0 
"the Purusa who is self-respondent, formless, unoriginated 
and pure . • • . is higher than the aksara". 
() 
(Mund. II.l. 2) 
"' 
The synonyms for avyakta as brahma, param dhruvam and 
aksaram establish the fact that aksara and avyakta are identical 
" "' 
/ (Refer Purvapaksa of Samkara Br.Su.I.l.21). The third 
- v • 
principle, brahma of the Mund. Upanisad is identical with the 
• 0 
mahan-atma of the Ka~ha Upani~ad, for mahan-atma is a name 
for Hiraqyagarbha, the first born,who is otherwise known as 
brahma. Thus we see that the Mung. Upani~ad contemplates a 
division in the objective principle of which the eternal 
Purusa is regarded higher than the non-eternal aksara. Katha 
. ~ 
Upanisad makes a slight difference in bringing out the term 
• 
avyakta in place of ak~ara and mahat or mahan-atma in place 
of brahma. Between these two Upanisads, Katha appears to 
.. , . 
possess more trends of the Sa~khya philosophy than the Mun~. 
Upani~ad. The Katha mentions buddhi, manas, indri-yartha and 
indriya in an order which was followed by the later Sa~khya 
system in a more or less same manner. Avyakta and mahan-atma 
are the two objective principles here, but there is no mention 
of ahamkara, which is a classical Samkhyan principle. 
~ 
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An important change is found in Sveta~vatara Upani~ad, 
where the two parts of the objective principle (viz. aksara 
" 
and brahma) are conceived under one unitary principle -
Prakrti. Besides the speculations on Purusa and aksara 
(t 
(Prakrti in later Sa~khya), the upani~adic literatures 
contain references to the other Samkhya principles. Though 
the technical sense of the te~ms are often different and 
som~imes not mentioned, yet the referneces to the ideas 
behind can be very easily regared as being those which developed 
into Sal!lkhya. 
The early Atman-Brahman philosophy started mainly by 
analysing one's own being, the corporeal and non-corporeal 
elements and by determining the mortal and immortal in one's 
own self. Such an analysis was done mainly (a) to know the 
ultimate in man and cosmos and a strive to realizes it, and 
(b) to know the immortal in man which would survive into the 
next life and possibly through the chain of births and deaths 
in the cycle of tranmigration. The early literatures from the 
~g-Veda downwards contain references·:~to those concepts which 
have formed the frame-work of all later syst·erns of philosophy, 
based upon the Vedas. 
We shall now discuss the different evalutes which emerge 
from Prakrti and their nature. The Chanr~ogya Upani~ad is 
the earliest to contain the idea of the Guna theory of the 
samkhya, though the terms sattva, rajagand tamas are not 
. 
mentioned. It declares - "The redness (rohita) of the fire 
is colour of brilliance, its whiteness (6ukla) is the colour 
of water and its blackness (krsna) is the colour of the food. 
<I • .... • 
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Hence fire ceases to be fire. It is nothing but a word. It 
is a modification (vik"ara) and only nominal. The three 
colours only are real" (Chan.VI.4.1). In the same manner 
the sun, the moon, the lightning are analysed in the succeeding 
passages into their constituents (or colours): redness, the 
whiteness and the darkness (Chan.VI.2-4). 
The advocates of the Sa~khya also describe the universe 
as Prakrti, which is said to have three gunas as its 
constituents and all the objects other than the self are only 
particular formations of the gunas and hence are in reality 
.. 
not different from them. It is interesting to note that in 
/ / ~ Svet'!svatara we find the mention o~ Prakrti_'_as the one unborn 
of lohita, sukla and krsna and characterises it by producing 
p 0 ' 
/ 
many offerings of its own form' (Sve.VI.4). In this Upanisad 
. 
we also find the mention of the term gu~a and it also speaks 
/ 
of triguna (Sve.V.?) . 
• 
Though the Chandogya and Brh. Upanisads know not.hing about 
. . 
the Prakrti of later times, the mention of rohita, sukla and 
~~?a is highly suggestive of having formed the future ~ 
theory. Buddhi is the first evolute of Prakrti and may be 
treated partially as vijnana which is referred in places in 
the Upani~ads. Buddhi is first mentioned in Ka~ha (III.lO.l); 
B~h speaks of vijnana in the same sense of buddhi (Brh.IV.4.2 
and Taitt.II.4;III.4). It is difffucult to say whether the 
term buddhi is used in the sense of 'adhyavasaya' as in the 
Ka~ha. Katha has also equated buddhi with sattva (Ka~ha VI.?.8). 
Again it is difficult to presume whether the equation rests 
upon a similar idea of the classical Sa~khya by mentioning 
buddhi as sattvic because of the presence of sattva predominantly 
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in it. The Chand. Upanisad says, - 'Verily I extend from 
~ 
below, I extend from behind, I extend from before, I extend 
from S'outh, I extend from the north' (Chand. VII. 25 .1). It 
tallies with the Samkhya conception of ahamkara to a con-
Q 
siderable extent. The Prasna Upani~ad, however, mentions 
ahamkara quite clearly. Manas and Sankalpa are described 
-
side by side in the ancient upanisads and are regarded as 
" 
two separate principles, but Samkhya holds samkalpa to be 
o r 
the function of the mind. Of the indriyas, the ehandogya 
knows the ear, the nose, the tongue, the mind (Chand.I.2; 
V.l.6-12), and skin is mentioned in V.2J.l-2. The B!h· 
possesses an advanced knowlecl'ge regarding the sense organs, 
five jnanendriyas and five karmendriyasand one manas. 
( Chand • I I I . 9 • 4 ) . 
The Upani~ads, anterior to the Pradna, do not mention 
the tanmatras. It is only in the Maitrayanl that they are 
explicitly mentioned. The Prasna Upani!ilad however, bears the 
idea of tanmatras very clearly. / In Prasna we find the prthivi 
I 
and prthivimatra, ~ and apomatra, teja and tejomatra, vayu 
and vayumatra, aka6a and akasamatra (Prasna IV.8). 
Thus, we see that almost all the principles of the Sa~khya 
system of thought have their origin in the Upani~adic literature. 
Section B - CARAKA-SAMHITA 
The second stage is comprised of more practical views of 
Caraka which will be the subject of this section. Caraka's 
enumeration of the Sa~khya is often regarded as a transitional 
stage between the Upani~adic observations and the orthodox 
-/ Sa~khya doctrines of Isvarakri~~a. 
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In the beginning of the first chapter of the eighth 
book of Caraka-Samhita, Atreya explains the nature of Atman 
to Agnive~a. He speaks about three different types of 
Atman as conceived from three different angles of vision. 
Of these, the first one is the conglomeration of the five 
material substances and the conscious element, the second 
forms the pure consciousness alone and the third is again the 
conglomeration of twenty-four principles which comprise of 
mind, the ten organs, the five objects of the senses and 
the eight-fold Prakrti, viz. avyakta, buddhi, ahamkara and 
the five elements (Caraka-Samhita VIII.l.15-16). According 
• 
to the first view, the Puru~a in the ordinary individual, 
consists of the six elements aksara, vayu, pr-thivi, ~· tej 
~ 
and the cetana (which is also called Puruea) (C.S.VIII.5.5). 
The second view is in accordance with the classical Sa~khya 
view. According to the third view , the twenty four constituents 
of the Puru~a are nothing but the evolutionary series of the 
/ . Sa~khya. (Sarira !.34). Purusa is said to be 'ra~i', that 
is, the conglomeration of the twenty-four principles. According 
to the classical Sa~khya however, Purusa is pure consciousness 
and is simply different from the group of Prakrti, 
Thus, by saying that the Purusa is a conglomeration of 
twenty-four principles, Caraka only refers to the psycho-
physical entity of the ordinary individual, i.e. man. The 
Supreme Puru~a is not subjected to birth, for it is without 
any beginning. I Moreover, the Purusa, which is called rasi, 
4 ------
is the outcome of delusion, desire and hatred (CS VIII.l.52) 
and it is endowed with happiness, misery life and death 
(CS VIII.l.36) and it can be subjected to medical treatment 
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(OS VIII.l.J?). The ultimate principles of Purusa and 
" 
Pra~ti are only inferable in the Sa~hyan metaphysics. 
It is natural then, that, purely from the practical point 
of view, a physician like Caraka should have considered them 
ayyakta (unmanifested/unseen) and therefore beyond diagnosis. 
What is strictly amenable to him is the psycho-physical 
combination, i.e. rasi (CS.l7.J4) - called 'man' (Purusa) 
in ordinary parlance. (Compare: Mahabharata XII.J51.16 
where ra~i speaks of subtle body). The conglomeration of 
sense objects (indriyartha) or gross matter, the ten senses, 
manas, the five subtle bhutas and Prakrti, the mahat and 
ahamkara taking place through rajas, make up the citadel 
of man. Thus, from one point of view, the term Purusa has not 
d 
been adopted as the Samkhyan technical term, but has been 
considered only as the 'humancorganism' to serve the purpose 
of Caraka's enumerations. Pleasure, pain, disease and death 
can happen to the psycho-somatic complex of man, while the 
transcendental Purusa remains untouched. 
In the Caraka Sawhita, Purusa and Avyakta Prakrti are not 
a 
separately mentioned by different termin~logy but are referred 
together as avyaktam. (l6 ) The unthinkable pure self becomes 
the knower of the field, and is eternal, and all-pervading. 
That which is different from this, is thinkable. Again, from 
another point of view, the whole of this psycho-physical world 
is yyaktam, but its basis, the ultimate ayyaktam is beyond 
sense-perception and can b~own only through inference. 
Here ayyaktam in ayyaktamatma is used definitely as an epithet 
of the Self whereas in the sutra 61, the same word seems to be 
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used in the sense of ayyakta-prakrti. The term ayyktam is 
• 
used to refer to both Purusa and Prakrti though the two 
principles are distinctly separated in the classical Samkhya. 
0 
Prakrti and Atman (Purusa) being taken under the same category 
. -
of avyaktam, constitute one single principle, and this is 
why Caraka enumerates 24 principles (instead of 25 in the 
classical view). (l7) K.B.R.Rao, on the other hand, believes 
that the psycho-physical combination of the 24 principles will 
have no significance if the 25th principle, P~, is not 
, 
implied therein, for it is the animating force (cetana-dhatu) 
in man. According to him, the misinterpretation of the term 
avyakta as unmanifested has arisen the confusion. The term 
avyakta should mean 'unseen' and not 'unmanifested'. That 
which is beyond the senses and can only be known by inference 
is the avyakta. From this point of view both the ultimates 
of a patient, i.e. the psycho-physical living entity are only 
avyakta or unseen. Had they been 'unmanifested', there would 
never be the psycho-physical entity. By not mentioning Purusa 
as a separate principle Caraka did not disregard the 25th 
principle, i.e. Puru~a, but only pointed to a transcendental 
state without characteristics. Here the term avyakta loses 
its techincality from the Samkhya point of view and is dealt 
. 
with in its ordinary meaning.(lB) 
It is important now that we clarify the meaning of a few 
terms used in Caraka Samhita. The term a~kta is verily a 
technical term. In the orthodox Sa~khya, avyakta is a synonym 
for Prakrti. Caraka states this to be one of the constituents 
of the eight-fold Prakrti and buddhi is its first evolute. But 
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Caraka identifies avyakta with ksetrajna, which ordinarily 
0 
passes for Atman (CS IV.?). He emphatically declares 
ayyakta, pradhana, prakfti and jiva as the synonyms of 
-Atman (CS IV.?). The combined category of Purusa and Prakrti 
under one name avyakta is somewhat a mixed category, which 
stands as the ultimate and unthinkable basis of this manifest 
universe, 
Prakrti has two aspects - asta-prakrti (the eight-fold 
a ~ a 
prakrti) and s·odasa-vikaras ( 16 vi !tar as) ( cs. I. 6 3) ; the 
& 
former consists of ayyakta, buddhi, ahamkara and the five 
elements, and the latter consists of five buddhindriyas 
(organs c;>f knowledge), five karmendriyas (organs of action), 
manas (mind) and the five indriyarthas (sense objects). From 
avyakta (unmanifested prakrti or cetana) arises buddhi. From 
0 
it the ahamkara (ego), from ahamkara the ether and the other 
elements in succession. These five are the gross elements and 
not the tanmatras (subtle elements) of the later Samkhya. Of 
them, ether has only one quality, while each succeeding element 
has got a corresponding increase of qualities (CS.I.27-29). 
When this process is complete 7 creation takes place. At the 
time of pralaya (periodical cosmic dissolution) all the evolutes 
return back to Prakrti or to the unmanifested causal state. 
At the time of new creation, they emerge from the unmanifested 
state of ayyakta or Purusa. This cycle of manifestation and 
the reverse goes on through·~;the influence of rajas and tamas 
(CS.I.68). The conglomeration of all the twenty-four principles, 
which is technically called ra~~:- -pur usa ( CS. I. 35) goes on 
¢1 
indefinitely because of the influence of rajas and tamas. 
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When there is the preponderance of sattava, the conglomeration 
ceases (CS.I.36). Thus, it is maintained that the three 
gunas are the cosmic factors in the evolution and dissolution. 
' 
The sense organs are five, their constituent elements 
are also five, five are their seats in the body, five are 
their external objects and five also the perceptions arising 
therefrom - so have the ancients said. But over and above 
the sense-organs, we have, which is called by different names 
such as sattva and cetas, whose activity is directed towards 
its own unique field of feeling as also towards congbition and 
conation and which is at the back of all activity of the 
external sense-organs. The mind in an individual is one only, 
though it appears as many on account of differences in 
subjective moods, etc. It is in fact not many since it 
cannot proceed in different directions simultaneously. The 
sense perceptions are due to the contact of the sense-organs 
with the objects, of the mind with the sense-organs and of the 
soul with the mind. Mind (citta or manas) is the instrument 
of knowledge (CS.I.l9), without which there can never be 
knowledge in the Purusa. Its functions are thinking and 
reasoning. It directs the senses (CS.I.21). It is the 
apparatus of sensations without which there can be no contact 
between the Puru~a and the objects and so no pleasure or pain 
( cs . I. 13 5) • 
The existence of a technical Puru~a except as a rasi-purusa 
0 
is established in the Craka Samhita 37-52 (also in the Bhagavad 
Glta XVIII.14-16 and Mbh.XII.218.20-42). Two aspects of the 
Puru~a are recogn;ised herez transcendental and the empirical. 
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The transcendental Purusa is beginningless, unborn and is 
• 
called Paramatman. He is different from the rasi-purusa 
6 
as it is the product of the fruits of actions performed 
through delusion, desire and aversion. Being caused, it 
is not eternal like the uncaused eternal self (CS.I.5J-59). 
It is also unthinkable. Such a transcendental Purusa is 
, 
only one (CS.I.14,84,155 and also in Mbh.XII.219,48-49). 
Towards the existence of this transcendental self, the 
proof is that a pot cannot be produced without a potter. 
One, who says so, utters falsehood and suffers ignorance. 
This self is not merely a series of changing states either; 
for in that case, for the work of one, bthers will be 
responsible (CS.I.46). Thus, the paramatman is eternal, 
unmanifested and unthinkable. Though consciousness belongs 
to the self - the conscious states arise when the self is one 
with the 2J-principles (atma jnah karanaih yogat jfianam tasya 
6 I 
pravartate - CS.I.5J) .. The self is called k~et~jna,and the 
objective principles are called ksetra. This self, the 
0 
ksetrajna, being cetana (sentient), karta (doer) and sakshi 
----
(onlooker) is the empirical self. When it is associated with 
the individual body, it is called bhutatma (CS.I.57, 84, 155). 
Though omnipresent, this self is localized in the bodies and 
therefore, though omniscient (~arvavit- CS.I.14), cannot 
apprehend all sensations occurring in all bodies (CS.I.79). 
'Yoked to the mind that cleaves to it by virtue of the acts 
performed through the instrumentality of the body, the soul, 
though present in all bodies is to be regarded for practical 
purposes as localized in one particular body'(CS.I.81). The 
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transcendental condition of the empirical self, as described 
in the Caraka-Samhita, indicates that there is no dualism 
between them ultimately. 
'V / 
Section C - PANCASIKHA: MAHABHARATA 
,.,. / 
I - PANCASIKHA 
In the Mbh XII.219 Panca£ikha (believed to be the pupil 
of Asuri, who is the direct disciple of Kapila, the founder 
of the Samkhya system) gives an account of the Samkhya which 
is much in accordance with Caraka's views. PancaJikha 
describes the ultimate truth as "Avyakta (unrnanifest -
Prakrti) in the state mf Purusa (purusavastham-avyaktam)" 
d 
(Mbh.XII.218.12). · Pancasikha postulates same proofs as 
Caraka to establish the existence of the self that bears all 
our duties and moral responsibility. ,....., I • • Pancas1kha, l1ke Caraka, 
says that 'all consciousness is due to the conglomeration 
of our physical body, mind and the elements of cetas'. The 
self is other than this conglomeration. The misjudgement of 
this conception that, 'conglomeration is the self', is the 
cause of suffering. Gunas are only the good and bad qualities 
0 
of the mind. Since the conglomeration is not .the self, any 
attachment to this ego is false. The elements of the 
material bodies remain together in a collective whole by 
their nature and they are spearated also in the same manner. 
The self is characterless. It acquires the characteristics 
(as it were) when it is associated with the body. In the 
state of release the self becomes aliQga and unmanifest. 
I 
Pancasikha's atheistic views together with Caraka's enumeration 
- I 
may have given rise to the atheistic Sa~khya of Isvarakrsna. 
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According to S.N. Dasgupta's opin~on, views of Caraka and 
Pahca~ikha formulate the transitional link between the 
Upani~adic doctrines and the classical Samkpya. (l9) A.B. 
Keith, on the other hand, does not believe in any connection 
between Pancasikha and the Samkhya system. (20) But, I 
agree with Dasgupta's views in maintaining the theory that 
views of Caraka and Pancasikha together with the accounts in 
the Mahabharata brought out the classical Sa~khya~iew. 
A 
II :-.. MAHABHJUy'rA 
fV I Apart from Pancasikha's short enumerations, some details 
/ 
are found in the Santiparva of the Mahabharata ~ .. d"-i..chco~nform 
with the theistic Sa~khya views. The Mahabharata describes 
Purusottama (the high·est spiritual being) as the ultimate 
. 
reality and the Purusa (empirical self) and Prakrti (nature) 
~ -----0--
as two different essential phases of the highest Lo.rd. 
Pra~ti is endowed with the dynamic power of evolving and 
dissoloving the universe. But to carry out the creation, 
Prakfti is under control of the supreme principle (who is her 
lord and master - Trigunadhipa). This spiritual principle 
6 
is the transcendental reality (Mbh. ~antiparva 50.26.27), 
and includes both Pra~ti (Mbh.JOJ.Jl-34) and the individual 
Purusa (Mbh.J50.26-27). This is the principle of consciousness 
which illuminates and supports everything. He is the twenty-
sixth principle and the final support of all. 
The supreme principle (referred as puru~ottama in the Mbh.) 
is unique by itself. The duality is referred in the second 
-v 
stage between sattva and ksetra.ina (p:erceiving self). The 
• 
twenty-four categories, including avyakta, constitute the 
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physio-mental conglomeration known as ksetra (field) and the 
individual soul, that resides inside this whole, is known as 
the adhisthata or knower of the f~eld. This is the twenty-
. 
fifth principle or ksetrajna who is the empirical self -
b 
i.e. the perceiving and living self inside rohe mind-body 
complex. The ksetrajna is not the supreme principle, as 
it is distinctly stated in the Mahabharata, that it becomes 
united with the twenty-sixth principle at the time of kaivalya 
or release (Mbh.307.16 & 308.11-12). It is only in the 
state of bondage that the empirical self fails to discriminate 
between the highest self and its ownself. Though different 
in nature, these two principles are related together like 
fish and water or fly and fig leaf (mbh.l94.39-40). In this, 
way, the untouched and characterless self (in man) identifies 
itself with the nature and that ~eads to bondage. Though 
the Purusa is inactive and conscious yet due to ignorance, it 
assumes the pleasures and pains, which essentially belong to 
the Prakrti or sattva. 
0 
The three gunas - sattva, rajas and tamas, are mentioned 
• 
in the Mahabharata only as three different mental states -
good, bad and indi~ferent. They did not achieve the standard 
of cosmic factors till later. Buddhi is regarded as a cosmic 
principle in the Mahabharata. The universe is said to be 
'shot' through and through with the buddhi. All matters merge 
into it and emerge from it (Mbh.l94.17,18). We come across 
the terms bhutatma and bhutakr.t in the epic and all the 
bha~tika elements are said to have evolved from it. 
According to the epics, the various parts of the empirical 
world are derived from Prakrti. But there are a number of 
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views on this point differing from each other. According 
to one view, there are five senses - mind, intellect and 
spirit as ksetrajna (Mbh.246.17). In another view, the 
spirit is admitted as the ninth element, as citta, a new 
element is added to the group (Mbh.274.16,18). In Chapter 
/' 
306 of Santiprava, sixteen vikaras are mentioned as - the 
five organs of sensation, five organs of action, mind and 
the five objects. These categories are almost the same as 
in the classical Sa~khya system. 
The Mahabharata postulates that the individual souls are 
many and that they can be relieved of the burden of sufferings 
by their abandonment of Prakrti and its evolutes. The 
supreme spirit is transcendental and is the merging ground 
of all multiplicity and difference (Mbh.Santi.350.26). When 
the individual soul realizes his own nature and thus he see!'\ 
his difference from the psycho-physical structure and thus 
from Prakrti, the sufferings cannot affect him anymore. Thus, 
as regards systematization, the Epic shows marked step 
forward than the Upanisads. The theistic expositions in the 
0 
Mahabharata probablyl.created the transitional period when the 
dualistic idea became consolidated. 
Section D - CLASSICAL SAMKHYA 
In the previous sections, I have tried to bring out the 
complex and intricate problem of gettfung a more or less 
consistent picture of the nature of human personality in the 
pre-classical literature bearing fragmentary references to 
the Samkhya system of thought. In this section, I shall 
. 
discuss mainly the classical Samkhya conception of Man . 
. 
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By the term 'Classical Samkhya', I mean the formulation of 
.. 
conceptions as in isvara-kr~~a's Samkhya-karika with its 
commentary, and in the S~mkhya-sutra with Pravacanabhasya. 
0 c 
The precise dates of these texts are difficult to determine 
accurately. It can be assumed that the Samkhya-karika was 
0 
known in the sixth century A. D. (refer page 92). The 
Samkhya-pravacanasutra is a later work - perhaps as late as 
• 
the 14th or 15th century A.D. ( 21 ) For centuries, the 
Samkhya-karika was the only definitive text of the Samkhya 
0 r 
tradition. I have, therefore, taken the S~khya-karika as 
the representative text for the classical period. 
We have seen that the Sa~khya system is not a 'mo~lithic' 
system; but the systematization was carried on for a long 
time and it has thus assimilated a variety of traditions 
over a long period of time. Influences can be traced to the 
ancient vedic hymns of creation and to the old upanif?adic 
conception of At~ and Brahman (discussed in previous sections). 
It is finally in the Karikas of -/' that we Isvarakrsna come 
0 •• 
across a systematic analysis of the SaJl.!khya views. SallJkhya 
here stands as an unified system, which is quite distinctive 
from :Yoga and other branches of ph:ilosopfiy. Larson comments 
that, "this classical system represents a synthesis of many 
ancient traditions in which previously diverse and frequently 
contradictory doctrines are given a systematic and coherent 
form. From this synthesis an extremely subtle and sophisticated 
system of thought emerged ... (22 ) 
Usually the Sa~khya has been interpreted as a philosophic 
naturalism (Garbe, Dasgupta and others), or as a decadent 
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form of Vedanta (Deussen, Raaha-krishnan, C. Sharma and 
others). (23) Further, classical Sa~khya may better be 
interpreted as a 'quest:i.for salvation from suffering'. (24 ) 
It begins its analysis from within the context of concrete 
human experience. In the first verse of the first chapter 
of Samkhya-karika, the purpose of the exposition is related 
s 
as suffering in human existence. The purpose of Sawkhya 
philosophy is to provide means to get released from this 
suffering. Karika says that this release must be final 
(atyanta) and not temporary. The only means to this ultimate 
goal is vyaktavyaktajna-vijnana, i.e. the intuitive 
discrimination of the 'knowing one' or 'knower' (jna), the 
'manifest world' (yyakta) and the •unmanifest' (avyakta). 
This knowledge leads mankind to salvation from suffering. 
Suffering is said to be threefold: (i) adhyatmika, that 
which is brought about by factors related to the bodily or 
mental make up of man himself; (ii) adhibhautika, or external 
and (iii) adhidaivika, factors coming from the cosmic or 
supernatural forces. In other words, suffering pervades 
man's whole life. The purpose of Sa~khya philosophy is to 
provide a means of release from this suffering. 
Classical Sa~khya begins its analysis from within the 
context of concrete human experience. According to Samkhya, 
. 
consciousness is suffering. 'The karika deals at length with 
the problem of man and the manifest world, and the way to 
release from sufferings. It rejects the Buddist notion of 
no-self or the Vedanta interpretation of self'. (25) It maintains 
rather a fundamental dualism - between the individual 
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consciousness on the one hand and a real world on the other. 
The sides of this dualism are interacting with one another, 
and it is this dialectic or interaction which brings about 
both the manifest world and the ultimate salvation of 
Puru~a.( 26 ) The knowledge of the manifest (vyakta), unmanifest 
(ayyakta) and the knower (jna) brings about the ultimate 
salvation. These three are intermingled in the personality 
of man. The structure of individual human personality 
corresponds a macrocosmic counterpart in Sawkhya philosophy. 
I shall try. to describe them separately. 
I - PURUSA: 
The term Purusa is most important in Sa~khya expositions. 
It appeared quite early in the religio-philosophic l~terature. 
We find the term in the ~V.X.97.4-5, sigqifying the 'mortal 
man'. The same term is used in the RV.X.90. to mean the 
'cosmic man'. In the AV.X.2 and X.lO there are a few 
interesting suggestions. 
Pu.N1..s o... 
In the Upani~ads, the termAis· often used as a synonym to Atman. 
In the later texts (the pre-classical period), the term 
Purusa is used to signify the self along with a number of 
terms like Atman, Jiva, Bhutatman, ~etrajna, etc. In the 
Upanisadic stage, the term Atman is more prevalent. In the 
0 
post upani~adic and epic literature where we find the emergence 
of a syste,matic Samkhya tradition, the term Ksetra,jna (knower 
. , 
of the field) is used~fuore frequently. But in this stage, 
there is still an evident suggestion of a cosmic self. In 
the later epic age, a marked dualism came through. 
The classical Sa~khya gives a much more sophisticated 
notion ·of the Purusa as self. Purusa has become a technical 
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term here. Kilrika I of the Sal!lkhya-karika mentions Purusa 
as jna (knower) apart from yyakta (manifest) and avyakta 
(unmanifest). Here we can assume that the remnants of the 
preclassical conception of k~etrajna (knower of the field) 
is jna (knower) whereas yyaktavyakta might be the ksetra 
(field). (27) Karika III mentions the term Purusa for the 
first time, and it says - 'na prakrtir - na vikrtih purusah' 
• , 0 .,...__.._.. 
(Purusa is neither creative nor created). Purusa, thus, 
~ ----r-
is over and above the twenty-four principles. Again in 
Karika XI Puru~a is described as opposite to Pra~, i.e. 
'Purusa is not characterized as being made up of three gunas; 
> G 
it is discriminating, subjective, specific, conscious and 
non-productive'. Purusa is in relaity, completely different 
.. 
from the manifest and unmanifest.' 
The characteristics of Purusa is described in Karika XIX. 
They are: i) Saksitvam- the character of being a witness; 
ii) kaivalyam - isolation or freedom from misery; ii) 
madhyastham - neutrality; iv) drastrtvam - percipience, and 
v) akartrbhavasca - non-agency. Here, the isolation of 
Purusa from the manifested world and even its cause, the 
. 
Prakrti is established firmly. Purusa is completely free, 
being different from the manifested-and unmanifested. Purusa 
0 
is not a part of the universe and may only be described from 
a negative approach (like the netivada of the Vedantins to 
describe Atman). 
Purusa is the logical presupposition of all knowledge. (28 ) 
There is the necessity of accepting the existence of this 
changeless transcendental soul, for there is 'consciousness' 
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in the world. An unconscious principle cannot bring out 
the varied and unique universe. Again, every distinction 
in the phenomenal world is for something, and that is Purusa. 
On the other hand, Purusa must be free and transcendental. 
(i): Inferences for the existence of Puru~a, as the 
transcendental being, has been precisely and carefully 
elaborated in the Sa.I!lkhya Ka.rik8.. In the SaJ'!lkhya System, the 
assumption of a transcendental; self is ne.~essary to make it 
possible for the empirical self to act as a person. The 
material basis of the empirical self is buddhi or a~tahkarana 
which is an unconscious evolute of the primordial matter 
(Prakrti). A person is no person without consciousness or 
self-affirmation. So buddhi has to be elevated to the status 
of a person who has to derive or borrow consciousness or 
so~hing simulating consciousness from some external entity, 
whose essence is consciousness itself. That external entity 
is Purusa or transcendental self, which is reflected in buddhi. 
This assumption of the transcendental self is based on a series 
of inferences which are comprised in the Karika XVII: 
"$amghata pararthatvat - trigu(ladiviparyayat adhisthanat 
12uru~o~asti bhokt:rbhavat kaivalyarthaftl. pravrttesca" 
The wordings of the verse do·.:not express the exact syllogistic 
structure of the inference. The syllogistic sturcture is 
obtained by extension and modification of the karika form. 
The expression 'Samghata pararthatvat' contains both the 
middle term and the major terms (hetu and ~adhya). Pararth~ 
is the major term and Samghata is the middle term. For the 
purity of the inferential syntax, parartha should be understood 
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as Pararthatva and samghata as samghatatva. Pararthatva 
means the property of existing for others and samghatatva 
means the property of being a composite body. The minor 
term (paksa) is not expressly stated in the karika. It 
a 
should be avyaktamahadadayah (the non-manifest prakrti, 
~ 0 
intelligence, ego etc). In short, any material object 
which is a composite> body may stand as the minor!_·term. 
Technically, we cannot accept Purusa as the minor term and 
it's existence as the major term. The paksa is that, in 
3 
relation to which the major term is not yet established, but 
is only proposed to be established.( 29) Now, if'existence' 
is itself~the major term, which is not yet established in 
relation to Puru~a - it would mean that the paksa 
.. 
(purusa) 
v-
itself is non-existent. Then, how are we going to establish 
something in relation to something, which is non-existent? 
A correct middle term (hetu) cannot be reaBtedto a non-
existent minor term (paksa). That would mean that upanaya 
f) 
(minor premise) in such a case becomes absurd due to the non-
established nature of the minor term. In Indian logic this 
is technically called the fallacy of a~rayasiddha, because 
the middle term itself stands unestablished due to the 
impossibility of its being related to a non-established minor 
term. 
In the context of his critic~sm of the Samkhya theory 
Dharmaklrti in his pramana-varttika has advanced the objection 
0 
that no inference is possible with the existence of the minor 
term itself conceived as the major term. He says: 
~siddhe btiavadharmo~sti yyabhicharyubhajasra~~ ~harmo virudhao abhavasya sa satta sadhY-ate katha~(30)» 
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This verse has been quoted with approval by Jayantabhatta 
. N- ~. ~ (31 ) F 1 f 1 t d . t 1n yayamanJar1. rom pure y orma s an po1n , a 
m~nor term should be either a positive entity (bhava-
padartha) or a negative entity (abhava pad~tha). 
'"' 
Now formally speaking,three alternatives are possible 
as regards the relation between the minor term and the 
middle term. Either the middle term is the property of 
a positive paksa or of a negative paksa or of both the 
I • 
negative and the positive paksaS'o 
5 
If the existence of the minor term itself is proposed 
to be ther,Sadhya and if the minor term be conceived as a 
positive entity - the position becomes absurd. Since we are 
~ / - . trapped in the fallacy of asYayas1ddha, as has been shown 
above. Let us examine the second formal alternative, in 
which, the middle term is supposed to be related both to a 
positive paksa and to a negative paksa and the~existenc~ is 
f i 
proposed major term. In this situation, apart from the 
fallacy of asrayasiddha, we also face the fallacy of vyabhicara 
or anaikatttika i.e. the violation of the major premise. A 
property of a negative entity is also negative in character. 
" But 'existence' is a positive property. As such it cannot 
be the property of a negative paksa. In such a case 'existence' 
6 
is turned into non-existence. This would mean that the hetu 
or middle term exists even in the absence of the major term 
(sadhya), which means the violation of the major premise. 
Let us then take the third alternative, in which the middle 
term is supposed to be related to a negative paksa and 'existence' 
" 
is supposed to be the major term. In such a position, apart 
- / - . from asrayas1ddha and vyabhicara, we also face the fallacy 
-132-
of Viruddha, in which the middle term goes to establish 
just the opposite or contradictory of the major term. 
Since 'existence' is supposedly going to be established 
as a property of a negative paksa - it is also going to 
0 
be turned into its opposite i.e. <non-existencE?. Thus, the 
hetu employed for eBtablishing'existence' formally goes to 
extablish ~on-exitence~ This is technically called the 
fallacy of Viruddha in which the middle term actually 
goes against the major term - which it is expected to prove. 
To avoid this technical diff~culty, the proper structure 
of the inference, which goes to prove Purusa should be 
restated as follows: the expression samghata pararthatvat 
shoulG be bifurcated into two elements, pararthatva which is 
t.. 
the major term and samghat~a which is the middle term, 
After supplying the minor term av)~ktamahad-aha~karadaya~, 
the proper inference should stand thus: 
".avyakta-mahad - ahamkaradaya9: parartha!l 
samghataty'at, sayanasanadyaqgavat." 
(Prakrti, mahat, aha~kara etc. ·exist for serving some others 
purpose, because these are composite entities, like the 
accessories such as bed, seat etc). This is the compressed 
form of the syllogism which may be expanded in the following 
way: 
(i) Prakrti - mahat - ahawkara etc. exist for serving some 
other's purpose = Pratijna - the proposition to be established. 
(ii) Because these are composite entities = (the reason, the 
middle term- ~- probans). 
(iii) Whatever is a composite entity exist for serving some 
other's purpose, like the accessories such as bed, seat etc. 
4daharana i.e. vyapti with example - major premise. 
tr 
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(iv) Prakrti, mahat, ahamkara etc. are composite entities = 
upanaya, the minor term. 
(v) Prakrti, mahat, ahamkara etc exist for serving some other's 
purpose = conclusion or nigamana. 
The s·amkhya thinks that once this inference is established, 
" 
it follows by a further implication; that this para or 
• some other • is • asamhata Pur usa •, the,mon-composi te transcen-
dental self. 
-
The Buddhist logicians Di~9ag~and Dharmakirti, by 
challenging this implication, have attempted to expose the 
fallacy involved in the main body of the inference. This 
. . ./ . ";-' - . fallacy l.S called dharmavl.sesa - Vl.parJ.ta-sadhana l.n Nyaya: 
s 
prave~a asqibed to Di~aga, - and istavighata~t in 
Dharmakirti's Nyayavindu. In both these treaties, th-is 
fallacy has been shown as a type of Viruddha. These two 
giants of Buddhist logic show the fallacy in the following 
way: 
It is not enough for the Samkhya, simply to prove that the 
0 
composite bodies exist for other's sake. It must be further 
proved that this 'other'is a non-composite entity which is 
the transcendental self. This, however, is not proved by 
the inference. What is proved, on the contrary, is just the 
opposite of what the Sa~khya intends to prove. We see that 
the composite accessories like bed, seat etc. exist for the 
purpose of another composite entity i.e. the human body. 
Thus, these composite objects exist for the comforts of 
another composite object (like the human body) and not for 
the sake of any non-composite entity (like Purusa - proposed 
' 
_::D4-' 
by the sawkhya). Purusa is a monolythic unit of consciousness. 
~ 
The purpose of the Sa~khya can only be served by proving 
this monolythic nature of Purusa, which is the other (para) 
for which Prakrti etc. are supposed to exist. But we see 
that one Samhata (composite) object exists for another 
0 
composite (samhata) object but never that a samhata (composite) 
object exists for another asamhata (non-composite) object. 
Thus, the inference goes to prove just the opposite of what 
the Samkhya intends to prove. (3 2 ) 
• 
In Dharmottarapradlpa, Dharmakirti observes - nanu ca 
trtiyopi istavighatakrt viruddah. The purpose of nanu with 
• • " w ,_ 
which Dharmakirti's text begins here, is not to imply that it 
is not a Viruddha fallacy. It goes to imply that this should 
not be considered as a special type of Viruddha (unlike Dinnaga) 
.. 
but should be included in the previous two types shown by 
Dharmakirti. 
Both·Vacaspati and the annonymous author of Yuktidlpika 
• 
have taken into consideration this formidable objection 
advanced by Di~oaga and Dharmakirti. The author of Yuktidipika 
deals at length with this objection. (33) 
Vacaspati in his Tattvakaumudi is very precise in not, ing 
• 
this objection and answering it in his own way. He remarks -
You (the Buddhists), on the strength of hetu and udaharana 
want to entertain the harmful (for the Samkhya) major premise 
• 
i.e. - 'any composite body exists for the.sake of another 
composite body.' But in that case, you cannot escape the trap 
of infinite regress (anavastha). Since what is established 
here is a 'samhata para' (composite other) - this being a 
samhata, the object will lead to another Samhata para and in this 
way you cannot reach the end ·of the process. Hence to avoid 
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the infinite regress, you must reach out a point of 
asamhata-para (non-composite other). If this is so, the 
major term of the vyapti 
:.._b_wt"simply pararthatva. 
should not bec~~~ata-pararthatvat~ 
This 'para' then must be asamhata 
(non-composite), because otherwise, the infinite regress is 
ines~apable. (34 ) 
Moreover when we go to establish an inductive generalisation 
on the strength/basis of some instance, we do not transfer 
all the special characteristics of the instance to the 
constitution of the major term figuring as the predicate of 
the generalisation. Suppose maha~asa (kitchen) having 
coexistence of fire and smoke, serves as the instance of 
generalisation - 'wherever there is smoke, there is fire.' 
Let us also suppose that the 'fire' in our kitchen is produced 
by cow-dung cake. Here, 'being produced by cow-dung cake' 
is a special property of the kitchen fire. But, we are not 
entitled, on the strength of this, to entertain the generalisation 
that 'wherever there is smoke there is cow-dung produced -
fire, and proceed to infer that this mountain has cow-dung 
produced fire, because it has 'smoke'. If we insist on such 
a generalisation on the basis of involving all these special 
characteristics of the instance, in the predicable major term-
no correct inference is possible at all. Hence, for the 
sake of correct generalisation and inference the instance 
should be accepted in its most general characteristic of 
having fire and not in the specific characteristic of having 
'cow-dung producedfire.' In a similar way, in the S~khya 
inference concerned the instances bed etc. should be taken 
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in their general characteristics of simple 'pararthatva' 
and not 'samhatapararthatva' . 
• 
(ii) There is another crucial factor in the nature of 
Purusa and that is its multiplicity. In the pre-classical 
Samkhya, ;IPurusa is regarded as a cosmic reality and it 
G · e 
resembles the conception of Atman in the Upani~ads. But 
classical Samkhya recognises multiple number of Purusas -
.., 
as many as there are animate individuals. In Karika XVIII 
the reasons are brought out - and the plurality of Purusa is 
·established, viz. (i) because of the diversity· of births, 
and faculties; (ii) because of actions or functions (that 
take place) at different times; and, (iii) because of 
differences in the proportions of the three gunas (in different 
D 
entities). 
,. 
In the absence of such a plu~lity, birth and 
death will be one for the whole universe. Thus, at the birth 
of one individual, all individuals would be born, and at the 
death of one, all would die. But, in fact, people are born 
and they die at different times individually. The absurdity 
of universal Uniformity of human action is avoided by the 
hypotheses of multiplicity of Purusas.Vaca~patimi~ra concludes 
his commentary on Karika XVIII saying - 'This diversity or 
differentiation due to the distrubution of the attributes in 
the various entities, could not be explained if the spirit 
were one and the same in all. On the hypothesis of plurality, 
however, there is no difficulty.'(35) Again, action is 
individually restricted, that is, all do not perform the same 
work at the same time. Lastly, gUQaS are differently 
manifested in different individuals, i.e.' whereas a sattvic 
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person is happy, a rajasic person is unhappy, and a tamasic 
one is deluded ( Kcirika XVII). The classical SaiJlkhya deviates 
from the older doctrine of a cosmic self. (36 ) 
On the one hand, the doctrine tends to under-score the 
dualism of the system. All manifestations of the world have 
their existence in the mulaprakrti apart from Purusa, though 
"' 
they depend on Purusa for their existence. On the other hand, 
the doctrine of the plurality of Purusa tends to under-
score the concreteness of the problem - salvation. (37) 
Kapila in Samkhya-pravacana-sutra 1.154 mentions 'nadvait-
o 
asrutivirodhah jatiparatvat.• 'There is no opposition to 
the scriptures (declaratory)" of the non-duality (of soul), 
because the reference (in such texts) is to the genus (or 
to soul in general). I According to &avies, the sutra is 
probably a late interpolation, by someone.who wished to 
reconcile the system of Kapila with that of Vedantist school. (3B) 
He further states th~t'Kapila himself seems to have been too 
honest and too bold a thinker to make such an attempt.' 
Vijnanabhik~u enumerates that the oneness of the soul 
advocated by the Sruti, the .. Vedanta, etc. refer to 'the 
homogeneous nature of Purusa and not to their numerical unity' 
(SPB.I.154). We cannot say that there is one soul only. The 
one soul appears as many,due to the imposition of different 
adjuncts (upadhis). In the case of a space, limited by a 
chair, the limited space can be saved from limitation by 
removing the chair; but that same space may be limited again 
by the imposition of some other things on it (SPB.I.150). So, 
if one spirit is recongnized, bondage and l·tberation, limitation 
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and freedom will become absurd and meaningless. 
S.N. Dasgupta has shown the realistic approach of Sa~khya 
thus: " .. if the different selves be the reflections upon 
different buddhis from one Purusa or Atman, as in the Ved~nta, 
then the notion of self or personality would be false. For, 
then the only true being would be the being of Purusa. So, 
the knower being false, the known also becomes false, the 
knower and the known having vanished, everytning is reduced 
to that which we can in no way conceive , viz., the Brahman 
..... The Samkhya-yoga view does not hold that the knower 
• 
is false, but analyses the nature of the ego and says that it 
is the seeming unity of buddfui and the Purusa, both of which 
are real in the strictest sense of the term."(39) 
Purusa in Sa~khya is individual but not personal. The 
personal ego or self-consciousness is included in the notion 
of buddhi, ahamkara and manas. Thus what is known as self-
consciousness or e·go in classical SaiJlkhya is to be other than 
the Purusa, although Purusa's presence is required in order 
for the various human experiences to appear.· Thus, Purusa by 
itself has no knowledge, action and emotion. Self is only a 
spectator. Purusa.~y itself is just the fact of consciousness. 
0 
'Impersonal yet individual, it is the fact of man's experience 
which renders him able to become a man.•( 40) 
Everything in this world appears through the interaction 
of Purusa and Prakrti. How these two principles come together 
for the purpose of creation, is not explained anywhere. 
Purusa is never bound to the world. Only through the proximity 
of Purusa, Prakrti undergoes series of transformations from 
which the WOI'l.ld is manifested. According to the Karika XXI, 
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the purpose of the creation is the freedom of Purusa. The 
Karika says, "The association of the two, which is like 
that of a lame man and a blind one, is for the purpose of 
Primal Nature being contemplated (as such) by the spirit 
(from three-fold misery); from this (association) creation 
proceeds." (SXXXI). Thus Purusa and Prakrti serve mutual 
purposes. 
Purusa is pure consciousness, and has got no movements. 
Pralq'ti is dynamic but unconscious. When the Purusa through 
beginningless ignorance, identifies itself with Prakrti, 
• 
then only creation takes place. According to Samkhya, 
buddhi is the intermediate link between Prakrti and Purusa. 
The Samkhya-karika explains the union of the two principles 
5 
thus: "Hence, from their union, the non-intelligent linga 
-
becomes intelligent as it were, and so too, though agency is 
of the constituents, the indifferent one (the spirit) becomes 
agent as it were~ (Karika XX). Purusa being inactive, 
experience depends solely on the intelligised buddhi. 
II - PRAKRTI: 
<> 
The twenty-five principles of the classical Sa~khya may 
be grouped into two categories- the 'Self' and the 'Not-Self', 
or Purusa and Prakrti. Purusa is the only member of the 
first category, while the second category comprises of twenty-
four principles. All the twenty-four principles constitute 
what is called vi~aya or object (SK.XI) in relation to the 
twenty-fifth principle~ Purusa, which is the knowing subject 
(Jna: SK II). 
The dualism of Sa~khya lies in the recognition of Prakrti 
(avyakta or pradhana) as an independent principle, existing 
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along side Purusa, Prakrti is the name for the noumenal 
condition of all that exist apart from the self, and of 
which that comes into our experience. <41 ) For that reason, 
Prakrti is called by the significant terms like avyakta 
(unmanifest or unseen), mula prakrti (the root nature), 
<> 
pradhana (the primordial one). <42 ) 
The reality of such a primordial unseen entity is established 
on the basis of inductive reasoning: from an examination of 
the phenomenal particulars to the universal noumenon. <43) 
The concept of causation is developed by the Sa¥1khya philosophers 
under the name of Satkaryavada and Parinamavada. The arguments 
are put forward in the Samkhya-karika thus: "The non-
' 
perception of that (avyakta) is due to its subtlety, not to 
its non-existence (n~abhavat), for it is cognised from its 
effects." (SK.VIII). Further, 'the effect is existent (in its 
cause) prior to its becoming the effect, since non-existent 
cannot be produced; since an (appropriate) material is. selected 
as a cause for each thing, because anything cannot be produced 
(from anything); since a potent (cause) can produce only that 
which it is capable (of producing); and since the effect is 
of the same nature as the cause' (SK. IX). As Keith has 
suggested, these reasons can be reduced into three ways; first 
of all, non-being obviously produce or do nothing; second, 
the effect is made up of the same material as the cause, there 
being a difference only with respect to the appearance or 
modification of the material; and third, a specific cause is 
able to produce only a specific effect. (44) 
These arguments establish that this phenomenal world of 
experience points to a source, for without which it would not 
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exist. The source is not non-existent, for the reality of 
the world of experience points to its existence. The 
existence of a primal cause, called mala-prakrti or avyakta 
is established, as the ground of all objective manifestation. 
Thus, Prakrti is regarded as an ultimate first principle and 
... 
its synonyms are avyakta and pradhana (unmanifested and the 
chief principle). Since this prakrti is the uncaused first 
. 
cause of this vast and multifarius universe, it is unlimited, 
all-pervasive and infinite. (45) In Karika XI, vyaktavy-akta 
is described as follows: it is characterised by three gunas 
» 
(trigunam), undiscriminated (avivekl), objective (visaya), 
3 d q 
general (samanya), non-conscious (acetana) and productive 
~prasavadharmi). In Karika X, the yyakta, i.e. that which 
includes the 23 evolutes of avyakta is described as follows: 
it is caused (hetumat), finite (anityam), non-pervasive 
(avyapi), active (sakriyam), plural (anekam), supported (asritam), 
• 
emergent (lingam), composite (savayavam) and dependent 
; 0 
(paratantra~). (46 ) Avyakta or mulapra~ti is said to be the 
opposite of these characteristics. 
Of all the characteristics of mulapra~ti, the most vital 
are three gunas, which pervade all the evolutes from buddhi 
. 
down to the gross elements. According to the Samkhya-karika, 
G 
gu~a is a 'substance' as well as a 'quality', both being 
inseparable from each other, and guna is an ontological real. (47) 
--2-
Gunas are not the 'adjectival qualities of Prakrti but are the 
. ' 
very 'constituents'. M. Hiriyanna explains that Prakrti is 
. 
the first cause of the universe, and thus one and complex, and 
its complexity is the result of its being constituted of three 
factors, each of which is described as a~~· By the word 
" 
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guoa here, we should not understand what it is commonly 
-
taken to mean, viz., a quality. It means here rather a 
'component factor' or a constituent of Pra~ti. But it 
should not be regarded as built up out of them - for, while 
it depends on them, they depend just as much on it, both 
being equally beginningless, This intrinsic interdependence 
of the gunas excludes the possibility of the breaking up of 
u 
the Prakrti by their separation. <48 ) 1 Mahadeva, in his 
., 
Samkhya-sutra-vrttisara, says - Prakrti is not the receptacle 
4 • 
" 
of the gunas, but is itself the guqas. <49) Aniruddha in his 
Sa~khyasutravrtti says - Although Pra~ti is the state of 
equipoise of three gunas, still the word Prakrti is also 
., 
conventionally used to denoteeveryone of these severally 
(SSVS. I. 61). In Karika XII - XIV, the gunas are described as 
' 
sattva, characterised by pleasure (priti) and illumination 
(prakasa); it is buoyant (laghu) and shining (prakasaka). 
Rajas is characterised by pain (apriti) and actuation 
.. 
(pravrtti). It is stimulating ( upastambhaka) and moving ( cala),.' 
. 
Tamas is characterised by indifference (visada) and restraint 
(niyama). It is heavy (guru) and enveloping (varanaka). 
All the three g~as mutually or reciprocally involve 
each other. They should not be taken individually or separately. 
As the Samkhyakarika explains - they mutually 'suppress, 
a 
support, produce and exist. ,(50) However, when these 'forces'(5l) 
are in equilibrium, we have, what is called the 'noumenal 
condition of Prakrti', technically known as the 'avyakta'state. 
The equipoise or samyavastha of Prakrti is the state where 
these three forces are equally operative in keeping the identity 
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of Prakrti from transforming into Vikrti (i.e. in evolution). 
When the equilibrium of Prakrti is disturbed by the 
preponderence of one or the other guna, evolution takes 
"' 
place. A varying proportion of these 'forces', got to make 
up the variety of the manifested world, in the following 
manner: (i) When the condition of sattva predominates, the 
manifestation exhibits the physical characteristics of buoyancy 
and illumination and psychological characteristics of 
pleasure. (ii) If the condition of rajas predominates, the 
manifestation exhibits the physical characteristics of 
stimulation and movement and the psychological characteristics 
of pain and passion. (iii) If the condition of tamas 
predominates, the manifestation exhibits the physical 
characteristics of weight and resistance or inertia, and the 
psychological characteristics of despondency or rejection. 
The gunas thus are characterised from both psychological and 
• 
physical characteristics. The psychological characteristics 
are pleasure, pain and rejection, and the physical characteristics 
are lightness, illumination and so on (SK XIII,XIV). It is 
impossible to think of an evolution from only quality or only 
substance, and so guoas are conceived to be both. 
::.-..-:.-
Thus, Pralrrti is one and is nothing but the unity of the 
three guqas in a state of potentiality and incoherence. It 
supports all, being the cause of all, and is not supported 
by anything else. It is alinga, because it does not refer to 
0 
any other category for its existence. Prakrti is niravayavf 
(formless), because, in this state, the production of different 
evolutes does not commence. It is svatantra (independent), 
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unmanifested (avyakta) and unconscious, and also the 
objective ground of all cognitions, Prakrti or the primordial 
• 
nature moves in two ways - anuloma (forward) - generating 
or evolving, and pratiloma (backward) - thus retreating the 
stages in which she marched. Samkhya-karika xv & XVI also 
• 
justifies the validity of the avyakta prakrti being the source 
• 
of all manifestations (vyakta). It says - because of the 
finite nature of specific objects, because of homogeneity, 
because of evolution being due to the efficiency of the cause, 
because of separation between cause and its effect and because 
of the merging .of the whole world of effects, there is the 
unmanifest as the cause. All effects are finite - being 
caused. But Prakrti being the potential cause, cannot be 
finite. 
The avyakta, being the cause of the manifest world, 
exercises its creative functioning by means of the interactions 
of the gunas. The diversity of the phenomenal world is due 
1 
to the various manifestations of the gunas, which are 
" 
continually undergoing changes and transformation. The gu~as 
can be traced back to the avyakta, and thus are like the 
Prakrti, uncaused and eterna·l. Prakrti, by means of the three 
.. 
gu~as represents everything from the unmanifested potential 
causal state to.the gross matters. Thus Prakrti in a way 
0 
stands for 24 principles of Sai?khya except the Purul?a. The 
presence of Puru~a as we have seen before, is the only factor 
which brings purpose to the evolution of Prakrti . 
• 
III - THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN PURUSA AND PRAKRTI 
According to the SaWkhya view, 'creation proceeds from the 
proximity (or association) of the two (viz. Purusa and Prakrti) 
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which is like that of a blind man and a lame man (which is) 
for the purpose of seeing the pradhana (i.e. Prakrti), and 
for the purpose of isolation of Purusa (SK.XXI). In this 
verse, the purpose of creation is said to be for the benefit 
of Purusa and Prakrti. But ultimately it is only the Purusa, 
who is benefited from the creation. This notion is clearly 
expressed in the Karika LVI. "This creation br:ought about by 
Prakrti from mahat (or buddhi') down to the specific gross 
objectsc .... _ is for the purpose of the release of every P~; 
(this is done) for the sake of another, as if it were for her 
own (benefit) ... (5 2 ) 
Samyoga (or proximity) being the Puru~artha is . teleologica: 
But the question arises, how the insentient Prakrti can have 
• 
the understanding or consciousness of the purpose. The 
Karika answers - 'though Prak;ti is insentient, it can work 
for the sake of Purusa in the same way as the non-intelligent 
milk flows for the nourishment of the calf!. (SK LVII). 
Different views are propounded regarding the nature of the 
relation between Purusa and Prakrti. Dasgupta says - 'It 
seems that the union of the buddhi with the puru~a is 
somewhat mystical. ,(53) He also mentions that Yoga has a 
different view on this. It holds that it is the creative will 
-I 
of Isvara which enhancesthe evolvement of Prakrti. Radhakrishnan 
. 
describes the relationship thus: The first cause, as well 
as the final cause, of all the cosmic process is Purusa. But 
the causation,·bf Purusa is purely :roechanical, being not to its 
mere proximity. Purusa moves the world by a kind of action 
which is not movement. It is compared to the attraction of a 
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magnet for iron. (54 ) Here we see a disagreement between 
the two views. What Dasgupta regards 'the transcendental 
influence of the Purusa· is considered 'purely mechanical' 
• 
by Radhakrishnan. 
Max Muller has cited a simile of the dualism of Purusa 
and Prakrti thus: the puru~a, when he seems to see, to 
combine, to rejoice, to suffer, and to will, does so by 
misapprehension only, like a spectator who is carried away 
by his sympathies for Hecuba, but who, in the end,dries 
his tears and stops his sighs, leaves the theatre of the 
world and breathes the fresh air of a bright night'.(55) 
Max Muller's point of view agrees with Karika LIX which says, 
"As a dancing girl, having exhibited herself to the spectators 
of the stage, ceases to dance, so does Nature cease to operate 
when she has made herself manifest to the spirit". Prakrti 
evolves for the sake of Purusa (SK LVIII). The liberation 
of Purusa lies in the isolation from Prakrti. It is effected 
by the discriminatins knowledge of the buddhi (SK LXIII). Then 
the knowledge arises in Purusa - "'I' does not exist, noth~ng 
0 
is 'mine', there is nothing like 'ego'", (SKLXIV). This 
gives rise to the extinction of all individuality. This is 
the most complete knowledge which does not leave anything more 
to be known. 
IV - EVOLUTES: 
To bring out the experience of knowledge, Prakrti has to 
go through a series of evolution. The proximity of Purusa 
I 
brings forth the first evolute from Prakrti, namely 'buddhi' . 
. 
From buddhi emerges ahamkara; from that comes the group of 
.. 
sixteen. Moreover, from five among the sixteen, come forth 
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the five gross elements. Up to the pQint of the emergence 
of ahamkara (ego), the evolution is vertical, i.e. each 
0 
emergent appearing successively from the prior one. From 
ahamkara, the group of sixteen emerges - containing manas, 
five senses, the five organs of action, and the five organs 
of action, and the five tanmatras (subtle elements). The 
emergence of these sixteen, however, is not vertical. It is 
rather horizontal, i.e., ahamkara becomes transformed into 
mind, senses and subtle elements. In fact these sixteen 
elements arise from different aspects of ahamkara. Finally 
from the five subtle elements, the five mahabhUtas (gross 
elements) come forth. 
In Karikas 23-38, the author describes each evolute separately, 
and the analysis is directed to the individual. According 
to Larson - "Classical Sa~khya seems to have interpreted the 
old cosmic principles in the individual terms". (56 ) Thus, 
the 'Cosmological Self' is reduced to the individual Purusa. 
The existence of Purusa as a witness is absolutely necessary 
for the manifestation of Prakrti. In Puru~a's presence, 
Prakrti immediately undergoes transformation into the manifest 
world, which is then witnessed by Purusa. This process takes 
place immediately, as from Karika XX, we know that the mani-
fest world appears immediately as if it were cons€ious. Thus, 
from the point of view o·f experience, the world is understood 
in terms of the individual Purusa- (i.e., ~rusarthata). 
As the classical Sa~khya maintains the individual Purusa and 
not the cosmic one, it is most logical that the tattvas are 
described from the point of view of individual consciousness. 
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The first evolute of Prakrti is 'Buddhi' or'Mahat' 
(intellect or the great one), which is predominantly 
sattvika in character. It is also called jagat-vija (seed 
of the world), as the rest of the world emanate from buddhi. 
According to Keith, the notion of buddhi or mahat probably 
goes back to the old cosmological idea of 'the creative 
principle entering his creation and becoming the first born 
of the creation.' (57) In its psychological aspect it is called 
buddhi (intellect) and relates to the individual while in the 
cosmic aspect it is known as mahat (the great one). This first 
principle is not individual or particular, but it includes 
within itself, the buddhis of all individuals and thus is 
called buddhi-tattva ( the principle of intellect). Because 
of the universal character of buddhi, the world becomes the 
common objective ground of experience for all persons. Had 
it not been so, each person would have his own world of 
experience. In the Bha~ya, the synonyms f~r buddhi are given 
-
as mahat (the great one), asuri (demonic), mati (understanding, 
thought of inclination), khyati (perception), inana (knowledge) 
and pra- .ina (insight or wisdom). Some of the characters here, 
like mahat and as uri ref.er to the cosmic aspect, while others 
point to the individual side. Buddhi is the first 'manifest' 
principle, and thus is caused, finite, non-pervasive, active, 
plural and so on, which are the common characteristics of all 
the manifest objects in the world (SK.X.) Buddhi is defined 
and illustrated in Karika XXIII as - "Buddhi is (characterised 
by) ascertainmert or determination (adhyavasaya). Virtue 
(dharma), knowledge {jnana), non-attachment (viraga) and 
/ 
possission of power (aisvarya) are its sattvika form. Its 
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tamasa form is the opposite (of these four):. In the 
Karikas, buddhi is characterised as adhyavasaya - the root 
being 'sa' or'si', meaning 'to bind' with the prefixes 
• adhi •. and • ava'. It could mean 'attempt', 'effort' , 'exertion' , 
'perseverance' and so on. Buddhi includes the eight bhavas 
(SK XXXIII), the 'dispositions' or • condi tio,ns' which determine 
the style of life of the human being (SK.XLIII). Four of 
them are related to the sattvika form of buddhi and four to 
tamasika. (5B) Of these bhava§ only knowledge (,jnana) helps 
to attain salvation. Other seven lead to suffering only. 
Buddhi is in itself unconscious, but it becomes intell~ised 
l'e.flA.c.tc.:cm.l!- of PIM'"v.-~o...S eo-nscA.crw:>~ i..v\.. iJ:., a..l'\.d. t~US 
by the~reflected cetana (consciousness) being united with the 
'conceptual determinations' of buddhi, creates the phenomenal 
self which actually undergoes the various experiences of 
pleasures and pains. Purusa, the tr:ue seer, remains all the 
time in the background. The experience of the phenomenal 
aspects is only a transcendental illusionr.for the Purusa due 
• 
to avidya or ignorance. Thus the act of experience occurs 
in the buddhi only. 
Psychologically, buddhi also ascertains and decides. The 
decisions about things are made.,~by men by virtue of this 
principle, which exists in him as his special inner organ. 
The senses and the mind act on behalf of buddhi (SK.XXXV;XXXVIII). 
From the sattvika part of buddhi arises ahamkara. Being the 
----
first evolute, buddhi is perceived by Purusa. With the 
emergence of buddhi, Purusa appears as 
what it is not that is as if it were buddhi. Larson suggests 
that the best way to take buddhi is as 'will', but not as 
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'will' in the sense of conscious choice and decision. Rather, 
buddhi is 'will' in the sense of being that dimension of man, 
which is the source of his fundamental strivings or urges. 
Thus, according to Samkhya, it is the structure or dimension 
u 
of man which makes up his innermost core of being and which 
provides the foundation of his self-conscious life. (5 9 ) 
Ahamkara (self-awareness) emerges directly from buddhi. 
It is described in the Karika thus: "Ahamkara is self conceit 
(abhimana). From it a twofold creation emerges, the group of 
elev:en and the:: five subtle elements, (SK.XXIV). The: term 
aharpkara has been translated in different ways, as 'ego', 
'individuation', 'I- consciousness' and so on. It has got 
two parts- aham the personal pronoun meaning 'I' and 'kara', 
which may mean 'making', 'doing' and so on. Buitenen pointed 
out to a new meaning, emphasizing the cosmic significance of 
the term, and understands it as the creative cry - 'I' or 
omkara. (60) It seems, amongst all, the best expr-ession should 
be 'self awareness' which is not present in buddhi except 
potentially. In itself, ahamkara is simply the sense of 'I' 
or 'mine'. 
/hcd 
The Karika enumerates/the two-fold creation emerges from 
ahamkara. In its s.attvikaaspect arise the eleven organs, which 
according to Karika XXV-XXVII, includes mind (manas), the five 
'(61) 
sense organs and five organs of action.· With the emergence 
of the eleven categories of the mind and senses from the 
sattvika ahamkara, man comes into contact with the external 
world. (62 ) 
Manas (mind) according to Karika XXVII is samkalpa - i.e. 
it is 'constructive', 'reflective', 'analytic' and 'explicative. • 
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The bhasya explains manas as determining and arranging the 
• 
impulses or sensations coming from the senses. Samkhya-
tattva-kaumudl regards manas in the sense of determining and 
arranging the impulses or sensations which are vaguely 
perceived by the senses.( 63) Manas, therefore, acts as a 
co-ordinator between buddhi, ahamkara and the senses. In 
. 
Karika XXXIII-XXXV, manas, buddhi and ahamkara are mentioned 
together as antahkarana (SPB.II.40). In Karika XXVII, it is 
also mentioned as a 'indriya'. The co-operation of manas is 
at least neces.sary for both perception and action (SPS.II.26). 
Manas is not all-pervading since it has action and movement, 
( SPS. V. 69-70) . 
The ten sense organs are divided into two groups - five 
sense organs and five organs of action. The five sense organs. 
func:tfuon as sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch (the 
senses are said to arise out of our needs. The Mahabharata 
~- ~ . 
explains - ruparagat abhut caksuh, 1.e. the eyes came forth from 
0 0 
~ 
the attachment of beauty .... Mbh.Santiparva 213.16). The 
senses are not formed of theelements since both the categories 
arise from ahamkara. The senses are not external since their 
rise and fall are seen. The organs of action comprise of 
the tongue, feet, hands and the organs of evacuation and reproducti( 
Manas, with the organs, is aaid to produce the five vital 
airs, Bamely, prana, apana, samana, udana, vyana (SPS.II.J1). 
) 
According to the Samkhya-sutra V.llJ, prana (life force) is a 
.. J 
modification of the senses and thus does not exist in their 
absence. Parallel to the emergence of the 'group of eleven' 
from sattvika ahamkara, there is another group of five, 
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arising from the tamasa ahamkara, called the tanmatras, 
which correspond the five senses. (64 ) 
The Tanmatras are the essences of sound, touch, hearing, 
et«. and are conceived 'as physical principles, imperceptible 
to ordinary beings'. (65) The tanmatras are regarded as 
'avisesas' (SK.XXX VII) i.e., they do not possess definite 
characteristics like gentleness, etc. They are 'infra-sensible' 
and thus are beyond the reach of human sense organs. But 
these tanmatras do not belong to an indifferentiated or 
indeterminate state like the bhutadi. There is some kind of 
/ -
characterisation as they are mentioned as 'sabda tanmatra!, 
rupatanmatra, etc. These invisible (atoms) or essences are 
inferred from the visible objects. Only the yogins through 
their transcendental perception can see them. Regarding the 
genesis of the tanmatras, Yogavarttika gives the following 
account: Bhutadi produces the sound potential with the help 
of the element of rajas. The sound potential then, with a 
further addition from bhutadi gives rise to the touch potential, 
which with a further addition of bhutadi creates the 
rupatamatra. The others also are derived in similar way, 
In the tanmatra stage, the subtle elements cannot be 
differentiated, yet they are named separately. 
From tanmatras, by further process of evolution, the five 
gross elements are generated viz.,air, fire, water, earth and 
ether. These categories are called visesas, as they possess 
• 
specific characters, including spatial dimensions and thus can 
be recognised as large or small (these are unlike the 
vaise~ika atoms). According to Vacaspati, akasabhuta (the 
element of ether) is derived from the aka~a-tanmatra only, the 
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/ , 
air-atom from sabda and sparsa (sound and touch). The fire-
atom is derived from sparsa (touch) and rupa (form); the 
/" (' -
water-atom from sabda, sparsa, rupa and ~~ and earth-
--- ' atom from sabda, sparsa, rupa., rasa and gandha. Vijnanabhiksu 
gives a slightly different account of the genesis of atoms in 
the sense that , in his opinion ether-atom has originated from 
akasatanmatra with an addition from bhutadi. 
-----
The evolution of the specific (vi~esa) from the unspecific 
(avisesa) is called tattvantara-parinama. When the gross atoms 
a o 
(sthulabhutas) combine, their properties are transmitted in 
their products and thus they do not give rise to a new kind 
of existence (tatvantara). The subtle elements are incapable 
of producing pleasure or pain, but they are discernable in 
the state of gross elements. Thus the gross elements are 
'· 
distinguished as soothing (6anta), terrific (ghora), and dull 
(mudha). The tanmatras in Samkhya are visible, unlike the 
• 
vai£esika atoms. From the tanmatras emerge the organic and 
inorganic things. Evolution goes on due to the preponderance 
of one or the other quality and the various arrangements of 
the atoms. 
V - THE EMPIRICAL PERSONALITY: 
In Indian philosophy, the term denoting human personality 
is 1 ,j iva 1 • According to Samkhya, jiva is the self distinguished 
• 
by the conjunction of the senses and limited by the body 
(SPS.VI.6J). Vijnanabhiksu clarifies that Purusa with 
• 
ahamkara (ego) is jiva and not Purusa in itself (SPB VI.6J). 
In the Vrttil Atman is divided into two categories - para 
.. 
(transcendental) and apara (empirical) -
latmanam dvi-vidham prahur paraparabibhedatah, 
. . parastu n1rgunah proktah ahamkarayuto!parah 1 
., qo a: a 
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Here the transcendental self is called Purusa and the 
---.-
·-empirical self called jiva. Puru9a is eternal, ubiquitious, 
immaterial, inactive, immobile, eternally pure, conscious 
and free. It is devoid of the gunas. It is the noumenal 
. 
self, unchangeable and immutable.· It is devoid of pleasure, 
pain, desire, aversion, volition, merit, demerit, and 
disposition. Purusa is consciousness itself (citsvarupa). 
It is conscious (cetana), subject (avi~aya), seer (dra~~~) 
or witness (saksi). 
When through the proximity of Prakrti and its reflection 
in the buddhi, it is invested with the body, mind and merits 
then it is called jivatman. Aniruddha defines jiva as the 
self determined by the body, the external senses, manas, 
ahamkara and buddhi (SSV.I.97). The jiva differs from the 
Purusa or the paramatman in that, the former is limited by 
the adjuncts of the internal organs, while the latter is 
pure self, free from all determinations (SPB.VI.6J). Though 
it is not active, it appears to be active in.conjunction with 
buddhi. ·When this pure ~u~u§a, through eternal ignorance, 
identifies itself with the Prakrti, the manifold world comes 
into being. The union between Purusa and Prakrti takes 
---.--
place through the reflection of Purusa in the .buddhi. The 
Puru§a in itself is not the agent or enjoyer, since it is 
immutable. Jiva is the agent and enjoyer. Jiva, being the 
Purusa, determined by the body and the senses, - can act and 
enjoy in the presence of the body and sense organs only. It 
cannot act and enjoy in their absence (SPB.VI.6J; SSV.I.l06). 
All the empirical cognitions (vrttijnana) belong to the 
• 
empirical self. It is limited in time and space in its 
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experience. When the limiting adjunct (~adhi) of the 
psycho-physical organism is completely destroyed, jiva 
becomes indentical with Purusa. 'It appears that Purusa 
represents that which is permanent, immutable, and 
intransient in each individual. That which reaffirms 
D 
constantly that the individual of today is the same individual 
it was yesterday, plus all the new and continuous experiences 
that have and are proceeding eternally. ,( 67) 
Purusa is reflected in buddhi, and it wrongly identifies 
itself with its reflection in buddhi and thinks all the modes 
to be its own. Aniruddha says that ji~~ is the doer (karta) 
the enjoyer (bhokta) and the guide (adhisthata), since the 
, u 
self is reflected in buddhi owing to its proximity (SPS.SSV.I.96). 
The pure self wrongly thinks itself to be an active agent, 
owing to the reflection (SPS.SSY.I.l06;I.64). Aniruddha 
holds that only self is reflected in buddhi, but buddhi is 
not reflected in the self (SSV.I.4J). Buddhi and the other 
sense-organs act for the realization of the purposes of 
Purusa which is reflected in buddhi and appropriates 
the merits and demerits. 
Vaca~patimisra holds that the conscious Purusa, devoid 
of mental modes, being reflected in the unconscious buddhi 
modified into cognition, pleasure and other modes, wrongly 
identifies itself with· buddhi and thinks the mental modes to 
be its own, though in reality if is immutable (STK.IV). 
Purusa can never be modified into buddhi which is formed of 
. 
the three guQas - sattva, rajas and tamas. It is devoid of 
the gugas. Thus it can know objects by being reflected in 
buddhi, and not by being modified into it (SPB IV;II.20). He 
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further observes that self is reflected in buddhi, but 
buddhi is not reflected in self again (SPB I.87). In the 
commentary of SPB 1.87, Vijrtanabhik~u states Vaca~patimisra's 
view thus: 'the self manifests a function or mode of buddhi, 
only when it is reflected in the mode. The mental mode is 
known by the self, only when it receives the reflection of 
the self and becomes illuminated. There is no reflection of 
the mental mode in the self.' 
Vijnanabhik~u objects to this view of Vaca~pati. He 
considers buddhi to be intellectualized by the reflection of 
the image of Puru~a which is then super-imposed upon Puru~a. 
Vijnanabhiksu assumes that the mode of buddhi being modified 
0 
into the form of its objects does not modify the self, but 
is reflected in the self. This leads to a false sense of 
identity (abhimana) between Purusa and buddhi. The self 
cannot have knowledge without the double reflection. (68 ) 
Thus, in Sawkhya view, buddhi acts as an intermediary between 
the self and the external objects. Buddhi is modified into 
the forms of the objects and it also receives the reflection 
of the self. Buddhi appears to be an intelligent knower, 
though in reality it is unintelligent. 
It is generally assumed that the theory of reciprocal 
reflection between buddhi and Purusa is a special contribution 
of Vijnanabhik~u to the SaTkhya theory of knowledge and 
personality. It is a contribution only in the sense that 
Vijnanabhik~u has tried to adduce logical reasons for the 
necessity of double reflection:. 
That he is not the originator of the theory is evident 
from his reference to old texts. (69 ) The idea of reciprocal 
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reflection is clearly stated in Kamalasila's commentary on 
Tattvasa~graha in the context of refuting the Sa~khya view, (70) 
where one gets a very precise formulation of an important 
aspect of sawkhya theory coming from an uncompromising 
opponent. We think that Vijnanabhik~u has not been able to 
improve upon his statement except trying to offer some clumsy 
reasons behind the assumption of double reflection. 
The theory of double reflection is also hinted at by 
the anonymous author of 7uktidlpika,who seems to accept this 
theory. In his attempt to show that the Sawkhya theory of 
knowledge does not settle down to the identity of prama and 
pramana, (which is a very distinctive feature of Buddhist 
epistemology) the author of Yuktidlpika remarks -'puddhya~rayam' 
I 
etc. (71 ) In short it means that pramana in the form of 
" 
adhya~rasaya or vrtti belongs to buddhi, while the resultant 
prama belongs to Purusa obviously Purusa cannot be the real 
substratum of experience. So an experience can belong to 
Purusa only in the form of a reflection . 
• 
. _,..,....,.;.._ . ' V1Jnanabh1k~us attempt to find the rationale behind the 
reciprocal reflection does not appear very convincing. His 
:: difference from Vaaaspati il!>\. this context refers to the 
• 
interpretation of the term 'pauru§eya in Vyasa's remark 
'phalam-avisista pauruseyascittavrttibodhah'(72 ) This remark 
• • r --- •-
means that the result of pratyaksa pramana is the knowledge 
. . 
of qittavrtti (i.e. modification of intelligence in the shape 
of the projected object). This knowledge belongs to Puru~a. 
By virtue of this knowledge, the distinction between the pure 
spirit and the material intellegence is obliterated. 
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Vaca~pati takes the word 'pauruseya' in the seconda~y 
sense. According to him, it does not mean that Puru~a 
possesses the knowledge of cittavrtti. Purusa or pur~ spirit 
is reflected in buddhi and .as a result, being enlightened by 
the reflection, the material buddhi behaves like a spiritual 
entity (cetanayamana). The seemingly conscious behaviour of 
the unconscious intellegence throws Puru~a into the background 
and enables buddhi to usurp the role of Puru9a. Hence, the 
dist~nction between Puru§a and puddhi is lost. 
Vijnanabhik~u however in def·erence to some old Purapa texts 
insists that the expression 'pauruseya' in Vyasabhasya should 
a u 
be taken in the primary sense and· not in the secondary one. 
That means that Puru~a should be the real substratum of 
experience. But in that case, there is an obvious danger of 
Pu~ undergoing constant transformation through constant 
change in the range of experience. Hence, Vij~anabhiksu 
0 
hastens to add that Purusa is not the substratum of experience 
or cittavrtti itself, but of the reflection of cittavrtti. 
0 c> 
The reflection being an unreal phenomenon, cannot cause any 
transformation of Purusa. The determinate knowledge (vyavasaya) 
such as 'this is a pitcher', is possessed by Purusa only as a 
form of reflection cast by modified intellect. Knowledge in 
this form of reflection in Purusa is the resultant Prama while 
the original modification of buddhi in the shape of the object 
is Pramana. 
A very pertinent objection crops up against this theory. 
If Purusa gets the reflection of Buddhi, let this single 
reflection serve the episternic purpose of the Sarnkhya theory. 
c> 
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what is then, the further need of Purusa being reflected 
back on buddhi? Vijnanabhik~u answers that the second 
• 
reflection is necessary for explaining the phenomenon of 
'anuvyavasaya' or introspective knowledge viz. t . I know the 
pitcher: Otherwise there is the fallacy of karmakartrvirodhah 
(nominative-accusative contradiction.i.e. the subject 
becoming its own object) which is a contradiction in terms. 
O\-~c;p 
The idea is this that the same knowledge cannot ~roup itself 
in the process of introspection. So the introspective 
knowledge or anuvyavasaya must be a different knowledge which 
captures the previous knowledge (vyavasaya). Vyavasaya, 
belongs to Purusa in the form of buddhi's reflection in 
Puru~a, while anuvyavasaya belongs to buddhi in the form of 
Purusa's reflection in buddhi. Let us see how far this 
a 
assumption of V~nanabhiksu stands to reason. It is agreed 
. 
that 'anuvyavasaya' comes after vyavasaya. It will follow 
hence that the reciprocal reflection is not simultaneous. 
First buddhi is reflected in Purusa and then at the next 
0 
stage Puru~a is reflected in buddhi. But, why this delay in 
the 2nd reflection? Purusa and puddhi stand in proximity to 
each other, each having the capacity to reflect the other. 
If that is so the two reflections must be simultaneous. Under 
which royal command should the reflection of Purusa in buddhi 
be delayed? It is absurd to suggest that this delay is 
necessary to make 'anuvyavasaya' possible. Purusa is under 
no obligation to delay its reflection in subservience to the 
need of 'anuyyavasaya' or the fond wish of Vijnanabhiksu . 
• 
Moreover, the theory of anuvyavasaya suggests that knowledge 
in the form of vyavasaya is not self-expressive, but is 
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expressed or manifested by a subsequent introspection. 
This is the NV. theory and there is no evidence that 
Sa~khya-yoga accept this. Purusa as pure consciousness is 
. 
accepted as self effulgent . So its reflection in buddhi 
which is enlightened by it, may easily be accepted as self-
expressive. The reflection of the Sun in a mirror is self-
manifest and has the capacity to illumine an object in a 
dark corner. Hence, the modification of buddhi_in the shape 
of 'a pitcher' can be well-illumined by Puru~a's reflection 
in buddhi which thereby acts as a secondary consciousness. 
So we think that Vaca~pati's theory of a single reflection is 
a more rational hypothesis. 
The Specific Functions of the Components of Personality: 
Thirteen evolutes or emergents of Prakrti together make 
... 
up what is called Karana or linga(73) They are buddhi 
Q <> 
(reason), ahamkara (ego), manas (mind ) , the five senses and 
. 
the five organs of action (SK. XXXII, XXIII, XLI). Of these 
thirteen buddhi, ahamkara and manas make up the'internal organ' 
(antahkarana) which functions in the past, present and future 
(SK.XXXIII). In Karika XXXV, the 'ex.ternal' is compared to 
a door while the internal organ is called the 'doorkeeper'. 
This thirteenfold instrument functions as a whole by 'seizing' 
(aharana), holding (dharana) and manifesting (prakaSakara) 
r 
(SK.XXXII). The function of the five senses is 'bare awareness' 
(alocana-matra), and the functions of the five organs of action 
are, speech, grasping, motion, excretion and procreation. (SKXXVII) 
The specific function of buddhi is determination 
(adhyavasaya) (SS.II.lJ). It is definitive knowledge of 
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objects (Gaurapada-Bha~ya 23), or it is resolution to perform 
an action (STK.23). When there is a preponderance of sattva, 
it has such modes as virtue (dharma), knowledge (jnana), 
detachment (vair1igya) and supernatural powers (aiivarya). 
When there is a preponderance of tamas, the contrary modes 
prevail in buddhi. Empirical·cognition (vrttijnana), pleasure, 
~ 
pain, desire, aversion, volition or action, disposition, 
merit and demerit are modes of buddhi. They are unconscious 
mental modes. The self appropriates these modes of buddhi 
to be its ow.n, owing to its false sense of identity with buddhi 
in which it is reflected (STK.5). Buddhi is the highest 
sense-organ. The external sense-organs, manas and ahamkara, 
function for buddhi, while buddhi itself functions for the 
self. The external sense-organs give indeterminate perception 
of objects. Manas turns it into determinate perception. 
AhamKlira leads to the appropriation of determinate perception 
. 
by the empirical self. Buddhi turns it into definite 
knowledge. Ascertainment and resolution (nidcaya and adhyavasaya) 
e 
are~ffected by buddhi. The self, being reflected in such a 
buddhi, assumes the characteristics of buddhi. Recollection 
(smrti), thinking (cinta), meditation (dhyana) and reflection 
p 
(manana) are the functions of buddhi, meditation being its 
highest function (SPS;SPB.II.40-47; SPS,SSV I.71). 
Ahamkara is an evolute of mahat or buddhi (SKXXII;SPS I.62,72). 
It is described as eabhimana~ i.e. self-awareness (SK.XXIV; SPS.II.11 
Every person has, at first, knowledge of an object, - and 
then he appropriates it to himself. This consciousness of 
'I' or 'mine' is behind every action, when we refer as 'this 
is mine', 'I know this'and so on. This is called apperception 
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or self-appropriation (abhim.ana). Buddhi is the material 
cause of ahamk~ra. It has the specific function of determination 
(niscayavrtti). So buddhi is inferred from ahamkara as its 
" 
cause (STK.24; SPB.I.64,72; II.16). Ahamkara is not mere 
self-awareness (i.e. abhimana). It is considered as an 
internal organ, which has the function of self-awareness. It 
is inferred as the cause from its effects, viz. the subtle 
elements (tanmatras) and the sense-organs (indriyas). Ahamkara 
is their material cause. In dreamless sleep (susupti), self-
awareness of ahamkara is destroyed but it persists as the 
substratum of disposition (vasana) (SPB.I.6J). Merit (dharma) 
and demerit (adha~) are the modes of ahamkara and ahamkara 
being the effect of buddhi, they are modes of buddhi too 
(SPS,SSV VI.62). The self is not an agent (kartr) since it 
is immutable (aparinamin). Ahamkara is the agent. 
Manas (mind) evolves from ahamkara in its sattvika aspects 
" 
(SK.XXV; SPS II.18). It is the central organ supervising 
both the organs of action and knowledge. Without the 
supervision of manas there would be no sense-perception or 
action (SK XXVII; SPB II.26). The ten different sense organs 
are different modifications of the manas. They are originated 
from the different modifications in the constituent gunas 
0 
(s.attva, rajas and tamas) and are aided by the merits and 
demerits (SPS,SSV.II.27). Manas becomes identical with each 
organ in its diverse functions. 
Manas is not atomic. If it were atomic, it would be 
eternal. But it is not eternal. It is an evolute of ahamkara. 
It may be connected to different sense-organs at the same 
time, so it is not devoid. of parts ( SPS, SPB V. 71 ) . It is 
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not all-pervading (bibhu), since it is an insturment (karana), 
0 
a sense-organ, like an axe which is of limited dimension. It 
is the instrument of experiences connected with whole body. 
This shows that manas is of intermediate magnitude (madhyama 
parirnlana) (SSV.V.71). Further, manas is capable of movement. 
The self goes to another sphere of existence after death with 
the aid of its adjunct (upadhi) i.e. rna~ The self, which 
is all-pervading, is incapable of movement. Only its adjunct 
manas is capable of movement. So it is not all-pervading 
(SPB V.70). Thus manas is neither atomic, nor all-pervading, 
but of intermediate'magnitude and is possessed of p~ts. 
Manas has the function of assimilation and discrimination 
(~amkalpa). It reflects:.Jupon an object intuitively, apprehended. 
by an external organ, and determined to be either like this 
or not and thus has a determinate perception of it. It knows 
the object in a subject-object relation (visesana-visesya-bhaya). 
- " 0 
The external sense-organs acquire knowledge in an indeterminate 
perception. Manas yields determinate perception. This is the 
view of Vaca~pati. But Vijnanabhiksu holds that the external , 
sense-organs yield determinate perception. According to him, 
indecision and decision are the functions of manas. Decision 
(sa~kalpa) is the desire to do (cikir~a)(SPB.II.JO). 
Buddhi, ahamkara and manas are the three internal organs 
(antahkara~a). Materials are supplied by the external sense-
organs, to be elaborated by the antahkarana, which has a 
~ 
greater capacity than the sense-organs. The antahkara~a apprehends 
the past, present and future objects, while the sense-organs 
apprehend only the present objects (SK.XXXIII, XXXV). As 
mentioned above, the functions of buddhi, ahamkara and manas 
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are 'determination', 'self-awareness' and 'differentiation' 
respectively (SK.XXIX; SPS.SSV II.JO). With respect to 
perception, the 'internal organs', together with any one or 
more of the senses, function either simultaneously or 
successively (yugapat or krama~ah). 
There are ten external sense-organs, five buddhindriy~' 
(organs of knowledge) and five karmendriyas(organs of action). 
The sense-organs are the instruments of the self. They are 
the effects of ahamkara, together with the mind. The self is 
the knower (drastr); the cognitive sense-organs are the 
" .. 
instruments of knowledge (SPS.II.29). Though the self is 
immutable and therefore inactive, it moves the motor sense-
organs to act, even as a magnet moves a piece of iron, without 
itself moving. The sense-organs are evolved to realize the 
ends of the self (SPS, SPB.II.36). They act also the fulfill 
the merits and demerits of the empirical self. The sense-organs 
act by themselves for the sake of the self, even as milk flows 
of itself from the udder of the cow for the nourishment of the 
calf (SPS,SPB.II.37). All the sense-organs are beyond perception. 
They are wrongly indentified with eyes, ears, etc. which are 
their physiological seats. They are powers behind the seats. 
All the ten external sense-organs are the different powers of 
the one chief sense-organ, manas, which is both cognitive and 
motor organ. Manas, in conjunction with the eyes, ear, etc. 
become indentical with them and thus has the functions of 
vision, hearing, etc. (SPB.II.26-27). 
The five vital breaths (praoas) circulate throughbut the 
thirteen-fold instrument and according to the commentators, 
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maintain 'the living functions or life-forces of the instrument'. (74 
Gaudapada's commentary gives an idea about the nature and 
• 
functions of the vital airs, namely prana, apana, samana, 
' 
udana and yyana. They co-exist with antahkarana, and when it 
is dissolved, the P£anas also cease to exist. Gau~apada 
• 
explains - 'the air, called prana, is that which is perceptible 
. 0 
in the mouth and nostrils, and circulation is the common 
function of the thirteen kinds (of instruments): that is, 
where there is breath, the organs acquire (are connected with) 
soul (they become living). Breath, like a bird in a cage, gives 
motion (vitality) to the whole. It is called prana, breath 
0 
or life from breathing. From carrying downwards (apanayana) 
the air apana is so named, the circulation of which is also 
the common function of the organs. Samaha is so named from 
conducting equally (samanayana) the food, etc. (through the frame). 
It is situated in the central part of the body, and its 
circulation is the common function of the instruments. The air 
udana denominated from ascending or from drawing or guiding 
best (un-nayana). It is perceptible in the space between the 
navel and the head, and the circulation that it has, is the 
common function of the organs. Lastly, the air by which internal 
division and diffusion through the whole body is effected is 
called yyana, from its pervading (vyapti) the body like the 
etherial element. The circulation of that also is the common 
function of the assemblage of the organs. ,(75) 
I have already mentioned about the 'linga' which consists 
0 
of,the thirteen components and I have already discussed the 
components separately. Finally, this linga or thirteen-fold 
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instrument transmigrate until the Purusa attains salvation 
(SK.XL,XLIV). This li~ga_tr.ansmigrates or attains salvation 
because of the force or power of the bhavas which reside in 
the buddhi (SIC XL, XLIV, XLV). Larson puts it this way -
'that the thirteen-fold instrument is an essential structure 
or nature of man, which enables him to grasp and know the 
world and himself. It includes within it the/entire mental 
and emotional make up of man and it is by means of one aspect 
of this instrument, i.e. buddhi, that man is able to discover 
or discriminate Purusa, which is both the reason why man is 
ultimately free or isolated. Hence this thirteen-fold structure 
is appropriately called the instrument (karana) or the 
characteristic mark (~iqga). ,(76) 
The thirteen-fold instrument or liVga cannot exist without 
some kind of support (SK.X.LI). The five subtle elements 
(tanmatras) make up sort of a body or support. According to 
/ -the commentators, this sheath or body (sarira) accompanies the 
li.r:ga in its transmigration from life to life. Thus the li~ga 
with respect to its nature as a transmigrating entity is made 
up of eighteen parts: the thirteen- fold instruments with the 
five subtle elements. The Bha9ya, Samkhya-tattva-kaumudi, etc. 
~ 
all refer to this total transmigrating entity as the linga-
"' 
sarTra or suksma-sarira. Samkhya-karika refers to the linga-
• • 
I ' sar1ra and li~ga both as ligga only (SK.X. -XLII). But it is 
implied in SK.XLI, that the five tanmatras support the linga. 
q 
In the classical S~khya, the bhavas are supposed to be 
some kind of power or force which enhance the transmigration 
I 
of the li9ga-sarira. It explains why the linga transmigrates , 
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from life to life . Bhavas are 'conditions' or 'dispositions' 
or 'fundamental strivings' in the inner-most core of man. 
The Samkhya-ld1rika believes that a different causation is 
• 
brought about by the bhavas, which reside in the buddhi 
(SK.XXIII,LXIII). These bhavas are eight in number; (i) dharma 
(virtue); (ii) adharma (vice); (iii) .i'nana (knowledge); 
(iv) ajnana (ignorance); (v) viraga (non-attachment); (vi) vaga; 
(attachment); (vii) aisvarya (power), and (viii) anaiS'varya 
(lack of power). All the conditions except ,jnana lead man-kind 
through various phases of transmigration and suffering (SK.LXIII). 
Only the condition of jnana leads to salvation. It is important 
to note that continuation of life, suffering and ordinary 
existence is attributed in the classical Sa~khya, to these 
fundamental quest for the inner-most nature. What a man becomes 
is determined by what he has done. Thus the eight bhavas are 
essential parts of man's nature. In fact, according to 
Karika LVII, the bhavas add an essential dimension to the 
functioning of the linga; na vina bhavair liqgam n~li~enavina 
bhavanivrttir ' I I I I I Thus there are two functioning systems 
or structures - one is the linga - structure (elemental) and 
the other is the bhava - structure (intellectual). The bhava-
structure is a part of the linga - structure, since it resides 
• 
in the buddhi. It perfor_ms the essential function of determining 
the future of the linga. 
0 
Another account of the bhava·- structure is given in 
Karika XLVI - LI which is different from the previous account. 
In these verses, bhavas are said to be fifty in number -
comprising of five viparyayas, 28 asaktis, 9 tustis and 8 siddhis. 
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The doctrine of fifty bhavas represented in Sk.XLVI -LI is 
interpreted as a later interpolation by Keith. (77 ) E. 
Frauwellner says that it must have been an older sacred 
tradition which r~varakrsna felt obliged to include. (78 ) 
- ~ 0 
-- =/ It is evident from the Karikas that Isvarak~~Qa supported the 
view of eight bhavas as he mentions it a few times in the 
text. 
Thus we see that the conception of human personality is 
quite explicit in the Samkhya texts. The essential reality in 
0 
man is singled out and given a sparate position than 
the empirical entity which has evolved out of the unconscious 
Prakrti (Nature). The 'lingasarira' is that inner entity 
~ 0 
of man which outlives the physical decay, and carries on the 
empirical entity till the ultimate salvation. 
The conception of human personality as brought out in 
the Sa~khya literature has been discussed. We will evaluate 
the respective ideas further in the next chapter. 
CHAPTER - IV 
CONCLUSION 
Section A: A REVIEW OF THE CONCEPTION OF HUMAN PERSONALITY 
IN THE ADVAITA VEDANTA AND THE CLASSICAL SAMKHYA 
0 
In the previous chapters, I have described the evolution 
of the conception of 'Human Personality' in the two main 
systems of the Indian philosophy, namely Advaita Vedanta and 
Classical Samkhya. Since the Vedas are the main sources of 
the Indian philosophy and influenced either positively directly 
or positively indirectly, or negatively all the other schools, 
both Sawkhya and Vedanta owe to the Vedic literature to a great 
extent. The positions of Vedanta and Sa~khya in the back-
ground of the Indian philosophy can be classified thus(l): 
Indian Schools 
Orthodox system 
(Accepting the authorit~ 
of the Vedic scriptures) 
Based directly 
on the Vedas 
I Based on 
independent 
reasoning 
Mlmansa 
(Emphas-
izing 
active life 
Vedanta 
(Emphas-
izing contem-
plative life 
I_ . I Nyaya- VaJ.se-
sika 
. 
Heterodox system 
(Not accepting the authority 
of the Vedic texts) 
Jainism 
Buddhism 
--, 
S amkhya -Yoga 
.. 
carvaka 
Vedanta and Samkhya constitute two main branches of the , 
orthodox system, and thus it would have been incongruous not 
to have referred to the Vedic literature appropriately as a 
background to the Vedanta and the Sa~khya systems. Very often 
the same mantra is interpreted by both Sa~khya and Vedanta in 
accordance with its own concept. They have many concepts in 
common, having the common source to support their views. Yet 
there are, important differences regarding some fundamental 
metaphysical questions and also regarding human personality. 
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The main contention of difference between the two systems 
is that, whereas Advaita Vedanta believes in an unitary 
principle underlying the universe and empirical personality, 
i.e. the Atman or Brahman, Sal'!lkhya believes in dualism of 
Purusa (spirit) and Prakrti (nature). The Upanisads conceived 
• 
Brahman (the cosmic eternal reality behind the universe) and 
Atman ( the essential reality of the human personality) as one. 
Likewise, the Advaita conceives an unitary principle as the 
essential reality of the universe in Brahman and proclaims -
'all this (the empirical entities) is verily the Brahman 
(sarvam khalvidam brahma)'. According to the Classical Samkhya, 
" 
there are two ultimate entities - one conscious and the other 
unconscious. Both are transcendental and inter-dependent. The 
one, i.e. the mulaprakrti includes in itself the potentiality 
. . 
of all things in the manifest world, both mental and physical. 
The Purusa, however, is something like the simple fact of 
consciousness. In the Sa~khya-karika X & XI, the different 
nature of Purusa, Prakrti and the manifest universe is brought 
• 
out. It says - "The manifest (vyakta - universe) is caused, 
finite, non-pervasive, active, plural, supported, emergent, 
composite, dependent: - the unmanifested (avyakta-Prakrti) is 
0 
the opposite". Again Purusa is different from both manifest 
and unmanifest. While both the manifest and unmanifest i.e. 
the universe and Prakrti are "characterised by the three gunas, 
----~·-- ij 
the undiscriminating, objective, general, non-conscious and 
productive; - the Purusa is the opposite of them, although 
similar.". Thus Purusa is uncharacterised by the three gunas, 
-~ a 
discriminative, subject, conscious and unproductive. It is 
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pure consciousness. Prakrti is sat or existent as the world 
which we perceive is very much existent and is evolved from 
Prakrti. The effect being existent, the cause, i.e. Pra~ 
must be true. I have suggested that the conception of Atman 
in the Upani~ads is the origin of the conception of Purusa in 
Samkhya. "In preclassical Samkhya (viz. Gita and Moksadharma) 
Q • • 
Puru~a is regarded as a cosmic reality and it resembles the 
conception of Atman in the Upanisads". {2 ) 
0 
Advaita Vedantic conception of Atman and the universe is 
different from the Sa~khya views. The cosmological world-
ground is known as Brahman in V~t~. Brahman, according to 
/" 
Samkara is the cause of the origination, subsistence and 
0 
dissolution of the world, which is extended in names and forms, 
which consists of many agents and enjoyers (SB.I.l.2). When 
we look at the created world, Brahman is viewed as I~vara. 
Brahman, associated with the principle of maya or creative 
power, is IsY.ara, who is engaged in creating and maintaining 
the world. Brahman is at once the material cause as well as 
the efficient cause of the world. There is no difference 
between cause and effect. Clay is the cause and jugs and jars 
are the effects. These transformations are appearances of 
names and shape (namarupa). The world of experience is not 
the ultimate reality, i.e. paramarthika, but only empirically 
true (vyavah~rika). 
The supreme Brahman is sat (existent), cit (conscious) 
,..... 
and ananda-svarupa (of the nature of bliss). -For Sall1kara, 
ultimate reality is pure intelligence (cin-matra) devoid of 
all forms. Brahman is devoid of qualities. Whatever qualities 
are conceivable can only be-denied of it: 'eko brahma:dYi~-
nasti'. Scriptures describe Brahman as reality, consciousness 
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and infinity (satyamj~anam-anantam brahma). These are not 
qualities, but are one with Brahman. They constitute the 
~ 
very nature of Brahman. Samkara holds that the self is of the 
essence of consciousness and bliss (cidana~arupa). But 
the Samkhya considers pleasure and pain to be unconscious 
• 
modes of buddhi which do not affect the conscious self. It 
is devoid of pleasure and pain (STK.XVII). The self is devoid 
of the gunas and therefore unchangeable. So bliss cannot be 
9 
a mode (dharma) of the self. If bliss were the essence 
(svarupa) of the self, it would be experienced in empirical 
life which is full of suffering. Consciousness is cognition. 
Bliss is pleasure. If the self were of the nature of consciousness 
and bliss, it would be affected by duality (SSV.V.66). 
That Brahman appears to be connected with the three 
conditions of the world, is as illusory as the appearance of 
a snake in a rope (SB.II.l.9). This is merely to indicate the 
one-sided dependence of the world on Brahman. We cannot say 
that an illusion is non-existent. The rope which is perceived 
as snake is contradicted when the perception of snake disappears. 
But the world does not disappear. Thus the appearance of the 
world is said to be anirvacariiya, to mean that it is 'unique'. 
We cannot describe it as existent or non-existent. According 
~ / 
to Samkara, the world has a relative empirical reality. 
0 
Samkara 
~ 
regards the world as maya, which is wrongly translated as 
~ 
'illusion'. Samkara says that the world does not exist in 
0 
reality and its manifestation disappears when the reality is 
known. Maya is not a real entity. Maya is neither existent 
nor non-existent - tatvantarabhyam anirvacariiya. Thus it 
-173-
v 
could be said that according to Sa!Jlkara - "Reality is one 
and the world of many is not real."(3) 
, 
According to SaiJlkhya, neither Purusa nor Prakrti is 
"" .. 
false or fictitious. Only the seeming unity becomes false 
in the highest state of emancipation. Prakrti of SaTQkhya 
and Maya of Vedanta function in the same way as both are the 
world- grounds and unconscious. Prakrti is eternal and 
existent. Maya is destroyed by the realization of Brahman and 
is neither existent nor non-existent. Prakrti is independent 
Maya is dependent on Brahman. Samkhya believes in the 
the reality of the world while Vedanta believes in its falsity. 
Some Samkhya philosophers hold that the Purusa is reflected in 
0 ----o-
buddhi. Some Advaita Vedantists hold that the Atman is 
reflected in the internal organ (antahkaraQa). These are the 
main differences between Samkhya and Vedanta on the metaphysical 
0 
grounds. 
Everybody experiences that 'I AM' (aham asmi). The term 
'aham' is always uttered in relation to a particular body, 
accompanied by the sense-organs, mind and intellect. But over 
and above these, there is something which constitutes the 
essential reality in man. This is the soul or self which is 
called Purusa and Atman respectively in Samkhya and Vedanta. 
~ ~ 
I have used the term ' human personality' to signify this 
total conception of man. It indicates x~ the soul and the 
physical and mental characteristics together. We are concerned 
here with the Sawkhya and Vedanta conceptions regarding this 
human personality. Both the systems regard man as a spiritual 
and psycho-physical individual. But the nature of spirit, 
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body-and mind is differently conceived in each school. 
It is necessary to mention here that none of the orthodox 
schools openly contradicts the view of the Vedas, including 
the Upanisads. But each system has interpreted the Vedic 
• 
utterances in its own way. The classical systems emerged 
through a long process of systematization for a long period 
of time. I have discussed the main _predecessors to Classical 
Sa~khya and Vedanta in the previous chapters. I have regarded 
their views regarding the conception of human personality 
and tried to show the process of transformation of the Upani~adic 
revelations about personality in two main systems of 
philosophy, namely Sa~kpya and Vedanta. 
The Vedanta teaches us that the real self, i.e. Atman is 
neither this body nor the mind, nor a combination of both; it 
is beyond both mind and matter. S~khya also conceives the 
conscious entity in the human frame as Purusa who is in reality 
untouched by physical, mental or psychical aspects. According 
to Vedanta, Atman is sat (existent), cit (conscious) and 
anandasvarupa (of the nature of bliss). According to Sa~khya, 
bliss is a characteristic of the inner instrument (antahkarana) 
. 
particularly of reason (buddhi) when it becomes pure (sattvika). 
But the Atman (self), when it exists by itself, has no relation 
to reason (buddhi). Buddhi, after all, is a product of Pra~til 
-but the Atman or Purusa is independent of Prakrti. According 
to Sa~khya, Purusa is completely free and not a part of the 
universe or empirical entity. The existence of Purusa is thus 
---.-
only inferred. Moreover, the classical Samkhya recognizes as 
. 
many Purusas as there are animate individuals. The diversity 
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of attributes in different entities is explained by the 
plurality. Vijnanabhik~u has explained that the oneness of 
/ 
the soul, advocated by the Sruti, the Vedanta and others, 
refer to 'the homogeneous nature of Pur usa (Atman) and not 
to their numerical unit. ,(4) 
The Advaita 
/ 
Vedanta of Samkara 
. 
accepts on the whole, the 
..-
evolution of man as given in the Taittiriya Upanisad, but it 
~ 
treats the explanation as of secondary importance, because it 
is the explanation which is a product of maya. The Advaita 
conception of the constitution of the individual is also the 
same as that given by the Upani~ad in its doctrine of the 
. -levels of the Atman and the body. These levels are interpreted 
by this school as sheaths (ko~as). The original pure Atman 
is encased, first in the sheath of bliss; this is encased in 
the sheath of reason, this in the sheath of mind, this in the 
sheath of life and this finally in the sheath of matter. 
The or~ginal nature of the Atman is 'saccidananda', i.e. 
existence, consciousness and bliss. 
The Taittiriya Upani~ad indicates that, that which is 
in man and that which is in the sun are one and the same. 
According to this Upani~ad, out of the Atman was born ether, 
out of ether air, out of air fire, and out of fire water, out 
of water earth, out of earth plants, out of plants food, and 
out of food man, who speaks of himself as ''I". This is the 
Atman but what is 'I' - 'Aham'? (Taitt. III). This Taittiriya 
conception of Atman is ellucidated by P.T. Raju thus - 'If a 
child is named John, and we ask him - who is John? It points 
to its body. So the 'I' or ·~· is first regarded as the body. 
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But is it really the body? When a man dies, the body is there, 
but it does not speak of itself as the 'I'. It does not 
breathe, and so we may say the life-principle has escaped, 
and identify the life-principle with the Atman. But is the 
~ 
life-principle then Atman? When a man is fast asleep, his 
body is alive but does not call itself 'I'; so we may say that 
his mind is not ther~. But the mind also is not the Atman, 
because a mad man may say that he was dead long ago and refuse 
to eat and drink, because dead bodies do not eat and drin~. 
What is lacking in him is reason. We may therefore say that 
reason is the Atman. But we say, 'I have reason, it works 
rightly'. But again what is this 'I' that has reason? That 
is the Atman and is the fullest bliss .• (5) The same kinds of 
f 
arguments are put forward in the Bhamati by Vacaspatimisra . 
• 
The Sa~khya conception of the nature of man is more in 
accordance with the Katha categories than with the Taittir1ya 
account. According to Ka~ha, Atman is smaller than the smallest 
and yet greater than the greatest (Ka~ha.I.II.20). It is 
imperishable. In truth there is no death for the 'I'. Only 
the body is destroyed at death. But how can we find Atman? 
The objects are higher (deeper) than the senses (Katha.I.J.l0-11), 
. 
for with reference to the objects we measure our reality. 
Manas (mind) is deeper than the object, reason is deeper than 
mind, the mahan atma (cosmic reason) deeper than reason, the 
unmanifest (avyakta) deeper than the cosmic reason and the Atman 
(Purusa) deeper than avyakta. There we find the Atman, deeper 
a 
than which there is nothing. It is not an object towards which 
the senses, mind and speech can be directed. Yet it is not 
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non-existence or 'non-being', but existence or 'Being' itself. 
According to this view,-•as the centre is to the circumference, 
so man is the correlate of the external world". But the centre 
of both man and the world is the ego, or rather, ego comprehends 
both, because both issue out of it. The ego itself comes out 
of reason, which comes out of the primeval matter, Prakrti. 
Some Vedantic systems make Prakrti part and parcel of the 
Brahman. The improtant difference between the Samkhya and the 
~ 
Katha is that, the former leaves the opposition between spirit 
0 
and matter unreconciled, whereas the latter makes matter only 
a derivative of the spirit. It is along the line of the Katha 
' 
that some of the Vedantic schools have reconciled the opposition 
by making the material principle a form of the energy aspect 
(maya;akti) of the Brahman. <6 ) 
We have already mentioned that according to Sa~khya, the 
Atmans are of an infinite number. The classical sa~khya, as 
an atheistic philosophy, rejects the reality of God. Purusa 
is not personal but individual. 'Impersonal yet individual it 
is the fact of man's experience', which renders him able to 
become man. The Brahman in Advaita Vedanta is the absolute 
and is impersonal; but God is not the 'absolute'; He is 
personal. Although God is not the 'absolute', He is not a 
separate being from the 'absolute'. Thus Dr. Raju explains-
"He is the Absolute facing the world and knowing it as his 
object. At the level of the 'absolute', there is no distinction 
between the subject and the object, but at the level of God 
the distinction obtains. The Brahman creates out of itself, 
the world of souls and matter and faces it; as facing it, the 
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Brahman distinguishes itself from the world and becomes God. 
He is not over-whelmed by the forces of the world; but as 
facing them, he is free and above them. Yet element of 
finitude enters His being, because He distinguishes Himself 
from something which He is not. The Brahman as God is called 
Isvara (The Lord)."(?) Classical Sawkhya, however, does not 
regard it necessary to believe in an omnipotent god. 
Regarding the essential reality behind the human 
personality, the Sa~khya and the Vedanta conceptions are 
almost similar, as both regard a transcendent, conscious reality 
which is neither the doer nor the enjoyer, yet is wrongly 
,.. 
attributed with them. According to sawkara, the At~ is the 
same as the Brahman as involved in the mind, the senses and· 
and the physical body. The Atman again is not the same as the 
jiva. The .;iva is the ethical personality. It is subject 
to transmigration. The Atman does not really experience 
pleasures and pains, it is the jiva that experiences them. 
The Atman is only an onlooker. The Atman, as such, is neither 
the knower nor the agent of actions. Yet, without Atman there 
is neither consciousness nor even existence of the ,jiva. The 
jiva has three states and three bodies. First, the body of 
the waking consciousness! secondly, there is the body of dreams 
and finally, there is the body of the deep sleep called the 
causal body (karanas~rira) which the jlva carries during 
,. 
transmigration. According to Sa~kara, the Atman is not the 
same as 'I-consciousness' (ahamkara). The 'I-consciousness' is 
only the ego. The ego is only a part of jiva, along with 
----I -
karanasarira (causal body), citta (apperception), buddhi 
0 
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(reason), manas (mind), the five sense organs and five organs 
of action. The mind analyses and synth~ses the internal 
and external perceptions; ego appropriates those experiences 
as its own; reason asserts them through affirmative and 
negative judgements, and appreception unifies all experiences 
into an inter-connected whole. 
~ 
According to Sawkhya, jiva is the Purusa determined by 
the ego (ahamkara) as Vijnanabhiksu describes it. Purusa on 
• 
account of its proximity to Pralq;'ti receives the reflection 
of buddhi, and thus the modifications of buddhi are falsely 
ascribed to Puru~a. Aniruddha defines jfVa as the self, 
determined by the body, the external sense, manas, ahamkara 
and buddhi. Vaca~patimi~ra holds that the conscious Puru~a, 
devoid of mental modes being reflected in the unconscious 
buddhi modified into cognition, pleasure and other modes, 
wrongly identifies itself with buddhi and thinks the mental 
modes to be its own, though in reality it is immutable. The 
diversity of human existence is explained by S~khya by the 
theory of plurality of selves. 
The Samkhya conception of antahkarana is different from 
" 
the Vedantic conception in the sense that it comprises three 
aspects of the psychic phenomena - namely manas (mind) which 
determines and arranges the impulses or sensations coming 
from the senses, buddhi (i.e. reason), will and ahamkara or 
ego. Manas is the mediator be·tween the senses, buddhi and. 
ahamkara. The function of reason is asserting and determining. 
It has two aspects - the sattvika or the pure or transparent, 
and the tamasika or lethargic. To the former are due merit 
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(dharma), knowledge (jnana), detachment (vairagya) and 
lordship (aisvarya) and to the latter are due the opposite 
qualities. The functions of mind and ego are the same as 
those of the Vedanta. By including reason in antahkarana, 
the Samkhya seems to maintain that in possessing the inner 
. 
instrument, man transcends his private individuality. 
• Another peculiarity of the Simkhya doctrine of antahkarana 
. ~ 
is that, it carries the potency of both merit and demerit. 
Reason (buddhi) which is included in it, is both theoretical 
and practical; it is both consciousness and conscience in 
the usual meanings of these terms. ,( 8 ) 
The Samkhya conception of the vital principle is different 
~ 
from that of the Upanisads, which speak of<it as different 
• 
from mind. For both Samkhya and the Upanisarls, vital principle 
0 " 
is of five kinds;but the sawkhya says that the vital principle 
is the common function of the three forms of the inner instrument 
(anta~karana). Each of the three has its own function to 
perform, but together they perform the function of biological 
activity. 
The human entity consists of three parts - the gross 
body, the subtle body and the spirit; both Samkhya and Vedanta 
' 
adhere to this division. The spiritual aspect is the essential 
reality in man which is beyond perception. The gross body 
is constituted of the five gross elements. According to 
Vedanta, gross elements like fire, air, earth, water and ether 
arise through the panc1karana process (explained in the Vedanta 
" 
section) from the subtle elements. The gross element of the 
earth is the main constituent of the gross body and fire, air, 
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w~ter and ether consisting in the gross element of the earth, 
consi tute.:-the different parts of the body containing water. 
fire, etc. The sense organs evolve out of the subtle elements 
directly - from s.ound arises the organ of ear; from'.the 
element of touch, the skin and so on. Ar.cording to Samkhya, 
0 
the five sense organs and five motor organs arise directly 
from ego along with manas. The five subtle elements on the 
other hand give rise to the five gross elements. According 
to Sa~khya, two-fold creation emerge from aha~kara. 'The group 
of eleven' also called sattvika ahamkara or vaikrta ahamkara 
is made up of mind (manas), the five senses (buddhlndriyas) and 
the five organs of action (karmendriyas) (SK.XXV). It is on 
this level of emergence or evolution that man is first in 
contact with the external or the gross world. The ten senses 
or _indriyas are in two groups - (1) the five sense organs 
(buddhTndriyas) including the eye, ear, nose, tongue and skin; 
and (2) the five organs of action, including the voice, hands, 
feet and the organs of generation and excretion. These senses 
are not to be confused with the gross organs, which of course, 
are made of the gross elements. The senses rather refer to 
the functioning of the various organs. Emerging from ahamkara, 
at the same time as the sattvika ahamkara or 'the group of 
eleven', is the group known as the 'five subtle elements' 
(tanmatras) characterized by a predominance of tamas. The 
term tanm~tra means 'only so much' or rudimentary. It is 
difficult to determine the nature of the tanmatras; they are 
said to be avisesas, i.e. non-specific. The gross elements have 
been interpreted variously. The Karika does not say anything 
-182-
precisely. The Bhasya simply correlates the five tanmatras 
g 
with the five gross elements. In the older accounts of the 
tattvas, the five gross elements functioned in the place of 
the tanmatras and the remaining five tattvas were the objects 
of the senses, which are left out of the Classical Samkhya 
• 
listings. This change is probably another indication of the 
Classical Samkhyan interest in the analysis of the individual 
~ 
as opposed to the older cosmological concerns. The subtle 
elements represent a kind of bridge between the internal and 
external or between the individual and the world. 
There is another important difference between the Sa~khya 
and the Vedanta. According to Samkhya, the five elements 
• 
come simulta~eously from the ego; but according to Vedanta, 
they are out of one another: earth out of water, water out 
of fire, fire out of air and air out of ether. It should be 
mentioned here that according to the Taittiriya-account, ether 
-
comes out of the Atman; but according to the SaWkhya, all the 
elements come out of the ego and not out of the Atman. 
Sa~khya and Vedanta both believe in the transmigration of 
the subtle body. According to Samkhya, every jiva has a subtle 
~ --
/ -body (lingasarira) formed of the ten sense-organs, manas, 
~ 
buddhi, and ahamkara, together with the five subtle essences 
(SSV.III.9). It is the basis of re-birth (SPS.III.l6). The 
gross body is the effect of the -subtle body. The jiva enjoys 
its empirical life through it. Merit and demerit (karma) 
are the individuating principles. The bondage of the jiva is 
due to the subtle body, through which the merit and demerit, 
which are modes of buddhi or ahamkara, are wrongly appreciated 
-18J~ 
by the self or Purusa. The bondage of the Puru~a is only 
phenomenal. So long as the subtle body continues, merit 
and demerit are wrongly owned by the Puru~a. When it achieves 
discrimination (viveka), merit and demerit are destroyed and 
and therefore no longer appropriated by it, and it attains 
liberation. Discirimination leads to the destruction of 
merit and demerit, which dissolves the subtle body, annihilates 
empirical life and leads to liberation. (SPS.SSV. VI.67-70). 
/ 
Samkara also maintains that the empirical self transmigrates 
0 
with a subtle body (SBS.IV.2.21). It is subtle in its essence 
and dimension, and capable of movement. It is transparent, 
irresistible and invisible (SBS.IV.2.9). It contains the seed 
of a future body in the shape of merits·and demerits (karma). 
The kind of body to be assumed on rebirth is determined by 
the karma acquired in the previous births (SBS.II.4.ll). Those 
who have exterminated avidya by perfect knowledge or integral 
experience, realize absolute freedom. They never return to 
embodied existence (SBS.IV.4.22). The knower of indeterminate 
Brahman destroys avidya and other afflictions and attains absolute 
eternal life (SBS.IV.2.12). His life, senses and subtle 
elements constituting his subtle body are dissolved into 
indeterminate Brahman (SBS.IV.2,1J,15). This is the highest 
state of impersonal, absolute immortality. 
Section B: - CRITICAL APPRECIATION 
The declared aim of all the principal philosophical systems 
of India is to achieve salvation, the final freedom from 
worldly bondage. The metaphysical assumptions of different 
systems have been affected by different concepts of liberation. 
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The concepts of human personality have been carefully made 
responsive to the fundamental metaphysical postulates, which 
have been coloured by the need of liberation. Thus the concept 
of liberation calls the tune of philosophy which is made to 
accomodate both metaphysics and empirical personality within 
the spirit of final emancipation. According to the Sawkhya 
and the AV. systems, a self cannot achieve freedom if it is 
not basically free. If bondage belongs to the very nature 
of the self, it can never shake it off, because the·essential 
nature of a thing cannot be changed or distroyed. In this 
concept, freedom is more an affirmation than an attainment. 
It is not true that the self attains freedom which was not 
there. What is true, however, is that the self affirms its 
freedom, which it somehow forgot to affirm. It misses freedom 
only in the sense that it fails to notice what it really has 
and looks like possessing what it really has not. Freedom is 
the very essence of the self and bondage is only a false 
superimposition. Yet sufferings seem too real to be easily 
dismissed by the simple wave of hands. This paradox of being 
free and feeling bound, certainly calls for an explanation. 
The attempted explanation results in postulating two selves, 
the one transcendental and the other empirical. Bondage and 
suffering belong to the empirical self and not to the 
transcendental one. Yet, somehow, through false identification 
between the two, the transcendental self is made to seem to 
suffer. The seeming suffering is the play of an eternal illusion. 
The Sa~khya system, vigourously retains the reality of the 
material world. Indestructibility of matter is one of its 
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most fundamental tenets. The spirit of the transcendental 
self, which is nothing but pure consciousness is also equally 
indestructible. Matter, though eternal and indestructible, 
is everchanging. Its dynamism is irrepressible. Spirit or 
Puru~a is not only eternal and indestructible, but also 
changdess. Its static essence is too rigid to be reversible. 
The realm of matter and the realm of spirit are thoroughly 
unrelated. Yet, an eternally false relation is puperimposed, 
between the two, through an eternal 'avidya', the basic 
principle of falsity. This superimposition creates an empirical 
self out of buddhi, the first evolute of primordial matter 
and the reflection of the transcendental consciousness,in the 
same buddhi. By virtue of this reflection the material buddhi 
misleadingly appropriates unto itself the character of 
consciousness. As a result, the distinction between buddhi and 
puru~a is missed and worldly sufferings belonging to buddhi 
are fancied as belonging to Puru~a, which has nothing to do 
with what buddhi brings to it, through a false transference of 
property. This buddhi, usurping the role of consciousness 
by capturing the reflection of Purusa, is the empirical self. 
Both bondage, and freedom really belong to buddhi itself. 
Their ascription to Purusa, the transcendental self, is only 
a matter of transferred epithet. Thus the empirical self in 
its very nature is stamped with a note of falsity. Freedom is 
nothing but a realization of this falsity, which is again 
nothing ·b~ the realization of the distinction between the 
material Buddhi and the spiritual Purusa. Thus, bondage is 
~ 
the non-realization of this distinction (a-viveka) and freedom 
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is its realization (vivekakhyati). This realization also 
belongs to buddhi, for Purusa as pure spirit is too dignified 
in its secluded glory to need any realization whatsoever. 
It has lost nothing that it should try to gain back. As the 
supremely unattached being, standing in total indifference 
to anything else, it.is ever free and not in need of attaining 
freedom. 
The most intriguing problem consists in the assumption 
that buddhi is saddled with the responsibility of realizing 
the unattached and secluded nature of the Purusa and hence of 
distinguishing between the material essence of itself and 
the spiritual essence of Puru§a. Purusa itself has no responsibilit 
whatsoever. Constant meditative concentration on this 
distinction makes its realization take a firm root in buddhi, 
which is then no longer subjected to false abolition of 
distinction. But, the point is, does not this realization of 
distinction between matter and spirit require the reflection 
of the transcendental consciousness in buddhi? 
Realization of distinction is consciousness of distinction. 
But, buddhi cannot have any consciousness of its own. It must 
be borrowed from the Purusa in the form of reflection. But 
so long this very reflection has been responsible for obliterating 
the sense of distinction, making it possible for buddhi to 
act as a pretender to consciousness. Now, how should this very 
same reflection act in the opposite way, demolish this 
pretention and throw upon the surface of the false consciousness, 
the distinction?which it has been screening so long? How can 
a false consciousness be conscious of its own falsity? 
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Moreover, buddhi, coming in contact with the external 
world, must go on taking the shapes of external objects · 
(ytttirupa-pariqama) and these shapes of objective transformation, 
attended with feelings of pleasure and pain, must continue 
to be illumined by the reflection of Puru~a. Hence, the 
basic source of confusion between matter and spirit remains 
intact, making it impossible for the realization of distinction 
to dawn upon ~uddhi. If it dawns at all , it will be a queer 
companionship between continuous abolition of distinction and 
continuous emergence of distinction. The Sawkhya has no answer 
to this paradox. The Yoga, on the contrary, has appreciated 
this difficulty and so has assumed that at the .s·4e- of 
asamprajnata samadhi even this viveka-kayati as a form of 
buddhi-vrtti, is stopped. It is to be, then, further assumed 
that asampr~nata samadhi is such a stage, in which buddhi 
has n/~ longer the capacity to capture the reflection of Puru~a. 
Buddhi can catch the reflection only when it goes on transforming 
itself into shapes of objects. In asampra.;'~ata samadhi, all 
vrttis including vivekakhyati, are made to cease altogether 
There is then no objective transformation of buddhi, though a 
subtle form of non-objective transformation is there which 
is not capable of catching the reflection of Purusa (.sadrs'a-
,, "' . . 
parinama-dh~raJ. This is a bold mystic assumption enforced 
by the indispensible need of emancipation. But, the Samkhya 
system proper stops at viveka-khyati and has not the relieving 
feature of a further assumption which Yoga feels it necessary 
to make. 
Thus in final analysis, the empirical self along with the 
attending concept of personality is a false phenomenon in the 
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Samkhya doctrine. In liberation, this personality (and so 
., 
the empirical self) is assumed to be abolished, through 
the realization of falsity, leaving the Purusa to shine 
in its absolute glory, which is however never diminished by 
all the pretentio~ of buddhi. But, the Samkhya cannot thereby 
" 
escape the trap of paradox laid before it .. 
The AV view also fares no better in this respect. It has 
noted the discomfiture of the S~kflya in asserting the basic 
reality of both matter and spirit. If the two are equally 
real, a relation between the two must be maintained somehow. 
If there is no rBlation, what is the need of this unnecessary 
duplication of the real? The Sa~khya connot explain this 
relation or want of relatio~. If the material world is real 
how should its relation with spirit be called false? And if 
this relation is false how can Samkhya maintain the reality of 
"' 
the material world? Hence, to dispense with this difficulty, 
the AV. has dispensed with the world altogether. But has 
the AV. really gained anything by this total dismissal? 
The Sa~khya may say- the material world is too loud to 
be ignored. So we cannot dismiss it at our will. May be 
we cannot satisfactorily explain the nature of relation between 
Veclitll.lt& J , 
matter and spirit, but what right have you~got to dismiss the 
everkicking material world as a false appearance and what do 
v~~ you ultimately gain by it? The difficulty youAseek t~ avoid 
crops up in another form. The AV. then has to assume a 
principle of cosmic illusion which cannot be defined either as 
existent or non-existent. Yet the false world is assumed to 
be a transformation (pari~an1a) of this indefinable and false 
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avidya. Thus, the world is the pari~ma, of avidya and the 
vivarta of Brahman. A false world is superimposed on the 
universal consciousness - the transcendental Brahman. The 
world is thus a false projection of the ~rahman as the 
illusory snake is the false projection of a piece of rope in 
darkness. But why is it that what is false should appear as 
true? Hence, a cosmic principle of eternal illusion is 
postulated. But, if this principle is taken to be a reality, 
the AV. theory goes to pieces, for the Brahman, the One Reality, 
is then faced with an opposite number. To avoid this, it is 
then again assumed that avidya is not a reality. It is neither 
existent nor non-existent. It is inde£inable and so false. 
It amounts to positing a principle which is neither positive 
nor negative (bhavabhava-vilaksana), which is not far from 
saying that it is neither real nor unreal. Thus,Ve~~~ismissal 
of the material world has been more than compensated by the 
affirmation of an indefinable principle leading to the 
affirmation of an indefinable world. In a nutshell, a definite 
material world is replaced by an indefinable material world, 
which is the transformed state of an indefinable principle of 
illusion and a false projection of the One Supreme Real i.e. 
lhe Brahman. If this be an improvement on the Sargkhya view, 
let us not grudge it, but what then about the empirical self? 
It is the same ·samkhya view emerging under the cover of AV . 
• 
technique. The empirical self is jlva which is nothing but 
. . I h..e., 
the reflection of~transcendental consciousness in the Antahkara~a 
a transformed state of avidya (antah-karana-pratibimbita-
'" 
taitanya~ jiva~). According to the S~khya, antah~ara~a is a 
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real material object, while according to the AV. it is an 
indefinable object, being the parioama of indefinable avidya. 
::.._--- . 
Like the Sa~khya view, here also anta{lkaraoa undergoes 
transformation in the shape of presented objects and this 
transformation is also called vrtti ( (Y\...o--olu). This 
p 
antahkarana-vrtti is illumined by the reflection of the 
transcendental consciousness, in order to make for the possibility 
of empirical knowledge. 
Let us leave aside other technical details and concentrate 
on the aspect of personality. The personality belongs to 
the empirical self or the jiva, bu..t not to Brahman. The 
Brahman is the Supreme impersonal Being. The personal is a 
false projection of the Impersonal; through the ephicacy of 
the indefinable ~vidya, which is neither different from nor 
identical with Brahman. Liberation consists in the final 
realization that this personal self is an illusion and that 
basically it is one with the transcendental ;.Brahman. Thus, 
~emancipation is nothing but the _ 
Adepersonalization of the personal self (the empirical jiva). 
When its limitation by antahkarana is surmounted, the person 
a 
disappears into a complete merger with the universal consciousness. 
v'i':~.:st-_. 
But here also the moot question is - how do yourmake for 
the possibility of this depersonalisation? It is said that 
it is·made possible by constant meditation on the meaning of 
such Upanisadic mantras as 'Tattvamasi' (Thou art that). 
, ·----------
The meaning of these mantras, if constantly cultured in 
meditative realization, will lead to the uplift of the veil of 
avid~, which has been so long screening the Brahman from the 
view of the jiva. 'I am that Brahman' (So~ham) - this is the 
·-
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final realization. But, here also the question of questions 
is - whose realization is this? Obviously it should be the 
realization of the empirical jiva. If this is so, this real-
ization also is a form of 'antahkarana vrtti' which is a 
modification of antahkarana, which in its turn is a modification 
of avidya. As such, the realization of 'tattvamasi' or 
so.(ham being a modification (vrtti) of the internal organ 
(antahkarana) which is basically false, must itself be 
ontologically false. Thus, it is a queer case of falsity 
removing falsity. On the one hand the jiva or empirical self 
continues to be affected by the object-shaped transformation 
of antahkarana, on the otherhand, the same jiva is sought to 
. ~ 
be liberated at the same time through the same antahkarana 
undergoing another transformation in the shape of the meaning 
of 'tatt~amasi' etc. This realization of indentity is also a 
matter of the material world, being a modification of the 
material antahkarana. 
Thus, the conclusion settles down to this queer paradox-
a false state of a false material essence helps to falsely 
rescue a false empirical self from a false limitation and helps 
it to identify itself with the true Brahman. Is it a happier 
conclusion than the Sa~khya view? 
Thus, both the Satpkhya and the AV. systems in their 
attempt to rescue the empirical self from the bondage of 
personality and thus to affirm an ever existent freedom 
remaining screened so long have only succeeded in blighting the 
prospects of both liberation and personal confirmation. 
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